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Abstract
ISO 14001 is an environmental management system design standard. Accredited
private auditors (registrars) may be hired to periodically verify that a firm's management
system conforms to the standard's requirements. Many influential companies, such as
IBM, Ford and Toyota, are voluntarily implementing third-party verified management
systems that conform to this standard, and encouraging their suppliers to follow suit.
Thus, ISO 14001 may become a competitive requirement.
Depending on the nature of registered facilities, the impact of adoption on management
objectives, and the credibility of third party oversight, ISO 14001 may have a positive
impact on environmental performance. As a result, state and federal environmental
agencies are debating the use of ISO 14001 registration as a qualifier for regulatory
flexibility. However, the standard lacks performance requirements. Firms are not even
required to be in compliance with environmental law as a condition of registration. This
study therefore asks: What is the appropriate regulatory response to ISO 14001 in the
US ?
A statistical evaluation of adopter-facility characteristics shows that registered sites are
more likely to be large, foreign-owned, registered to ISO 9000, and to operate in
comparatively heavily-regulated, emission-intensive industry sectors. A survey of
registered organizations shows that ISO 14001 will likely have a positive impact on
environmental performance, by stimulating firms to develop more specific and
achievable performance goals, with greater management commitment. A survey of
registrars, however, concludes that third party auditors may be susceptible to conflicts of
interest.
This study concludes that ISO 14001 registration alone is insufficient justification for
granting regulatory flexibility to facilities. It offers suggestions, therefore, for revising the
standard, for enhancing the accountability of registered firms, and for making use of the
standard in regulatory reform initiatives.
Thesis Supervisor: John Ehrenfeld
Senior Research Associate, CTPID
Thesis Supervisor: David Marks
Crafts Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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Introduction
"Competitive pressures in Europe now dictate that automotive companies must become
ISO 14001-certified to sell vehicles."
-- Ford Motor Company webpage, September 1998
"Governments can use environmental management system standards to reduce
enforcement difficulties or [to grant] regulatory relief."
-- Dr. Mary McKiel, Director, EPA Voluntary Standards Network'
"The establishment and operation of an environmental management system will not, in
itself, necessarily result in an immediate reduction of adverse environmental impact."
-- ISO 14001 Specifications, Annex A
The environmental management system standard known as ISO 14001 is rapidly
becoming an international market condition. A non-governmental code of management
practices, the private sector in the US is voluntarily adopting the standard, presumably
to realize competitive benefits. Only two years old as this study is completed, worldwide
there are now over 6,000 registered sites, 200 of which are in the US (Peglau, 1998).
Many are owned by highly influential multinational corporations, such as Ford and IBM.
ISO 14001 offers an uncertain promise: "Improvements in [an organization's]
environmental management system are intended to result in.. .improvements in
environmental performance" (ISO 14001, A.1). Advocates see the management
systems approach as a powerful means for focusing management attention on
environmental issues. Critics point out that ISO 14001 does not require regulatory
compliance as a condition of registration, and that there is no guarantee of a link
between adoption of the standard and improved environmental performance.
Nonetheless, regulators in the US are considering granting some forms of regulatory
relief to organizations that adopt ISO 14001. While literally hundreds of papers and
books have been written on the standard, few in-depth studies have been performed to
better understand the structure of the management system, its impacts on internal
management decisions, and the ability of third-party auditors to verify that changes in
management practice are occurring. Given its potential to impact a broad cross-section
of American industry, ISO 14001 is an important area for public policy study.
Based on the extensive debate underway as to the proper role of ISO 14001 in
regulatory strategy in the US, this study will attempt to answer:
* What is ISO 14001 and how does it work ?
* Who is implementing it and why ? What are the common characteristics of those
firms that have adopted it so far ?
* How is it affecting adopters' internal management decisions in ways that are
important to regulators ?
* Is private third-party registration auditing a credible oversight mechanism ?
1 McKiel, M. US Remarks for UNIDO Expert Group Meeting on the Implications of International Standards of Quality and
Environmental Management Systems for Developing Countries. Unpublished draft. USEPA, 1998:2.
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* Based on the answers to these questions, what are the appropriate regulatory
responses to ISO 14001 ? What is the standard's role in environmental regulation ?
Should the standard itself be modified, and if so, how ?
The body of this report will concern itself with resolving those questions, and identifying
a best course of action for US regulators, as illustrated in Figure 1, below. In chapter 2,
the history and structure of ISO 14001 is briefly summarized, along with the major
critiques against it. Analysis of empirical data from registered companies, in chapter 3,
suggests why some companies find value in registration, with implications for the
diffusion and implementation of the standard. Drawing on the theoretical understanding
of the standard developed earlier in the report, chapter 4 underscores the importance of
goal-setting, and illustrates the impact of adoption on environmental management goals,
through interviews with senior environmental managers from registered organizations.
Chapter 5 explores the ability of third-party registrars to act as a credible oversight
mechanism, ensuring that goals are met, through interviews with accredited US
registrars. Chapter 6 probes the range of regulatory flexibilities legally and implicitly
available to environmental regulators in the US, and summarizes stakeholder interests
with respect to use of ISO 14001 in regulatory reform efforts. Chapter 7 summarizes the
preceding analyses and advances recommendations for preventing misuse of the
standard, as well as for deploying it in regulatory reform efforts.
Impact of Credibility of
Adoption on Ceiiiyo
Management Private Third Party
Objectives Appropriate Role Oversight
of
ISO 14001
in Public Policy
Nature of Companies
Who Have
Adopted Standard
Figure 1. Appropriate Response of the Environmental Regulator to ISO 14001
Depends on:
" The Nature of Registered Companies
" The Impact of Registration on Internal Management Decisions
" The Ability of Private Auditors to Ensure Accountability
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Chapter 1: Regulation and ISO 14001
This chapter will answer, for the purposes of this study, the questions:
" What is regulation ?
* How can different regulatory strategies be evaluated ?
" Based on those metrics, how successful is the prevailing regulatory strategy ?
* What is ISO 14001 and how does it fit into regulatory strategy ?
1.1 Business and the Environment: A Need for Regulation
"Fear, not greed, has driven most corporate environmental policies."
- Frances Cairncross, Author and Economist
A growing chorus of academics, policy makers and private citizens have come to the
conclusion that the current course of human development is unsustainable (Meadows
et. al., 1992 2; Holdren et. al., 19953; WCED, 1987). They point to frightening trends such
as the explosive growth of human population, the widespread deforestation of the
tropics, mass species extinction, the accumulation of anthropogenic chemicals in air,
water, soil and food, and the mounting evidence of global climate change (Suzuki and
Gordon, 1990)4. The role of industrial activity in that degradation, and in the correction of
that course, is pivotal: According to the World Commission on Environment and
Development, "Industry extracts materials from the natural resource base and inserts
both products and pollution into the human environment. It has the power to enhance or
degrade the environment; it invariably does both"(WCED, 1992)5.
According to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, "The old and still
prevailing view of the links between business and the environment is that environmental
protection and profitability are natural opposites."(Schmidheiny, 1992:83). Regulatory
compliance has been regarded as a burden on economic performance. As a result,
environmental efforts by firms have been "designed to meet regulatory requirements
and appease communities, largely as a reactive effort" (Cordeiro and Sarkis,
1997:1056). This relationship may be evolving, as many managers claim to see the
potential for competitive advantage from environmental proactivism, (Schmidheiny,
1992:86) through:
* more efficient processes. & improved productivity.
* lower costs of compliance. * new strategic market opportunities.
* higher employee morale. * Better access to capital.
* public acceptance of corporate activity. * Lower-cost self-regulation
2 Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., and Randers, J. Beyond the Limits: Confronting Global Collapse, Envisioning a
Sustainable Future. Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 1992.
3 Holdren, J.P., Daily, G.C. and Ehrlich, P.R. The Meaning of Sustainability: Bio-Geophysical Aspects. In Munasinghe
and Shearer, eds. Defining and Measuring Sustainability: The Biogeophysical Foundations. Washington, DC:World Bank,
1995.
4 Suzuki, D. And Gordon, A. It's A Matter of Survival. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990:2.
5 World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future. New York: Oxford University Press,
1987:4.
6 Cordeiro, J.J., and Sarkis, J. "Environmental Proactivism and Firm Performance: Evidence From Security Analyst
Eamings Forecasts" in Business Strategy and the Environment, Vol. 6, 104-114, 1997.
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Environmental proactivism has led to the emergence of business concepts such as
design-for-environment, eco-efficiency and product-takeback, and the adoption of codes
of management practice such as Responsible Care, the CERES principles and ISO
14001 (Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997)7. Major manufacturers such as 3M, Sonoco and
Electrolux claim to have reaped substantial benefits from products developed to be
'environmentally-friendly' (Arnst, 1997)8. Firms who market themselves as
environmentally-conscious, such as The Body Shop and Ben & Jerry's Ice Cream, have
enjoyed considerable financial success. Proactivism may even have a beneficial impact
on stock prices and insurance rates: there is some indication that analysts in the
banking and insurance industries are beginning to take into account firms' "compliance
costs, accident history and potential liability' when making investment decisions (Gentry
and Fernandez, 1997:19; see also Leggett, 199610 ).
In spite of these encouraging signs, many question whether market forces and public
opinion are sufficient inducement for firms to adopt environmentally-preferable practices.
While much environmental rhetoric from industry sources touts corporate responsibility,
a 1994 study by KPMG Canada, "reported that 95% of firms cited 'compliance with
regulations' as one of the top five factors motivating environmental improvements. The
next most frequently cited factor at 69% was directors' liability, while factors such as
cost savings, customer requirements and public pressure were cited by less than half of
respondents"(cited in Harrison, 1998:33)1 . Without the intervention of regulation in the
market to bring impacts that were previously 'external' onto a firm's bottom line, the
pursuit of short-term profits would likely be incompatible with long-run sustainability.
In short, the relationship between business and the environment is a complex one, and it
is unclear to what extent managers would modify or rethink practices that impact the
environment without the constraints on action imposed by regulation.
1.2 Regulation: Coordination of Interests Towards Broad Social
Values
What is regulation, and why is it used ? Regulation is an intervention in the market
transactions between private actors, in order to advance the public 'good'. Paraphrasing
Bregman and Jacobson, the purpose of regulation is to "[co-ordinate] the mutual
adjustment of individual [interests] through economic and legal institutions" (Bregman
and Jacobson, 1994)12. Thus, a democratic society such as the United States imposes
regulation upon itself in order coordinate actors' behavior towards maximizing certain
values. A list of such commonly-held values might include social welfare, equity and
dignity, democracy, and sustainability (Weimer and Vining, 1992:77-102).
7 Nash, J and Ehrenfeld, J. Codes of Environmental Management Practice: Assessing Their Potential as a Tool For
change. Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 1997. 22:487-535.
8 Arnst, c. "When Green Begets Green" in Businessweek. 98-103, Nov. 10, 1997.
9 Gentry, B. And Fernandez, L. Valuing the Environment: How Fortune 500 cFOs and Analysts Measure corporate
Performance. Yale center for Environmental Law and Policy, 1997.
10 Leggett, J. Ed. Climate change and the Financial Sector...The Emerging Threat. Munich:Gerling Akademie Verlag,
1996.
1 Harrison, K. Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to Environmental Protection. Unpublished draft, May
1998.
12 Bregman, E., and Jacobson, A. Environmental Performance Review: Self-Regulation in environmental Law. In
Teubner, G., farmer, L. And Murphy, D. Eds. Environmental Law and Ecological Responsibility: The concept and Practice
of Ecological Self-Organization. 207-236, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1994.
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1.3 Getting From Values to Actions: Evaluative Criteria for Regulatory
Strategies
How can regulatory strategies be evaluated ? In order to operationalize social values
such as welfare, equity, democracy and sustainability, regulation constrains behavior
through a variety of policy tools: economic, legal or social. Those constraints should be
as efficient as possible in meeting their goals, be transparent to and perceived as
legitimate by key stakeholders, be adaptable to changing conditions, and above all be
effective, in order to advance the public good they claim to serve (Similar evaluative
criteria for regulation are presented in Harrison, 1998; Laws, 199813; Bohm and Russell,
198514; and Kleindorfer and Orts, 1995).
Effectiveness: The capacity of a regulation to achieve its stated purpose (i.e. improving
air quality). This involves thinking not only of the immediate performance of the
regulated actors, but also the impact of the regulation on the internal values, structures
and procedures of those actors, which may have implications for long-term
effectiveness.
Efficiency: The degree to which a regulation operates "at least resource cost" to
society, or maximizes total welfare (Bohm and Russell, 1985:399). A regulation has four
phases which can be evaluated in terms of efficiency: development, implementation,
monitoring and enforcement.
Transparency: The clarity of the regulations' requirements, both to regulatees and to
other observers. This is the degree to which regulators, regulatees and interested
stakeholders may effectively understand and monitor compliance with the regulation,
and progress towards its underlying goals.
Legitimacy: Regulation "that is not viewed as legitimate is unlikely to be effective, at
least in the long run" because it will be challenged or evaded (Laws, 1998:9). Legitimacy
is derived from the degree to which a regulation is developed and operates consistent
with the principles of democratic accountability, with the Constitution and with the other
fundamental laws of the land (procedural, or 'systemic' legitimacy; see Kleindorfer and
Orts, 1995). Important, too, is the perceived 'fairness' of outcomes resulting from the
regulation, which reflect its impact on the distribution of 'goods' and 'bads' (perceived, or
'empirical' legitimacy, as developed by Kleindorfer and Orts, 1995).
Adaptability: This is a regulation's appropriateness to a variety of environmental,
economic, social and technological conditions, and the ease by which it can be adjusted
to meet changes in those conditions (Bohm and Russell, 1985:400).
In order to attain regulatory objectives, two sub-criteria suggest themselves -
compliance assurance, and comprehensiveness. Ideally, there should be no
opportunity for firms to 'cheat'. Likewise, improved performance in one (regulated) area
should not be invalidated by greater impacts in other (unregulated) areas.
13 Laws, D. Regulatory Design for Sustainability. Unpublished Research Proposal, 1998.
14 Bohm, P., and Russell, c. "comparative Analysis of Alternative Policy Instruments" in Kneese, A.V., and Sweeney,
J.L. eds. Handbook of Natural Resource and energy Economics, vol. 1. Elsevier Publishers, 1985.
15 Kleindorfer, P. And Orts, E. Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks. Wharton Impact Conference,
Philadelphia: Wharton School, October 1995.
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The next two sections will explore the prevailing US regulatory strategy, discuss its
perceived weaknesses with respect to the evaluative criteria presented above, and offer
a range of alternative policy tools.
1.4 Evaluating The Prevailing US Regulatory Strategy
"Because damage costs are externalities but control costs are not, what is cheapest for
a firm is not always cheapest for society as a whole... Firms which attempt unilaterally to
control their pollution are placed at a competitive disadvantage.. .The unimpeded market
fails to generate the efficient level of pollution control.. .Hence, the case for some sort of
government intervention is particularly strong for pollution control."
-Tom Tietenberg, Economist 6
From an economics-based perspective, because the costs of polluting are not
necessarily borne by the sources of that pollution, there is a strong need for pollution
control regulation.
How is regulation designed ?
A generic regulation may be thought of as having four components:
1. A performance standard, or goal.
2. A means for achieving that standard, explaining what needs to be done.
3. A set of information requirements that the regulatee must divulge for monitoring
purposes.
4. An enforcement incentive for complying with the above components, to be carried
out by an enforcer.
Thus, a range of regulatory approaches can be devised, based on differences in:
* Who sets the performance standard (e.g. private actors, the government, or some
combination, perhaps including a broader community of interests), and what
benchmarks are used to establish the standard (e.g. health-based, risk-based,
technology-based, or consensus-based)
" The means for achieving the standard (e.g. approved technologies and actions
required by the regulatee, or policy mechanisms such as emissions taxes or tradable
permits that alter the regulatees' economic incentives).
* The types of information required to be divulged (e.g. means used, confirmation of
compliance, performance data, internal policy statements, or management plans)
and to whom that information is made available (e.g. the government, an external
auditor or industry organization, an environmental advocacy organization, or the
public-at-large)
* The set of enforcement incentives (economic, criminal, civil, public shaming,
boycotts, etc.), and the identity of the enforcer (the market, the government, private
third parties, or the public).
In each case, regulation seeks to modify behavior through impacts on what Kleindorfer
and Orts call the firm's economic, regulatory and social franchises. "If a firm fails to
16 Tietenberg, T. Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, 4th ed. New York: HarperCollins College Publishers,
1996.
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satisfy its economic raison d'etre, it loses its economic franchise and falls into
bankruptcy or dissolution ...A business firm, composed of people, not just balance
sheets, must [also] legitimate itself as a legal and moral entity if it is to continue to enjoy
its social franchise without undue interference from its employees, customers and
neighbors" (Kleindorfer and Orts, 1995:13-4). As Shell International advised incoming
employees in the wake of the Brent Spar incident, "In the face of increasing competition
and social awareness, we must earn our 'license to operate' each day - understanding
the needs not only of our customers, staff and shareholders, but also the communities
with whom we work."' 7
The prevailing US environmental regulatory strategy is based on command and control
rulemaking by the EPA and state environmental agencies. This system is widely
criticized for failing to adequately fulfill the evaluative criteria of efficiency, transparency,
legitimacy, adaptability and effectiveness, in terms of advancing the public good.
The Regulatory System: A Government-Centered Approach
"'Command and Control' refers to a public policy approach that relies on centralized
regulatory commands to implement environmental goals. Governments issue detailed
requirements and follow up with inspections, enforcement and punishment. Command
and control has been the dominant public policy with respect to the environment in the
United States and Europe since the 1970s, when most environmental statutes were
enacted. Command and Control approaches generally take two forms. First,
governments may establish environmental performance standards for companies,
usually enforced through a permit system. Firms that have been issued a permit are
allowed to pollute within limits determined by health-based standards for the ambient
environment. The second approach is to require technology-based controls.
Regulations promulgated under the Clean Water Act, for example, establish industry-
uniform 'best-available technology standards. To obtain an environmental permit,
facilities must have in place the technology defined as the 'best' for their industry under
the law. Violations of performance or technology-based standards may result in civil,
and increasingly, criminal penalties" (Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1987:487-8).
The bulk of US regulation has taken the form of technology-based, rather than
performance-based standards (Steinzor, 1998:114)18. This is attributed to a lack of
fundamental information: "The reason Congress and EPA are compelled to apply
technology-based standards is that there is so little reliable information available to
evaluate, much less quantify, environmental risks"(Steinzor, 1998:114).
Critics agree that technology-based controls have been effective and that "the [US]
environment is generally better in 1997 than it was in 1970", (Davies and Mazurek,
1997:14)'. However, critics argue that such standards are inefficient, in that they may
cause sources to install equipment even where costs exceed benefits and the same
results could be achieved more cheaply by other sources or methods (Steinzor,
1998:114). Second, critics allege that such standards are unnecessarily contentious,
lacking perceived legitimacy. In this view, regulations are frequently challenged
17 Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies. Visions: Recruitment Pamphlet. 1997.
18 Steinzor, R. Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Jourey from command to Self-Control. In Harvard
Environmental Law Review, vol. 22, 1998:103-202.
19 Davies, J.C. and Mazurek, J. Regulating Pollution: Does the US System Work ? Internet Edition. Resources for the
Future, April 1997.
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because they do not adequately involve stakeholders in the rule-making process, thus
failing to secure broad consensus. "Limiting the role of non-agency participants to
adversarial challenges has been an ineffective means of building support for the policy
choices agencies have had to make"(Susskind and McMahon, 1985:136)20. Third, critics
allege a lack of transparency and enforceability. Rules are "complex, contradictory
and essentially unenforceable due to their sheer volume and dense, technical
language.. .Companies [believe] that compliance is impossible and regulators [are]
incapable of undertaking minimal enforcement"(Steinzor, 1998:117). Fourth, critics
allege that command-and-control is inflexible and fragmented, because it regulates on
a medium-by-medium, technology-specific basis (Heaton and Banks, 1997:24)21.
Therefore, it does not prevent the shifting of pollution from one medium to another, and
does not address many sources of pollution (ibid.). It favors existing technologies over
innovative ones, and does not provide adequate incentives for environmental
proactivism and pollution prevention (ibid.). As a result of these failures, it has largely
failed to prevent the emergence of cross-media and transnational problems, such as
global climate change and mass species extinction (Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997:489).
Thus, while successful in reducing many pollution-related threats to human health and
the environment, technology-based standards over-regulate in some areas while under-
regulating in others.
As a result of reliance on technology-based standards by the EPA, the door has been
left open to an unprecedented attack on the nature and application of environmental
regulation. Partly, this attack has been theoretical, arguing that policymakers are
imperfect. "As policy analysts, we should exercise caution in advocating public
intervention into private affairs. Some market failures are too costly to correct; some
distributional goals are too costly to achieve. More fundamentally, we just do not know
how government intervention will work out... Enthusiasm for perfecting society through
public intervention, therefore, should be tempered by an awareness that unintended
consequences will often arise"(Weimer and Vining, 1992:113). Partly, this attack is
ideological: "In the words of best-selling author Phillip Howard, government regulation
represents 'the death of common sense'. [These] critics have complained that the rules
intrude too deeply into the lives of citizens, [in addition to].. .imposing excessive costs
both on the regulated and the regulator...The widespread disdain of government
rulemaking has [thus] fueled a wholesale assault on government regulation"(Kettl,
1997)22.
By "picking up on early critiques of traditional rules articulated by the academic
community, industry representatives and commentators sympathetic to their point of
view [have] increasingly challenged the fundamental premises of command-and-control
as a regulatory strategy. These groups argued that there were far more efficient and
effective ways that were the foundation of EPA's original mission"(Steinzor, 1998). The
Republican 'Contract with America' and the 'Reinvention of Government' effort led by
Vice President Gore are a response to these pressures to reform government and
reduce regulatory inefficiencies (See especially Gore, 199323; also Breger, 199624;
20 Susskind, L. and McMahon, G. The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking. In Yale Journal on Regulation, vol.
3, 1985:133-165.
Heaton, G. and Banks. D. Towards a New Generation of Environmental Technology: The Need for Legislative
Reform.in Journal of Industrial Ecology, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1997.
22 Kettl, D. Regulatory Reform and Public Management: ISO 14000, collaborative Governance, and the States.
fKettI@lafollette.wisc.edu), September 1996.
3 Gore, Vice President Al. Report of the National Performance Review: Creating a Government that Works Better and
Costs Less. 1993.
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Steinzor, 199825). The next section will describe some regulatory strategies that have
been presented as alternatives to technology-based command and control rules.
1.5 Alternative Regulatory Strategies
"The world which we have created today as a result of our thinking thus far has
problems which cannot be solved by thinking the way we thought when we created
them."
- Albert Einstein 26
Command-and-control regulation is based on the concept that private behavior needs to
be constrained towards socially-optimal goals by clear rules and strong coercive
mechanisms, implemented by government. Given the limitations of this approach,
several alternative policy tools are being developed and tested.
According to Kleindorfer and Orts, environmental regulation can take four basic
approaches:
" Person-centered, such as the legal system, which establishes property rights and
relies on private actors to enforce them.
" Government-centered, such as command-and-control regulation, in which
government agencies legislate performance or design requirements for private
actors, and levy financial (civil) and criminal penalties on those who fail to comply.
* Market-centered, such as emission taxes, in which direct economic pressures are
employed to achieve the same ends as legislated requirements.
Institution-centered, such as Right-to-Know laws, which provides third parties with
information on private actors' operations. Such an approach relies to some extent on
social mechanisms such as shame, or fear of future legislation, to induce desired
behavior. This approach can also enhance both person, market and government-
centered approaches.
Two examples of institution-centered regulation are government-private sector voluntary
programs, and privately-developed communitarian regulations.
Voluntary Programs
"Governments can seek to persuade individuals or firms to change their behavior in a
variety of ways.. .[that] are nominally voluntary [but] vary in degree of
coerciveness"(Harrison, 1998:10). The first generation of such approaches include the
performance-based and strongly-sanctioned 'negotiated covenants' (popular in Canada
and the Netherlands), 'voluntary performance challenge programs' such as the EPA's
33/50 and Canada's ARET programs, and education/information dissemination
programs (Harrison, 1998; Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997). "A second generation of [US]
'voluntary' programs.. .focuses directly on 'reinventing environmental regulation' through
such efforts as the Common Sense Initiative, Project XL, and the Environmental
Leadership Program. Each seeks to move environmental regulation beyond single
2 Breger, M. "The Fiftieth anniversary of the administrative Procedure Act: Past and Prologue - Regulatory Flexibility and
the administrative State" in Tulsa Law Journal, winter 1996.
25 Steinzor, R. Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-control in
Harveard Environmental Law revew, 1998.
26 Schmidheiny, S. changing Course: A Global Business Perspective on Environment and Development. Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1992: 82.
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media approaches towards industry sector- or firm-specific cross-media alternatives.
Each would grant some measure of regulatory or compliance flexibility to companies
that commit to superior environmental performance. One criterion for participation in
some of these programs is for firms to have in place "environmental management
systems that establish performance objectives, require continuous improvement, and
integrate environmental concerns into product design and production"(Nash and
Ehrenfeld, 1997:491). An environmental management system standard that is frequently
identified as compatible with this criterion is one based around ISO 14001 (EPA,
199827).
Communitarian Regulation
A different regulatory concept again is the emergence of privately-developed codes of
environmental management practice, absent government involvement. "In contrast to
both the litigation model of person-centered law and government-centered hierarchical
standard-setting, an institution-centered approach may recommend that standards
derive from professional organizations or evolve in terms of 'best practice' standards
within business groups" (Kleindorfer and Orts, 1995:39). Efforts at 'communitarian
regulation' are best exemplified by the Chemical Manufacturers Association's
Responsible Care, the Board of American Forest and Paper Association's Sustainable
Forestry Initiative, and by the ISO 14000 series (Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1997).
"In communitarian regulation, a group of individuals or companies join together to
regulate their collective action and thereby solve a commons problem"(King, et. al.,
1998:1-2)28. In the field of environmental management, such groups seek to limit 'races-
to-the-bottom' for environmental cost advantages: "[A firm] can attempt to create private
regulatory institutions that develop explicit or tacit agreements not to compete along
environmental lines, thus binding its rivals' hands"(Reinhardt, 1998:3)29. Through non-
legal sanctioning mechanisms, such as moral suasion (shame, for example), or threats
of loss of privileges (such as expulsion from an industry organization, as in the Chemical
Manufacturing Association's Responsible Care program), groups may be able to enforce
sufficient discipline that members comply with their own regulation, and in so doing,
improve collective action and reputation (King et. Al, 1998:7).
From a regulatory standpoint, there may be significant benefits to self-regulation. "By
changing values, diffusing information and facilitating negotiation, self regulation can
help coordinate action among member firms and improve collective behavior"(King et.
al., 1998:3). In terms of efficiency and adaptability, it can be argued that since
communitarian regulations are not subject to the procedural requirements of
government debate, and are designed by industry to be compatible with business
interests, they will be easier to modify, and less burdensome than traditional regulation.
By the same token, their effectiveness and therefore their legitimacy may be
questionable: Since "they provide firms with discretionary power in target setting and/or
in monitoring and compliance.. .they give room for strategic behavior by industry... In the
absence of enforcement mechanisms, a firm will try to capture the benefits of making a
voluntary commitment without bearing the corresponding abatement
27 EPA Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems and ISO 14001/DOCID:frl2mr98-64, 1998.
2 King, A., Lenox, M., and Ehrenfeld, J. Communitarian Environmental Regulation: A Study of Responsible Care and the
Chemical Industry. Unpublished draft, 1998.
29 Reinhardt, F. Environmental Product Differentiation: Implications for Corporate Strategy in California Management
Review,(ABI-Inform web-based version) 40(4):43-73, 1998.
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costs"(Leveque, 1997:5,8)". "Without strong coercive mechanisms, communitarian
regulation will fall victim to adverse selection and moral hazard, " as bad actors join to
disguise their poor performance, adopting the form of the standard but shirking the real
effort required (King et. al., 1998:3).
In order to limit strategic behavior, typical prescriptions are (Leveque, 1997:8):
* "involvement of third parties in the process of setting environmental targets.
* a monitoring and reporting system guaranteed by an independent party.
* a credible mechanism of sanction for non-compliance".
Opportunism may also be limited by members' self-interest: "Unfulfilled commitments
may accrue more costs to industry in terms of loss of consumer reputation and of
imposition of onerous regulations, than no commitments. Moreover, it is not in a firm's
interest to enter a voluntary agreement that is not credible to public opinion and the
public authorities, for it then runs the risk of incurring costs associated with the
agreement without gaining any benefits"(Leveque, 1997:8). Thus, in spite of what might
be regarded as weak coercive mechanisms, communitarian regulation offers a
potentially valuable tool in the advancement of the public good.
1.6 ISO 14001: Communitarian Regulation with Public Policy Potential
1.6.1 What is ISO 14001 ?
The emergence of ISO 14001 may be viewed as an international, multi-industry effort at
communitarian environmental regulation, and may have an important role to play in the
US EPA's effort at reinventing its own regulatory programs. The following sections will
explore these two assertions.
"The ISO 14000 series of standards extends the [quality] management systems
approach first pioneered in the International Organization for Standardization's ISO
9000 series to the field of environmental management"(Roht-Arriaza, 1997). In
particular, the ISO 14001 standard provides firms in all fields with a common framework
for establishing an independently-verifiable environmental management system, or
EMS. This framework is based on the notion of quality management, a concept which
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. In brief, quality management recognizes
that it is competitively beneficial for an organization to minimize waste and defects, and
deliver as nearly as possible exactly to the customer's specifications. Since improving
quality requires efforts at all levels of the organization, quality management requires a
comprehensive, or 'systems' approach, where all efforts are directed towards continually
improving not only the products themselves, but the processes through which the
products are developed, made, serviced and disposed. An efficiency-oriented 'systems'
approach like this clearly has subsidiary environmental benefits. For example, waste
minimization and pollution prevention are overlapping, though not completely parallel,
concepts.
30 Leveque, F. Voluntary Approaches for the Improvement of Environmental Performance. Prepublication draft in
convery, F. And Ekins, P. The policy research services on market based instruments for sustainable development.
Edward Elgars Pub., 1997.
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By placing an explicit focus on environmental management, ISO 14001 seeks to raise
consideration of environmental issues in all aspects of an organization's operation. The
ISO 14001 standard requires organizations to establish a rational procedure for setting
environmental policy goals and implement plans for achieving them. To do so, the
organization must commit to comply with relevant regulations, to prevention of pollution
and to continually improving the management system itself, which includes both
demonstrating progress towards the underlying policy goals, and ensuring that those
goals are appropriate to changing business conditions. Thus, an organization must
commit to periodic revision of the system in order to improve its information gathering,
its evaluation of the information's significance, its goals, and the means to achieving
those goals. Independent registration audits, by ISO-accredited registrars, ensure to
outsiders that an organization has a systematic management structure for managing its
environmental impacts, and is following through on internal environmental commitments.
An important issue is whether ISO 14001 will become widely used. In the 1970's, the
ISO developed and promulgated its quality management standards, ISO 9000, which
have since been adopted by over 130,000 organizations worldwide (Symonds, 199631).
Today, these standards are a de facto business requirement in several industries
internationally, including automobile manufacture and microelectronics. ISO 14001 was
published in 1996, and has since been adopted by over 6,000 firms worldwide, over 200
of which are in the United States (Peglau, 1998)32. Should ISO 14001 take the same
course to widespread diffusion as ISO 9000, it may have a dramatic impact on corporate
environmental practices. Indeed, one study by the Global Environmental Technology
Foundation asserts that "at least 150,000 firms will be registered" by 2002, based on
current market trends, representing implementation expenditures on the order of US$20
billion (GETF, 1997)33. Presumably, non-registered firms would be at a competitive
disadvantage for failing to have their 'environmental affairs' in order, similar to the
experience of non-ISO 9000 firms in the early 1990's, who found their industrial
customers requiring certification as a condition of further business (Rabbitt and Bergh,
1994:37)31
In the US, "companies have been quick to embrace the concept of environmental
management systems.. .but they have been slow to take the final steps to
registration"(Sissell, 1998:43)3s. However, there is credible evidence that, in the
chemical, microelectronics and automobile manufacturing industries at least, ISO 14001
is becoming very common, and may someday become a supplier requirement. For
example, "the number of chemical companies in the UK, France, Italy, Germany and the
Netherlands registered to...ISO 14000 is forecast to increase from 156 to more than
600 within the next three years, according to the respective chemical associations
(CWA, 199836). IBM, GM and Honda are all encouraging their suppliers to seek ISO
14001 registration (see figure 1.61, below).
While both ISO 14001 and ISO 9000 seek to benefit an adopter-firm's financial bottom
line, there are two key distinctions between the standards. One is a difference in scope:
31 Symonds, J. Mobil Survey of ISO 9000-registered Firms. TQM-Mobil Europe, Tel. +44 171 412 4897, December,
1995.
32 Peglau, R. The Number of ISO 14001/EMAS Certification of the world. ISOworld website:
www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld/english/analy14.gif. 31 March, 1998.
3 GETF. ISO 14000 Market Summary. GlobeNet webpage www.getf.org. Nov 1997.
34 Rabbitt, J. And Bergh, P. The ISO 9000 Book, 2d ed. New York: Quality Resources, 1994.
3 Sissell, K. Behind the Scenes, US companies Prepare for Certification. Chemical Week. 160(13), April 8, 1998:43.36 Chemical Week Associates. Strong Forecast for ISO 14000. In Chemical Week, September 23, 1998:6.
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while quality management focuses its attention on the interests of the customer,
environmental management broadens the scope to include interested private third
parties, environmental regulators, and potentially, ecosystems. As a result, measuring
benefits is different between standards: the impact of quality management on customer
satisfaction in a private two-party transaction can more clearly be measured than the
impact of environmental management, since 'the environmental customer' includes not
only the direct purchaser, but also a diffuse group of environmentalists, community
members and government employees. Thus, it may be possible for a company to
determine the 'optimal' level of quality for its needs, but it may not be possible for it to
achieve similar certainty in the environmental context. Companies would therefore like to
know how they can capture value from implementing ISO 14001. Similarly, regulators
would like to know if there will be a link between the diffusion of this standard and broad-
based improvements in industrial environmental performance. The next sections will
explore these issues.
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Global Procurement
ISo 14001
April 13, 1998
Dear Supplier:
IBM has had a long standing commitment to environmental leadership around the world, and its
record demonstrates this commitment. For over 25 years, the company's environmental affairs
policy has provided the framework for its Environmental Management System (EMS). Central to
implementation of IBM's EMS are its environmental policy, programs, and performance. These
are discussed in our annual environmental report, which can be found on IBM's internet site at
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/environment. Recently, IBM earned a single worldwide registration
under the new international standard for environmental management systems, ISO 14001.
ISO 14001 is a voluntary standard that identifies the elements of an EMS necessary for an
organization to effectively manage its impact on the environment. The ultimate objective of the
standard is to integrate EMS with an organization's overall business processes and systems so
that environmental considerations are a routine factor in business decisions, recognizing that
good environmental management makes good business sense.
IBM's commitment to environmental leadership includes doing business with
environmentally responsible suppliers, and its contracts require that you comply with all
applicable laws and regulations in the work you do for IBM. The company is investigating
opportunities to further integrate sound environmental management throughout its supply chain.
IBM encourages you to align your EMS with the requirements of ISO 14001 and to pursue
registration under this international standard. This message comes in light of the increasing
worldwide interest in environmental affairs and as part of IBM's overall ISO 14001 strategy. We
are interested in doing business with environmentally responsible suppliers, and also believe that
such registration can be of benefit to you.
Should you have any questions regarding IBM and ISO 14001, please direct them to your
procurement representative or Tracy Harwin at (914) 766-2698 or e-mail:harwin@us.ibm.com.
Sincerely,
Javier Urioste
Director of Policy, Strategy and International Operations
IBM Global Procurement
Figure 1.6.1 IBM Letter to Suppliers, Encouraging ISO 14001 Adoption
(emphasis added)
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1.6.2 Why are Companies Interested in ISO 14001 ?
"International standards covering environmental management are intended to provide
organizations with the elements of an effective environmental management system
which can be integrated with other management requirements, to assist organizations to
achieve environmental and economic goals.. .A system of this kind enables an
organization to establish, and assess the effectiveness of, procedures to set an
environmental policy and objectives, achieve conformance with them, and demonstrates
such conformance to others"
-- ISO 14001, Introduction
"Instead of asking whether it pays to be green, we ought to be asking about the
circumstances under which it might pay."
--Forest Reinhardt, Harvard Business School
According to the International Institute of Sustainable Development, "ISO 14001 can fill
two requirements in an organization. The first is the internal need for a system that will
help the organization address all of the legal, commercial and other challenges related
to the environment that face it today. The second is the need to be able to assure to
those outside the company that the company is meeting its stated environmental
policies"(IISD, 1996:5").
What rationale do firms use to justify their adoption of ISO 14001 ? A recent UK survey
of more than 500 companies in France, Germany the Netherlands and the UK,
"indicated that external concerns - such as compliance with legislation, improved market
share, customer recognition and public recognition - were most responsible for
convincing these companies to implement such EMS standards as ISO 14001 and
EMAS" (cited by OECD, 1998:17). A similar study by the Japan Accreditation Board of
ISO 14001-registered companies indicates a focus towards external benefits as well
(see below).
Improved company image 82.0
Social responsibility 76.3
Improved competitiveness 50.7
Instructed to obtain certification by holding or parent 32.7
company
Reduced costs 14.4
Improved market position or greater market share 13.3
As link to eco-business 9.4
Urging of industrial association 6.8
Source:(JNC, 1998:3)"
Table 1.6.2 Japanese Accreditation Board Survey of ISO 14001-Registered Firms
Suggests that Improved Reputation is the Primary Driver of Adoption.
3 I1SD. Global Green Standards. Web-based version, 1997:5.
38 Japanese National committee for ISO/TC 207/SC1 (JNC). Implementation of ISO 14001: Japanese Experience and
Expectation. 1998
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In summary, it appears that while there a wide variety of rationales that could be guiding
firms' adoption of ISO 14001, the leading causes are related to reputational benefits
from third-party registration.
1.6.3 Why is the Regulator Interested in ISO 14001 ?
When evaluating ISO 14001 as a possible instrument of public policy, the regulator is
seeking improvements in regulatory performance, as measured against the prevailing
system of command-and-control regulation.
Several groups, including both the Aspen Institute and the National Environmental
Policy Institute, have proposed creating an alternative track to the command-and-control
regime, for firms who demonstrate a commitment to superior environmental
performance (Feldman, 1997:15; Aspen, 1997). Non-qualifying firms would still be
required to meet all command-and-control requirements. By contrast, qualifying firms
would be granted a degree of compliance enforcement flexibility, reduced inspections,
expedited permits, and other benefits. Some proponents argue that ISO 14001 might
provide the basic qualification for participation in the 'alternative path' (Feldman,
1997:1439; Kettl, 1996:740). Thus, in exchange for regulatory incentives, firms would be
required to implement an EMS conforming to ISO 14001, undergo periodic third party
registration audits, and potentially disclose certain measures of environmental
performance.
Creating an alternative regulatory track with ISO 14001 as its keystone has the potential
to reduce regulatory burden on industry and use limited regulatory resources more
effectively, relative to command and control. First, assuming that independent third-party
registration proves to be a credible oversight mechanism, it may be possible for
regulators to reduce their monitoring and oversight of registered firms (MacArthur and
Bellen, 1998:541). "Environmental management system provided information [may]
prompt government to do less, saving public dollars, and to require less - wasted work
and reporting - of the firm, improving efficiency"(Meyer, 1997:84). This may also free up
regulatory resources that may be devoted towards monitoring environmental laggards
and assisting small-to-medium size enterprises (SMEs), who lack the resources to
implement a systematic EMS (Feldman, 1997:1242).
Regulatory experience with the ISO 14001 standard is limited, but a concerted effort is
underway to better understand its implementation and potential impacts. The EPA and
the Multi-State Working Group, a collection of state regulators, environmental advocacy
organizations and universities, are collaborating with several companies on over 100
pilot projects in 10 states (Meyer, 1997:85)43. The Group will collect data from all sites in
an attempt to determine the impact of ISO 14001 certification on environmental
39 Feldman, I. ISO 14000 can Underpin a New Dual Track Regulatory System in Environmental Businesss Journal,
January 1997:11-15.
40 Ketti, D. Regulatory Reform and Public Management: ISO 14000, collaborative Governance, and the States, Working
Paper, Brookings Institution, 1996.
41 MacArthur, J. And Bellen, G. "ISO 14001 in State Regulatory Offices: A survey of Activities" web-based summary
available at www.nsf-isr.org, 1998.
42 Feldman, I. "ISO 14000 Can Underpin a New 'Dual-Track' Regulatory System" in Environmental Business Journal, 11-
15, January 1997.
43 Meyer, G. Adam Smith, the States, and the Financial Eco-Metric Imperative. In Environmental Quality Management,
Winter 1997:81-91.
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performance. The EPA has also played a lead role at the ISO meetings, in the
development of many of the standards (McKiel, 1998).
Abroad, the Japanese and South Korean governments have required registration of
many companies (Daugherty, 1998 44; Auerbach, 199845; Howe, 1998 46). According to
Eric Turner, an EHS director at Arthur D. Little in Brussels, "'Demand for ISO 14000 has
skyrocketed in Asia as a way of lending credence to a company's environmental
performance in a region perceived to have lax environmental laws"'(Sissell, 1998:43).
Industrial pilot projects are underway in nations as diverse as Singapore, Korea, China,
and Brazil (UNCTAD, 1997). In Canada, a Provincial Judge ordered an out-of-
compliance electronics manufacturer to obtain ISO 14001 certification as part of his
ruling (Cutter, October 1998:347). In Germany, some regulatory flexibility has been
authorized for firms demonstrating ISO 14001 certification and who additionally publish
detailed performance data (Cutter, September 1998:2)48. Finally, many federal agencies
in the US and other OECD countries are experimenting with implementing the standard
in their own facilities (Taylor and Lusser, 1998)49.
1.7 Policy Question: What Is The Proper Role Of ISO 14001 In US
Regulatory Strategy ?
The preceding analysis has defined regulation, offered criteria for evaluating regulatory
strategies, and explored briefly the range of strategies available. ISO 14001 has been
presented as a form of communitarian regulation, being adopted by private actors for a
variety of reasons. Regulators are interested in the standard because it presents an
opportunity to advance environmental protection through an alternative approach to
command and control regulation. The remainder of this study will attempt to respond to
the following policy question: What is the proper response from regulators to ISO
14001?
1.8 Research Questions and Structure of Report
In order to resolve the policy question posed in the preceding section, several issues
must be addressed. First, should ISO 14001 even be part of regulatory strategy ?
* What is ISO 14001 and how does it work ?
* Who is implementing it and why ? What does that tell us about the likely diffusion of
the standard ? What about likely impacts on the environment ?
" How are companies implementing the standards ? What impact does it have on
internal management decisions ?
* What is the role and value of third-party registration to the regulator ?
44 Daugherty, R. Director of Business development, BVQI. Interview, Oct. 7, 1998.
45 Auerbach, B. KEMA. Interview, Oct. 9,1998.
46 Howe, R. DNv. Interview, Nov 1, 1998.
47 Cutter Corporation. "Canadian Court Orders Cortec to Implement ISO 14001" in Business and the Environment's ISO
14000 Update. October, 1998.
48 Cutter Corporation. "German Agreement Offers Regulatory Relief for EMAS Participants" in Business and the
Environment's ISO 14000 Update. September, 1998.
49 Taylor, D. And Lusser, H. OECD Workshop on Environmental Management Systems for Government Agencies: Issues
Paper. Stockholm, Sweden, January 1998.
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Second, assuming there is a role to be played by ISO 14001 in regulatory strategy, what
types of regulatory flexibility can the EPA actually give ? How can regulatory strategies
be crafted around ISO 14001, given legal requirements and stakeholder demands ?
This study will focus on indirect methods of evaluating ISO 14001. There are two
primary reasons for this research strategy. Because this standard is so new, there is
insufficient data to adequately test the impact of registration on environmental
performance. Next, the focus of this standard is on a systems approach to
environmental management. Environmental performance improvements are a hoped-for
derivative benefit of improving the management system itself. It is therefore difficult to
define how to measure environmental performance in a convincing way that does justice
to the systems approach.
The structure of this report is as follows: Chapter 1 defined a set of criteria for evaluating
regulatory strategies, and introduced ISO 14001 as a communitarian regulation, with a
potentially high value to US environmental regulators. In chapter 2, the history and
structure of ISO 14001 is briefly summarized, along with the major critiques against it.
Analysis of empirical data from registered companies, in chapter 3, suggests why some
companies find value in registration, with implications for the diffusion and
implementation of the standard. Drawing on the theoretical understanding of the
standard developed earlier in the report, chapter 4 underscores the importance of goal-
setting, and illustrates the impact of adoption on environmental management goals,
through interviews with senior environmental managers from registered organizations.
Chapter 5 explores the ability of third-party registrars to act as a credible oversight
mechanism, ensuring that goals are met, through interviews with accredited US
registrars. Chapter 6 probes the range of regulatory flexibilities legally and implicitly
available to environmental regulators in the US, and summarizes stakeholder interests
with respect to use of ISO 14001 in regulatory reform efforts. Chapter 7 summarizes the
preceding analyses and advances recommendations for preventing misuse of the
standard, as well as for deploying it in regulatory reform efforts.
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT24
ISO 14000
Chapter 2: What is ISO 14001 and How Does It Work ?
This chapter will explain the importance and development of international standards,
and explore the international standardization of independently verifiable quality
management systems. It will then describe the development of ISO 14001, which was
officially promulgated in September of 1996. The roles of the key players and the
structure of the ISO environmental management system will be described. The chapter
will conclude with the major procedural and substantive critiques that have been levied
against ISO 14001, and an indication of likely changes to the standard in years to come.
2.1 A History of International Standards and Quality Management
International standards play an important role in ensuring product compatibility and
facilitating international trade. The International Organization for Standardization is the
key actor in the development of these standards. The following section will describe the
formation and evolution of international standards, from product-focused to process-
focused, culminating in standardized management systems.
2.1.1 International Standards: Facilitating International Trade
"The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) is a worldwide federation
founded in 1947 to promote the development of international manufacturing, trade and
communication standards. ISO is composed of national standards bodies from 118
countries"(Cascio, 1996:450). Decisions are taken on a 'consensus' basis, in which no
party strongly objects to the proposed standard (Hauselmann, 1997). During the
standard development process, the ISO receives input from government, industry and
other interested parties. "All standards are voluntary; no legal requirements compel
countries to adopt them. However, governments and industries do often adopt the
standards as business requirements, thereby making them virtually mandatory"(Cascio,
5, CEEM).
"Standards play an essential role in supporting economic activity. They convey
structured information to both producers and purchasers concerning the characteristics
they may expect of a product, system, material, methodology or production
process... Not only do standards play a key role in facilitating transactions on the market
place since they reduce transaction costs, but they are also key in ensuring technical
compatibility amongst products"(OECD, 1998:7). International-level standards have the
additional goal of facilitating international trade by harmonizing national standards. This
enables a producer to achieve greater economies of scale by manufacturing a product
that can be sold in a variety of national markets. It follows that the key problems posed
by standardization are their potential to limit competition, to prevent market access to
non-standardized competitors, and thus to stifle innovation (OECD, 1998:9).
Because of the dangers of technological lock-in and reduced competition, standards
have evolved away from design and performance standards, towards system-wide, or
'generic', standards. Underlying generic standards is the belief that "the quality of an
economic output is closely linked to the quality of the economic organization providing
50Cascio, J. CEEM, 1996.
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT 25
the good... [Thus] generic standards.. .determine the process an organization should
develop and follow, to achieve a certain qualitative performance"(OECD, 1998:9).
Generic standards have three common features (Uzumeri and Tabor, 1997:5):
1. An 'abstract' approach: rules for designing the system, but not specific requirements.
2. A 'paper trail: rules for documenting procedures and performance.
3. Option of third-party audits.
Returning to the history of the ISO, then, until the 1970's, its work was largely technical,
focussing on product specifications for such things as credit cards and screws. In 1979,
the ISO began to focus on underlying management systems, culminating in the
publication of the ISO 9000 series of standards regarding quality management and
quality assurance. The following section will present quality management, and explain
how the ISO 9000 quality management standard became an international business
requirement, based on third-party registration.
2.1.2 Quality Management: Improving Process to Improve Performance
"Listen to me, and in five years you will be competing with the West. Keep listening, and
soon the West will be demanding protection from you."
-- W. Edwards Deming, speaking to 45 key Japanese industrialists at a seminar in
195051
"Constantly and forever improve the system"
-- Deming's Fourteen Principles52
A firm has a 'competitive advantage' when a customer views that firm's product as
having higher value than that of its competitors (Flynn and Flynn, 1996:365).
Competitive strategy theory argues that firms seek competitive advantages for their
product relative to their competitors through two avenues, price and differentiation. "The
lower costs advantage is defined as the ability to more efficiently design, manufacture
and distribute a comparable product than the competition. Products with unique and
superior value - in terms of quality, features and after-sales service - are examples of
the differentiation competitive advantage" (Flynn and Flynn, 1996:361)53.
The notion of quality is thus of key interest to firms seeking competitive advantage.
Attaining quality is defined as maximizing "the fitness of use" of the product or service to
its customer (Juran and Gyrna, 1988:1)54. Proponents believe that greater quality - in
the form of fewer defects, faster delivery time, and reduced operation, maintenance and
disposal costs to the customer - leads to lower costs to the producer and greater
customer satisfaction, and therefore increased perceived value. It follows that the
51 Rabbit, J And Bergh, P. The ISO 9000 Book: A Global Competitor's Guide To Compliance And certification, 2d Ed.
New York: Quality Resources, 1994:5.
52 Scherkenbach, w. The Deming Route To Quality And Productivity: Road Maps And Road Blocks. Rockville: Mercury
Press, 1982.
5 Flynn, E And Flynn, B. "Achieving Simultaneous cost And Differentiation Competitive Advantages Through continuous
Improvement: world Class Manufacturing As A Competitive Strategy In Journal Of Managerial Issues, vol. 3, No. 3, Fall
1996:360-379.
54 Juran, J. And Gyrna, F. Quality Planning And Analysis: From Product Development Through Use, 2d Ed.New York:
McGraw-Hill, 198?.
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purpose of quality management is to achieve 'zero defects', and in so doing, eliminate
all costs extraneous to producing and delivering exactly what the customer wants.
Managers traditionally have concentrated their efforts on the products and activities
within factory walls. Improving quality, by contrast, is a multi-stage process, from
conception and design, through manufacture, sales and service. Achieving greater
quality therefore requires a 'systems' approach to the entire operation, including the
employees, customers and suppliers. Central to the systems approach is the notion of
continual improvement. This means that the product, the process whereby it is
produced, and the servicing of that product, must be continuously monitored and
improved upon. Quality organizations operate according to the 'Deming Cycle': Plan -
Do - Check - Act. Under a quality management framework, a business must
continuously "ensure good control of critical business activities according to plan, check
whether the predetermined requirements are being met and, where necessary, make
corrections"(Hortensius and Barthel, 1997:32)55. Key to control is the specification of a
policy by top management, training at all levels, documentation of procedures, and
continual monitoring of progress towards goals (Juran and Gyrna, 1988).
American quality pioneers Deming and Juran were unsuccessful at diffusing this notion
of quality management to US manufacturers. Quality did however find a ready ear in
Japan, in companies such as Toyota and Honda (Rabbitt and Bergh, 1994). Moving
from 'cheap clocks and radios' to dominate many high technology and manufacturing
markets, Japanese firms were extraordinarily successful in the 1970s and '80's. Their
products have become widely respected for their performance. Firms that were initially
reluctant to adopt quality management practices saw diminished market shares.
Producers came to require quality management of their suppliers, as a logical extension
of their own quality focus. A tremendous demand for quality management
implementation know-how therefore rapidly developed worldwide.
The US automobile industry provides an illustrative example of the diffusion of quality
management: "In 1979, the Ford Motor Company recalled more cars than it
produced"(Rabbitt and Bergh, 1994:5). Soon afterward, Ford executives called on Dr.
Deming, and by 1985, Ford had dramatically reduced defects, and surpassed far-larger
General Motors in earnings (Rabbitt and Bergh, 1994:6). Today, Ford advertises that
"Quality is Job #1". In fact, all of the US Big Three - GM, Chrysler and Ford - have
adopted quality management systems, and require them (QS-9000) of their suppliers as
well (ULI,1997:20)56.
Many standards for quality management emerged in the early 1980s. In order to assist
manufacturers in more readily identifying consistent quality programs in suppliers, the
national standards body of the United Kingdom developed a national, independently
verifiable quality management standard. Many other nations rapidly followed suit. In
order to prevent conflict and market barriers arising from these standards, in 1979 the
ISO formed Technical Committee 176 (TC 176) to develop global standards for quality
management (Tibor and Feldman, 1997:17). The ISO 9000 standards were formally
published in 1987, and have since become de facto market requirements in several
55 Hortensius, D. And Barthel, M. "Beyond 14001: An Introduction To The ISO 14000 Series", In Sheldon, c., Ed. ISO
14001 And Beyond: Environmental Management Systems In The Real world. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 19-44,
1997.
56 Underwriter's Laboratories Inc. (Uli), Ul's Global Services. Promotional Pamphelet, 1997.
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sectors, including the automobile and microelectronics industries, with over 130,000
registered facilities worldwide (Tibor and Feldman, 1997:18; Symonds, 199617).
But what does 'registration' really mean, in the context of management systems ?
2.1.3 Independent Registration: Proof of Quality ?
"Quality is not fixed: it may change over time either with changes in the level of human
capital or the amount of input effort. Because the quality of services may vary over time,
providing reliable information about their quality directly may be impractical.. .A common
policy approach is to license or certify providers who meet some standards of skill,
training, or experience"(Weimer and Vining, 1992:176)58
"ISO 9000 is proof of your commitment to quality in the form of independent assessment
and registration... Registration will provide your customers with the assurance that
products and services delivered meet or exceed their expectations."
- SGS Intentional Certification Services, 199859
A significant advantage of ISO 9000 over 'homegrown' quality management systems is
that it allows independent verification of an organization's claim to operate according to
internationally-accepted practices. The independent registration (or 'certification', in the
European terminology) audit demonstrates to customers and other interests that the
ISO standards are being implemented consistently. "Certification services 'guarantee'
minimum quality standards in processes or products.. .[For example], the Better
Business Bureau requires members to adhere to a code of 'fair business practices'.
Underwriters Laboratory tests products against minimum fire safety standards before
giving its seal of approval. When such services establish their own credibility, they help
producers distinguish their goods satisfying the minimum standards from goods that do
not" (Weimer and Vining, 1992:74). Registration saves a manufacturer the cost of
verifying for itself that suppliers have proper management practices in place,
disadvantaging non-registered suppliers. "If a European manufacturer has four
equivalent suppliers, three in Europe certified to ISO 9000 and one non-certified location
in the US, do you think it would spend $5,000 to send a review team to the US just to
maintain another supplier?"(Rabbitt and Bergh, 1994:36)
What is the registration process ? Registrars, accredited according to guidelines set by
the national standards organizations of each participating country, will periodically
review documents, interview personnel, and inspect the registered sites, to determine
whether the organization's management system conforms to the requirements spelled
out in the ISO 9000 standards. If so, they may allow firms to display their endorsement,
or 'mark of conformity'. "A mark of conformity is an indication that the item is in
conformance with a specific standard, and its use is granted exclusively as a result of
the certification process...In its most basic sense, conformity assessment is simply
confirmation that something does what it is supposed to do"(Urman, CEEM:347, 346)60.
Registration of a management system to international quality standards plays an
important role in international trade, by providing some measure of evidence that a firm
57 Symonds, J. Mobil Survey Of ISO 9000-Registered Firms. Tqm-Mobil Europe, Tel. +44 171 412 4897, December,
1995.
58 Weimer, D. And vining, A. Policy Analysis: Concepts And Practice, 2d Ed., 1992.
59 SgS IcS. ISO 9000 - The Sign Of Good Business. Promotional Material, 1998.
60 Urman, J. "Conformity Assessment" In CEEM.
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is sincere about improving the quality of its products. The following section will explore
the application of quality management and international standards to the field of
environmental management.
2.2 The ISO and Environmental Management
"While quality management systems deal with customer needs, environmental
management systems address the needs of a broad range of interested parties and the
evolving needs of society for environmental protection."
-- ISO 14001, Introduction
ISO 14000 was conceived to address public policy concerns relative to the environment.
In preparation for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Swiss industrialist Stephan Schmidheiny had been asked to prepare business advice for
the summit. His organization, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
approached the ISO and the IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission) "because
of their well-known consensus process in developing [management system]
standards.. .asking to see what they were doing in the area of environmental
management" (Cascio, 12, CEEM). "In August 1991, ISO and IEC established the
Strategic Advisory Group on the Environment (SAGE) to make recommendations
regarding international standards for the environment"(Cascio, 12, CEEM).
SAGE considered three issues:
1. Developing a "common approach" to environmental management similar to quality
management.
2. Measuring environmental performance.
3. Using international standards to facilitate trade and remove trade barriers.
SAGE was explicitly told not to consider performance criteria such as pollutant or risk
levels, technology specifications, or product/process criteria.
SAGE's work produced a series of recommendations for environmental management
that were incorporated into Agenda 21 and the Rio Declaration. SAGE also
recommended that the ISO continue with the development of a "uniform international
environmental management system standard"(Cascio, CEEM, 12) that "would extend
the Quality Management Systems approach to include environmental
management.. .and help settle international trade disputes centered around
environmental concerns"(OECD,1998:12,13).
In January, 1993, Technical Committee 207 was given the task of "standardizing the
field of environmental management tools and systems"(Cascio, 13, CEEM). This work
became very important as numerous national and international standards had already
been promulgated or would be shortly, such as the British Standards Organization's BS
7750 EMS and the European Commission's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS), among others. An ISO-based EMS standard would prevent duplicative,
competitive and trade-distorting corporate and government programs, and perhaps
create a means "to garner objective validation of industry commitment to effective
environmental management"(Cascio, 13, CEEM) through independent registration.
The ISO 14000 series comprises about 20 documents, ranging from specification
standards (auditable requirements) and guidance documents (descriptive guidelines on
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how to implement and coordinate the specifications) to more general guides and
technical reports (summarizing best practices, such as ISO Guide 64 -- Guide for the
inclusion of Environmental Aspects in Product Standards). Conformance of a firm's
Environmental Management System (EMS) to the ISO 14001 standard is the only part of
the series that can be independently audited. ISO 14004 offers greater detail and
guidance to implementing ISO 14001, but is not an auditable requirement. ISO 14010,
ISO 14011 and ISO 14012 are guides to auditing and auditing management systems in
particular. Other components of the standard include Life Cycle Assessment (ISO
14040, published in August 1997), Environmental Performance Evaluation,
Environmental Labeling, and Environmental Aspects of Product Standards (all still under
debate).
On September of 1996, the Environmental Management System (EMS) portions of the
ISO 14000 standard were published. Even before the standards were finalized, many
organizations were self-declaring their conformance (Roht-Arriaza, 1997:7). On January
3, 1996 , SGS-Thompson Microelectronics in Rancho Bernardo, California, became the
first ISO 14001-registered US manufacturer. Today, there are over 200 registered sites
in the US, and almost 6,000 worldwide (Peglau, 1998).
Process Oriented Standards Prod uct-Oriented Standards
Environmental Management System* Life Cycle Assessment
(ISO 14001)
Environmental Performance Evaluation** Environmental Labeling**
Environmental Auditing Environmental Aspects in Product Standards**
Used to implement, measure and revise Used to analyze and characterize product
management system attributes
* Auditable components. ** Unpublished, still under debate.
(adapted from Cascio, CEEM:16)
Figure 2.2 The ISO 14000 Standards: Only EMS May Be Independently Audited
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2.3 How Does ISO 14001 Work ?
2.3.1 Overview
"Using ISO 14001 ...requires the creation of a system, a management programme, with
appropriate resources, to deliver the commitments and policy, objectives and targets set
by the organization.. .Assuming third-party certification of the organization, there will be
an independent check that what has been agreed and planned has been implemented,
is audited and problems identified and remedied"
- O.A. Dodds, Chairman of ISO/TC 207 SCI, Environmental Management Systems
"An EMS is only the casing: The real issue is whether what is inside is real or is just
paper effort."
-Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Hastings College of Law, University of California
ISO 14001 presents a framework for an environmental management system, or EMS. In
brief, it is a structure for an organization to set and achieve environmental goals -
meeting regulatory requirements, reducing liabilities, or reducing environmental impacts
- within the context of other business management systems (e.g. financial management,
human resources management, or quality management). "International Standards
covering environmental management are intended to provide organizations with the
elements of an effective EMS which can be integrated with other management
requirements, to assist organizations to achieve environmental and economic goals"
(ISO/DIS 14001.2, v).
Based on a firm's goals, the EMS allocates responsibility and resources, establishes
procedures, performance metrics and timetables, and specifies the collection and flow of
internal and external information. Organizations have the option of self-declaring their
conformance to the standard, or seeking third-party registration. Before giving their
approval of the management system, registrars audit to ensure that each element is in
place, is linked to the achievement of the organization's goals and conforms to the
standard. The standard does not set performance requirements, or make judgements
as to the appropriateness or preferability of some types of action over others (Ehrenfeld,
1995:3)2.
The design of ISO 14001 reflects four objectives (Cascio, CEEM):
1. To manage the environmental aspects of business operation reliably and consistently,
using a quality framework.
2. To integrate environmental consideration into all activities of the enterprise.
3. To create a means for objective validation of corporate commitment to effective
environmental management.
4. To be applicable to the full range of industrial sectors and regulatory requirements.
61 Dodds, O.A. "voluntary Standards And Regulations, A Standardization Perspective" In ISO Bulletin, ISO Central
Secretariat, January 1997.
62 Ehrenfeld, J. ISO 14000 And Responsible care: What Kind Of Change Agents Are They ? Presented At ISO
14000:Preparing For Change Conference, September 27, 1995.
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Figure 2.3.1 ISO 14001: Key Elements of the EMS
ISO 14001 provides a list of elements that an organization needs to have in place to
achieve these ends (see figure 2.3.1, above). The following sections will describe the
roles of all key actors, and the individual components of the standard, in greater detail.
There will also be a brief discussion of Registration, and of the registrar's response to
detection of a non-conformance.
2.3.2 ISO 14001: Who are the Players, and What are Their Roles ?
The following is a brief discussion of the roles and responsibilities of the organizations
seeking registration, their consultants, the registrars, the national accreditation boards,
and the ISO itself (adapted from: AWMS, 1998; CEEM; 1998)63.
" The Organization Seeking Registration: This may be a facility site, portion of a
site, or group of similar sites. "In order to become registered the organization must
create its own EMS and operate it for sufficient time to.. .generate a record of its
operations... It [then] seeks a registration audit by an accredited ISO 14000
registrar..."(AWMS, 1998).
* The Consultant: Because of the complexities involved in establishing and
maintaining an EMS, organizations typically employ outside consultants to train their
staff and assist them in developing their system (AWMS, 1998).
* The Registrar: "Evaluates an environmental management system of [an
organization]...for conformity to ISO 14001. The evaluation will include an
examination of the company's environmental policy, environmental management
system and its documentation, EMS auditing program and procedures and
environmental record (document review). It will [also] include a thorough on-site
audit to determine conformance"(CEEM, 1998). In the US, there are currently 12
accredited registrars, with two others seeking accreditation as this study is
completed. "After a detailed inspection, the registrar will either register the
organization as conforming to ISO 14001, or will list the areas of non-conformance
63 CEEM "Frequently Asked Questions About ISO 14000", Homepage, 1998.
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and agree upon a deadline for their correction, at which time the registration will be
granted...In some cases [the registrar] will deny registration.. .Upon registration, the
registrar will add the organization's name to a list of registered organizations and will
grant the organization the right to use the registrar's conformance mark in
prescribed ways"(AWMS, 1998).
The Registrar Accreditation Board (RAB): Each ISO-member country must
establish an accreditation board, which may or may not be linked to the government
of that country. In the US, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the
RAB, linked together, act as the sole provider, and are non-governmental
organizations. "Accreditation is the initial evaluation and periodic monitoring of a
registrar's competence"(Tibor and Feldman, 1997:330). Registrars achieve their
accreditation through a process similar to that of an organization seeking
registration: document review, interviews, a formal assessment and periodic
surveillance audits, all by the RAB (Munn, CEEM:366 64). For ISO 9000, each
registrar is accredited to conduct registrations only within a limited scope of industrial
classifications, so that it may leverage its knowledge and understanding of specific
industries. For ISO 14001, on the other hand, the RAB decided that industry-specific
knowledge was not as relevant, since environmental impacts may not be common
across an industry sector. Thus, each registrar may conduct registrations in any
industrial sector (Hansa, 1998 65).
* National Governments: Recognizing the Competence of the Accreditors: "In
most countries, this is the task of the government...In the United States, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has recognized ANSI/RAB... Both
UKAS in the United Kingdom and Raad Voor Accreditatie (RvA) in The Netherlands
have similar agreements with their respective governments"(Tibor and Feldman,
1997:332). Governments therefore determine whether to recognize the accreditation
of foreign bodies. The European accreditation bodies established the European
Accreditation of Certification, a harmonized interpretation standard, to facilitate
mutual recognition through consistent application of accreditation (Tibor and
Feldman, 1997:332).
* International Organization for Standardization/TC 201: The ISO periodically will
review and revise the standard based on the feedback of its constituents, who are
representatives of its member countries. The first such review is scheduled for 1999,
and must be completed by 2001.
2.3.3 Environmental Policy
"To conform, [senior] company management must first define the organization's
environmental policy and ensure that it is appropriate to the nature, scale and
environmental impacts of the organization's activities. Each organization must commit to
continual improvement, to compliance with relevant laws and other requirements,
and to prevention of pollution, [as defined by the standard]. The environmental policy
must be publicly available and must contain a documented framework for setting and
reviewing environmental objectives and targets; assessments of environmental impacts
need not be published (ISO 14001: 4.2, 4.3)"(Roht-Arriaza, 1997:3).
64 Munn, S. Certification Body (Registrar) Perspective In CEEM, 199?:365-368.
65 Hansa, G. Sgs-Ics Environmental Certification Manager. Personal Interview, Nov, 1998.
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'Continual improvement' is defined by the standard as an ongoing process of
"enhancing the environmental management system to achieve improvements in overall
environmental performance" (3.1). In practice this may reflect progress towards
objectives, including reducing management costs, or it may refer to increasing the
appropriateness of the system itself to the organization and its context. 'Prevention of
pollution' is defined in the standard to include not only the avoidance of pollution and
reduction of toxicity, but also end-of-pipe control (3.13). 'Compliance with relevant
regulations' does not require that an organization be in compliance when obtaining
registration. Instead, it is intended to provide "assurance that the obligation to comply is
being managed" (IISD, 1996:51). In combination with continual improvement of the
management system, it is intended that this will lead to reduced incidences and severity
of non-compliance (Riedel, 1997:375).
2.3.4 Planning
Next, the organization must identify and evaluate the significance of all the
environmental aspects of its operation over which it might reasonably be expected to
have some control (4.3.1). Environmental aspects are defined by the standard as
"elements of an organization's activities, products, services, or physical resources that
may have potentially beneficial or harmful effects on the environment"(ISO 3.3; Martin,
22). Once its aspects have been identified, the organization must establish an
environmental management plan. The organization must set environmental objectives,
and targets, timetables and means for achieving those objectives, based on its
significant aspects, its legal requirements, its technological options, the views of
interested parties, and its business requirements (4.3.3). Important to the registrar here
is that the process used to identify aspects and rate their significance be consistent,
justifiable, and documented, without willfully ignoring significant issues (IISD, 1997:43)".
Significant Aspect Solid Waste Generation
Impact Waste of materials
Objective Reduce waste from materials used in manufacturing
Target and By 9/1/99, reduce scrap waste by 15% per unit
Measurement production, from 1995 base year.
Action Plan Identify and market valuable waste
Responsibility Facility manager
Documentation Quarterly Report
Budget $1,200 per year until 9/1/99.
Table 2.3.4 Example of Significant Aspect and Related Plan
The standard does not specify whether an organization needs to specify objectives and
targets for all its potential or actual significant environmental impacts. "At a minimum,
your compliance management system needs to include objectives and targets for
meeting legal requirements.. .that are currently not in compliance"(Knight and Ferrone,
CEEM:124). Environmental consultants suggest that "it makes good sense to select a
smaller number [of objectives].. .you are confident your facility.. .can manage to a
successful conclusion", as successes will reinforce the use of the EMS (Knight and
Ferrone, CEEM:126). However, the firm must be able to demonstrate to auditors that it
has not overlooked important aspects in the setting of smaller, achievable targets
(Knight and Ferrone, CEEM:126).
66 International Institute For Sustainable Development (lisd). Global Green Standards (web-Based Edition). 1997.
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2.3.5 Implementation
"Once objectives, targets and timetables are in place, management must designate
responsibility for achieving targets, provide necessary resources (4.4.1), train
appropriate personnel (4.42), and prepare an emergency response plan (4.4.7)" (Roht-
Arriaza, 1997:3). The organization must also establish procedures for internal and
external communication, and "consider processes for external communication on its
significant environmental aspects"(4.4.3). It is under no compulsion to report anything,
beyond its policy, to the public. It should be noted here that training must connect each
worker's roles and responsibilities with "the significant environmental impacts.. .of their
work activities" (4.4.2). It must include "all personnel whose work may create a
significant impact on the environment", including on-site contractors in environmentally-
significant roles (4.4.2; A.4.2).
2.3.6 Checking and Corrective Action
"[The above-described] activities must be periodically monitored and corrective action
taken in cases of non-conformance (4.5). Periodic environmental audits, whether
internal or external, are required (4.7). Certification bodies may audit the firm to help
verify conformance with the EMS "(Roht-Arriaza, 1997:3). Corrective action should
address the root cause of non-conformances: "to mitigate any impacts"(4.5.2) and lead
to "implementing or modifying controls necessary to avoid repetition of the
nonconformance"(A.5.2).
Corrective action and regulatory compliance are intrinsically linked by the standard,
according to some advocates of the standard: "Corrective action must be initiated when
any non-conformance is detected"(Bell, 1997:78). Since regulatory compliance must be
a goal in the environmental policy, non-compliance is a non-conformance, and controls
may need to be implemented to prevent recurrence, depending on how the standard is
interpreted in practice. "If the registrar finds a non-compliance to regulation, she wants
to know, 'Is there a system in place to identify, react and attack the root cause ?' If your
system does not adequately address how to handle the non-compliance, this is a
systemic failure"(Ross, 1998).
2.3.7 Management Review
In addition, periodic management reviews are to evaluate the system's continuing
effectiveness (4.6), The existence of an adequate system may be self-certified, or a firm
may seek third party verification to certify that it conforms to the standard (Introduction,
v-vi)"(Roht-Arriaza, 1997:3).
2.3.8 External Registration Audits
To maintain registration, an organization must submit to a comprehensive audit of all
aspects of its environmental management system, repeated every three years (ISO
14010, 14011, 14012). "ISO 14010 defines the principles common to all environmental
audits; ISO 14011 defines the procedures for an EMS audit; and ISO 14012 defines the
qualification criteria for an environmental auditor"(IISD, 1996:47-8). Auditors must
undergo formal auditing training, demonstrate discretion and objectivity, possess a
minimum of twenty days of on-site experience auditing management systems within the
last three years, and have substantive knowledge of environmental science, facility
operations, and applicable legal requirements (IISD, 1996:50). Conformity to the
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standard requires an organization to demonstrate to audits through records and on-site
inspections and interviews that all key elements are in place, and function as intended.
Registration audits may be either 'surveillance-style' or comprehensive. A surveillance-
style auditing program will evaluate pieces of the management system every 6 months.
Each audit will focus on different aspects of the system, with the goal of covering all
aspects of the system at least once in each three-year cycle. Alternatively, an
organization can elect to undergo comprehensive audits every three years, covering all
aspects of the management system (Daugherty, 1998; Abarca, 1998). Once a firm has
been approved, the registrar places it on its internal list of registered firms. Currently,
there is no centralized, publicly available list of registered facilities.
Non-Conformances: Should an organization fail to demonstrate conformance to the
standard, this is considered a non-conformance, and the registrar may either grant
conditional approval, with the understanding that the non-conformance will be corrected
by a designated date, or deny registration. If improvements are not forthcoming over
time, the resources or scope of EMS are insufficient or inappropriate, and the registrar
will want to see them modified. Non-conformances are allowed if they stem from an
absence of effective technology, or 'force majeure' (a major accident) (Ellis, AWMS, 98).
The registrar may suspend registration in the case of a pattern of such non-
conformances, indicating a failure of the EMS itself.
Firms may use several strategies for correcting non-conformances. One means is to
correct the 'root cause' of the non-conformance, such that the non-conformance occurs
less frequently, or is eliminated (Abarca, ABS, 1998). A second would be to reduce the
stringency of objectives, on the grounds that previous goals were 'inappropriate' (Ellis,
AWMS, 1998). Third, goals could be set low to begin with, or worded such that growth in
production - waste increases overwhelming gains from efficiency - does not lead to non-
conformance (Abarca, ABS, 1998).
In short, the ISO 14001 standard requires organizations to establish a coherent,justifiable, and consistently-applied procedure for setting environmental policy goals. A
method for achieving those goals must be chosen and resources allocated. The
organization must commit to continually improving the management system itself, which
may include demonstrating progress towards the underlying policy goals, and ensuring
that those goals are appropriate to its business operation. Finally, an organization must
commit to periodic revision of the system in order to improve the identification of
environmental aspects, the evaluation of their significance, the goals, and the means to
achieving those goals. Independent registration aims to ensure to outsiders that an
organization is actually following through on its internal environmental commitments.
The previous discussion has focused on the standard as it is today. However, it is
coming up for review in the summer of 1999. What is likely to change in the standard ?
To get a sense of what the future holds for ISO 14001, the following section will review
some of the procedural and substantive critiques of the standard.
2.4 Critiques of ISO 14001
Some parties declare ISO 14001 to be a revolution in environmental management: "The
ISO 14000 environmental standards will mean innumerable marketplace advantages
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and unlimited benefits"(CH2M, 1997)67. Others are less euphoric: "ISO 14001...is neither
international nor standard, and drops the floor on innovative models for corporate
environmental management" (Gleckman, 1996:1)68. Critics from the full range of
stakeholders, including industry, have lodged several important grievances against both
the process by which ISO 14001 was developed, and the effectiveness of the product
itself, which are important from a public policy perspective. (For a review of these
criticisms, see especially Gleckman and Krut, 1997:45-59; Krut and Gleckman, 199869).
Most importantly, many of these grievances are being responded to by the ISO. As a
result, many of these criticisms will have important implications for the future structure of
the standard, as it comes up for revision in 1999.
2.4.1 Procedural Critiques
The ISO May Be an Inappropriate Venue to Consider Issues of Public Policy: The
ISO is a private agency, a Non-Governmental Organization, and therefore provides little
democratic accountability to interested non-members. For example, Krut and Gleckman
(1998:44) allege that the ISO is inherently biased, since only 50 of 141 developing
countries that are members of the UN are voting members in the ISO, versus all 24 of
the most-economically-developed countries. They cite a statement submitted to the
OECD on February 19, 1996, in which "a broad coalition of environmental
organizations.. .called on developed country governments to halt the creation of any new
international industry-based standards until the full democratic implications of these
developments have been studied and evaluated"(Krut and Gleckman, 1998:41).
Inadequate Representation of Environmental and Developing Country Interests in
EMS Development: Participants in the TC207 meetings included representatives from
71 member countries, including both industrialized and developing economies, though
most commentators agree that the process was dominated by members from the
developed world (Gleckman and Krut, 199770 ; IISD, 1997:21). Non-governmental
'liaisons' were present, representing environmental advocacy organizations - including
the Environmental Defense Fund, the Sierra Club, the Friends of the Earth and the
World Wildlife Fund, international organizations - the UNEP and the European
Environmental Bureau, and consumer advocacy groups (IISD, 1997). However, "the
participation of developing nations and environmental NGOs in the development and
drafting work of the ISO 14000 series has not been very substantive"(OECD,1998:17).
The major environmental organizations withdrew early in the process before the EMS
standard was completed, for two major reasons. First, they did not want to implicitly
endorse an EMS standard that did not adequately address their concerns (Seifert,
1998)71. Second, the costs of overseeing the many standards under development, and
the high cost of attending the many exotically-located conferences, for 18 separate
working groups - made it beyond their financial capacity to meaningfully participate
(Hauselmann, 1997:10). The structure of the ISO is such that "those who normally
participate are those who can afford the time, expertise and money to
67 Smith, W. And Patchak, R (Ch2m) "So Long! Command And Control....Hello! ISO 14000" Ch2m Homepage, 1997.68 Gleckman, H. "Promising Much But Delivering Little: ISO 14001 Should Not Be Part Of Government Regulations Or
Procurement" In Business And The Environment's ISO 14000 Update, Cutter Information Corp, 1-6, April 1996.69 Gleckman, H. And Krut, R. ISO 14001: A Missed Opportunity For Sustainable Global Industrial Development, London:
Earthscan Publications, 1998.
70 Gleckman, H. And Krut, R. Neither International Nor Standard: The Limits Of ISO 14001 As An Instrument Of Global
Corporate Environmental Management In Sheldon, C. Ed. ISO 14001 And Beyond: Environmental Management Systems
In The Real World. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 1997:45-59.
7 Seifert, Deborah. ISO 14000 NGO Working Group Coordinator, Community Nutrition Institute. Interview, Oct 28, 1998.
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participate"(OECD, 1998:16)". The high cost of participation similarly excluded
representatives from many developing countries who are otherwise voting members
(ICF, 1998).
Because of the exclusion of interest groups and developing countries, some critics
allege that industry representatives dominated the EMS standards development process
(Hauselmann, 1997; ICF, 199773). In fact, a few believe that the ISO 14001 standards
are a strategic move by industrial actors, who were alarmed at the emergence of
stringent, performance-based EMS codes such as EMAS. "Although ISO 14001 started
out with a broad mandate, it ended up being written by a small group of business
executives"(Krut and Gleckman, 1998:27). Industry representatives regard those fears
as irrational: "Given the cautious attitude of most industry to ISO 14001, the implication
that industry somehow initiated the standards-writing process as a conscious strategy to
undercut other international initiatives is quite remarkable"(Bell, 1997:80).
In response to these procedural criticisms, in San Francisco in June of 1998, "a global
coalition of environmental groups and ISO Technical Committee 207 reached an
agreement.. .to improve participation by citizen groups and developing countries... [A]
task force will recommend processes, procedures and policies that will enable non-
governmental organizations and developing countries to participate in TC 207"(CEEM,
1998:1274). The potential for greater participation from NGOs and developing countries
may have substantial impacts on the ISO 14000 standards in the future.
2.4.2 Substantive Critiques
Small-to-Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) are Disadvantaged by High Relative
Cost of Implementing Formalized Management Systems: Formalized management
systems tend to favor large organizations, in that typically they already have clearly-
delineated structures, often have ISO 9000 registration, and are accustomed to
establishing training programs and documenting procedures. "Lack of financial
resources and qualified personnel, difficult access to information, resistance to change,
and the related costs of setting up the system and [obtaining registration] are major
constraints for SMEs"(UNCTAD, 1997:13). Other EMS-related initiatives have
recognized the special difficulties of SMEs: "Under EMAS, [for example].. .SMEs in the
European Union benefit from special assistance to facilitate their
participation...[including] information, training and technical support.. .So far, ISO has not
recognized a need to develop a special EMS standard for SMEs"(UNCTAD, 1997:12).
Lack of Accreditation Infrastructure May Create Trade Barrier to Developing
Country-based Firms: Many developing countries have raised a concern not
adequately addressed by the standard, should it become a business requirement: A
trade barrier could arise if firms in developing countries - lacking internationally-
recognized national accreditation bodies - must obtain registration to ISO 14001 from
comparatively high-cost foreign registrars in order to sell products internationally
(UNCTAD, 1997:7) . As a result, they are seeking assistance to develop training
7 OEcD. Review Of The Development Of International Environmental Management Standards - ISO 14000 Standards
Series. Env/Epoc/Ppc(98)6, 1998.
3 ICF Inc. The Role Of National Standards Bodies And Key Stakeholder Groups In The ISO/Tc 207 Environmental
Management Systems Standards Development Activity. Us Epa/Oppt, September, 1997.
74 cEEM. Expert Task Force To Advise ISO TC 207 On Future NGO Involvement" In International Environmental
Systems Update, Vol. 5, No. 7, 1998.
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programs and establish internationally recognized local registrars (Nyati, 1997 7;
Bratasida, 199776)
Lack of Performance Requirements May Render the Standard Meaningless as an
Indicator of Environmental Commitment: "ISO 14001 is not a performance standard.
Although there are detailed requirements concerning environmental policies,
programmes, management systems and environmental auditing, the specific
environmental criteria to be fulfilled depend on the regulatory requirements relevant to
the site or country and the company's environmental policy or targets" (UNCTAD,
1997:5). Thus, a company may not yet be in compliance with regulations, yet still be
registered under the standard. EMAS, the European Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme, explicitly requires both compliance with regulations and continual improvement
of environmental performance as pre-conditions of registration, in contrast to ISO
14001, which requires only continual improvement of the system itself (Nash and
Ehrenfeld, 1997:494).
Lack of Normative Requirements Means Standard Does Not Advance
Environmentally-Preferable Activities: ISO 14001 requires commitments to establish
a system conforming to the standard, to continual improvement of that system, to
compliance with regulation and other environmental commitments made by the firm, and
to prevention of pollution. None of these commitments say anything about the
desirability of one action, service or product over another, except that uniformity of
practice is important (Ehrenfeld, 1995:3). For example, the potential for the commitment
to 'prevention of pollution' to lead to meaningful rethinking of processes and products is
largely eliminated under the current standard, which includes end-of-pipe treatment in
the definition, and provides no hierarchy of preference. Some groups have proposed
revising this definition to establish such a hierarchy, emphasizing prevention over
treatment (MSWG, 1998:3.13)77.
Lack of Information-Sharing Requirements Make Public Oversight Difficult: Much
policy research effort focuses on the role of stakeholder pressures in modifying firm
behavior AMaltby, 199778; Lober et. al, 199779; Kleindorfer and Orts, 1995; Wheeler et.
al.; 19968 ). For example, a recent study by the US-Asia Environmental Partnership, a
program of USAID, asserts that "the less the public knows, the more industry is likely to
pollute"(Wheeler et. al., 1996). Given the standard's goal of "assur[ing] interested
parties that an appropriate environmental management system is in place" (ISO
14001:Introduction), it is inconsistent that there is no central list of registered facilities,
and thus no means for interested third parties to identify facilities that have lost
registration. Many parties join James Horne, of the EPA, in asserting that "some minimal
75 Nyati, K.P. Environmental Management Systems (ISO 14001) Needs Of India, Confederation Of Indian Industry,
Presentation To Expert Meeting On Trade And Investment Impacts Of Environmental Standards, Particularly The ISO
14000 On Developing Countries, UNCTAD, October 1997.
76 Bratasida, L. Facts And Figures On The Implementation Of ISO 14000 In Indonesia. Presentation To Expert Meeting
On Trade And Investment Impacts Of Environmental Standards, Particularly The ISO 14000 On Developing Countries,
UNCTAD, October 1997.
77 MSWG. Language To Clarify ISO 14001 From The Multi-State Working Group On Environmental Management
Sstems: Pollution Prevention. In Background Materials For Us Tag And Tc 207 Issues, October 11, 1998.
Maltby, J. Setting Its Own Standards And Meeting Those Standards: Voluntarism Versus Regulation In Environmental
Reporting. In Business Strategy And The Environment Vol 6, 83-92, 1997.
79 Lober, D., Bynum, D., Campbell, E. And Jacques, M. The 100 Plus Corporate Environmental Report Study: A Survey
Of An Evolving Environmental Management Tool In Business Strategy And The Environment, Vol 6, 57-73, 1997.
80 Wheeler, D., Afsah, S. And Laplante, B. The Role Of Local Communities And Markets In Pollution Control. United
States-Asia Environmental Partnership, Homepage, 1997.
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level of communication about the EMS, some core level of information that facilities
would be asked to provide, is reasonable...[ISO 14001] is not really embedded in the
public consciousness yet as.. .perhaps an improvement over command and control. It
never will be until there is some degree of public communication"(James Horne, US
EPA in BATE, Sept 1998:1-2)81. Unlike ISO 14001, EMAS requires specific
performance-related disclosures from each registered facility (Nash and Ehrenfeld,
1997:496).
Central to stakeholder oversight of ISO-registered firms is the disclosure of
environmental performance information. The ISO 14001 standards require only that a
firm "consider processes for external communication...and record its decision"(ISO
14001:4.4.3). Many participants in the ISO EMS formulation process consider this
inadequate. "Leslie Carothers, vice president for environmental health and safety at
United Technologies Corporation, endorsed efforts to develop common measures that
can be used to compare factories, companies and even entire industry sectors
worldwide"(BATE, Sept 1998:1). By contrast, according to the Coalition on ISO 14000
Implementation (C12), an industry group representing American automakers, forest and
paper products, steel, petroleum, power generation and microelectronics, "legitimate
interest in environmental performance cannot be equated with a right to involvement
with the internal deliberations of a company" (C12, 1998:6)82. In spite of opposition to
greater public accountability, both a Japanese NGO and the US MSWG have presented
proposals to the TC207 for incorporating environmental reporting in the standard
(EARG, 199883; MSWG, October 1998:3.10).
The Standard Does Not Reflect the State-of-the-Art in EMS Design and May Freeze
Innovation: Some critics believe that "ISO's low-level approach will tend to freeze
experimentation on environmental management. Firms that were willing to figure out
new administrative management systems, even those starting to grapple with
sustainable development management systems, might be tempted to reduce their
efforts if other companies can get ISO certification for far less effort - and with far less
benefit for environmental protection"(Gleckman, BATE, April 1996:3). "Environmental
groups in Europe have lobbied European governments to reject the ISO 14001
standard, arguing that it represents 'a step backwards from EMAS"'(Nash and
Ehrenfeld, 1997:509).
Misuse of the Mark of Conformity Leads to Public Confusion of Registration with
Improved Environmental Performance: The concern of many environmental groups is
that public knowledge of ISO 14001 is based on company advertisements, and that
image may be manipulated, so that a company may gain reputational benefits without
doing anything substantive to improve their environmental performance (Seifert, 199884).
For example, Japanese electronics manufacturer NEC took out an advertisement in the
March 1997 edition of the Smithsonian, in which it alleged "ISO 14001 ... environmental
standards written in mother nature's own hand.. .These comprehensive guidelines bring
a global focus to environmental management issues and allow organizations to compare
81 Business And The Environment (Bate) ISO Tc 207 Meeting Hears Call For Standardized Reporting In Bate's ISO
14000 Update, Vol 4, No. 9, September 1998.
82 Coalition On ISO 14000 Implementation (Ci2) Position Statement On The ISO 14001 Environmental Management
Systems Standard, 1997.
8 Environmental Auditing Research Group, Standardization Of Environmental Reports Is Needed, Presented At ISO
Tc207, Email:Aikawa2missionco.Jp, June 1998.
84 Seifert, D. Community Nutrition Institute, ISO 14000 Project Manager, Ngo Initiative, Personal Interview, Oct 28, 1998.
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their efforts against internationally accepted criteria...lSO 14000 spells good news for
the environment"(cited in Krut and Gleckman, 1998:28). In 1997, the World Wildlife
Fund urged the ISO to "urgently develop a system for controlling the use of logos and
certification marks, with sanctions to punish abuse"(Hauselmann, 1997:2).
Registrars May Lack the Expertise and Consistency to Perform as Credible
Oversight Mechanism:
Some industry representatives feel that registrars may be "hung up" on the quality
approach, lack sufficient understanding of environmental issues, and therefore lack the
necessary perspective to fairly evaluate conformance to ISO 14001 (Aurrichio, 1998).
Secondly, registration may not guarantee consistency of application. In principle, "An
ISO 14001 audit provides two key pieces of information to stakeholders: the structure of
the EMS implemented in the company, and the fact that.. .a qualified third party has
audited this company's operations and found that the company's operations comport
with the structure of its asserted management system"(Kleindorfer, 1996:3). Ultimately
then, the interpretation of the standard's requirements, and the credibility of the mark of
conformity as a signal of environmental commitment, will rely on the credibility and
consistency of the registration process. ISO 14001 is what the registrars say it is.
Therefore, regulators and other interested parties must monitor "auditor qualification and
licensing procedures as well as quality.. .of the audits performed by these auditors. If
these procedures are too lax, a 'lemons market' for auditors will result, and the credibility
of the entire process will be impaired"(Kleindorfer, 1996:26).
Implementing ISO 14001 Increases Liability: By improving their information-gathering
systems, and exposing themselves to an outside party's careful auditing of their
procedures and documents, a company actually increases its liability exposure. Since
the audit must evaluate how well a company is performing at achieving a stated goal,
and one goal must be compliance with applicable regulation, the audit will identify
documented instances of non-compliance (Freeman, CEEM:378) 5 . While the registrar
is required to maintain confidentiality as part of its accreditation, the audit results would
not be protected from outside knowledge, should the company be sued, and would be
subject to plaintiff review under legal 'discovery' (ibid.). As a result, some companies
have elected to contract the registration audits through their attorney, to guard the
results under attorney-client privilege (Freeman, CEEM:380).
Combining ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Would Reduce Costs but May Distract Focus:
According to BVQI, a leading registrar, "If a company already has ISO 9001 in place,
they already have about 70% of the implementation know-how of ISO
14001"(Kleindorfer, 1996:11). It is natural that some have proposed combining the
implementation and auditing of the two standards, to reduce costs to organizations
seeking to adopt both. This in fact will be one of the major issues in the upcoming
revision debates (Charm, 1998)86. This could divert attention from environmental effort,
the purpose of the EMS standard.
The issues raised in the above list, both procedural and substantive, will likely play a key
role in the ongoing debate over ISO 14001 and its appropriateness in public regulatory
strategies.
85 Freeman, D. Legal Issues: Principle Considerations. In CEEM, 199?: 375-386.86 charm, J. chairman, Us Subtag 1, Personal Interview, Oct 23, 1998.
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2.5 Summary and Conclusions
The analysis of the history and structure of ISO 14001 reveals several important issues.
First, ISO 14001 registration requires the adoption of a standardized quality systems
approach to environmental management, for establishing, attaining and revising
management goals. This may enable firms to improve their environmental performance,
to reduce the cost of their environmental management, or both. Second, the ISO EMS
has the potential, driven largely by market pressures, to modify environmental
management practices in a significant portion of US industry, and may become a market
condition, similar to ISO 9000. Third, independent registration auditing, if credible, offers
a tool for privatizing some aspects of environmental oversight.
Fourth, critiques of the existing standard cast some doubt on the legitimacy of ISO
14001 as a tool for improving environmental performance. The standard is criticized for
its failure to adequately involve and respond to the interests of environmental advocates
and developing countries, and for disadvantaging small-to-medium size enterprises. It is
also criticized for not setting performance requirements: a company may be registered
in conformance to IS014001 without being in regulatory compliance. As a result, many
believe that organizations may use adoption of the standard to falsely represent their
environmental commitment.
The next chapter will examine the nature of US-based organizations that have adopted
ISO 14001.
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Chapter 3: Who is Adopting ISO 14001 in the US ?87
3.1 Introduction
The chapter briefly tests some hypotheses about the types of companies who are early
adopters of ISO 14001, and attempts to draw conclusions about the future of the
standard, and its impact on the environmental performance of facilities, all with a view to
informing public policy decisions. Briefly, it is learned that the facilities that are early
adopters of the standard in the US are more likely to be large and to produce more
effluent per employee than their respective industry averages. Further, it is shown that
most have already adopted ISO 9000, are international in character, and compete in
highly regulated, emission-intensive industrial sectors.
If true, these findings support several conclusions regarding the diffusion of ISO 14001.
First, it is likely that the standard will become widely adopted, perhaps even a supplier
requirement, in Europe and Asia. Second, it seems likely that smaller companies are
disfavored by the large cost associated with adopting the standard, and will be less likely
to obtain registration than larger firms. Third, and contrary to expectations, the standard
is apparently being adopted by facilities that generate greater-than-average effluent per
worker, and may benefit most from the implementation of a systematic environmental
management system.
3.2 Early ISO 14001 Adoption in the US: Some Hypotheses
Communitarian regulation, such as ISO 14001, has the potential both to assist firms in
becoming better environmental performers, and in obscuring the poor performance of
some members under the cloak of membership (King and Lenox, 1998). It may become
widely diffused, driven by firms seeking to improve their environmental management
using a quality framework, by others seeking to boost their reputation, or by
premonitions that the standard may become an international trade requirement, like ISO
9000. Given data about early adopter companies in the United States as of November
1998, what hypotheses about these issues can be advanced and empirically tested ?
Three main forces will likely push firms to become early adopters of ISO 14001.
Assuming firms are aware of the standard, and consciously weigh the quantitative and
qualitative benefits and costs of its adoption, those for whom benefits exceed costs will
adopt the standard. As of yet, the benefits of the standard are far from proven. It follows
that firms capable of achieving registration at lower cost than others are likely to
dominate the early membership. In a similar vein, those for whom ISO 14001 seems to
most directly offer reputational benefits will likely seek registration earlier than other
firms. Finally, firms who are being required by customers or regulators to adopt ISO
14001 are more likely to do so than firms who are not similarly being constrained.
Relatively-low adoption costs drive early registration: Developing an environmental
management system from scratch is a costly affair. Understanding environmental
issues, allocating resources, training personnel and documenting procedures create the
need for a large up-front investment with little guarantee of payback. It follows, then, that
a firm cleaner than the norm in its industry will incur low additional costs in adopting ISO
87 The author would like to thank Mike Lenox for making this analysis possible.
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14001 because it is probably already doing much, also required by the standard, to
manage its environmental impacts. Second, a firm that already has ISO 9000 has many
of the required elements already in place, and would incur low additional costs in adding
an EMS. "BVQI, a leading [registrar], asserts that 'if a company has ISO 9001 in place,
they already have about 70% of the implementation know-how of ISO
14001"(Kleindorfer, 1996:11). Third, formal management systems favor large
organizations, in that typically they have clearly-delineated structures, training programs
and are accustomed to documenting procedures. "Most studies confirm that SMEs face
specific problems in establishing EMS... [particularly] difficulties with the comprehension
and interpretation of ISO 14001, with the identification of environmental legislation, and
with the identification of environmental aspects and impacts of their activities"(UNCTAD,
1997:13). Thus, early adopters are likely to be large - rather than small-to-medium sized
- enterprises.
Hypothesis 1: Firms with lower levels of pollution relative to their industries will
more often obtain registration to ISO 14001.
Hypothesis 2: Firms that have already adopted ISO 9000 are more likely to
adopt ISO 14001.
Hypothesis 3: Larger firms are more likely to become early adopters of ISO
14001 than smaller firms.
Reputational benefits spur adoption among the 'dirtiest' actors: If a firm operates
in an industry which is considered 'emission intensive', it will likely be under greater
regulatory scrutiny, and face more-frequent legal challenges (King and Lenox, 1998:13).
It would thus derive greater benefits from objective validation of its environmental efforts
than a firm in another, less regulated, industry. "Even if there is little evidence that it
includes the best firms, the standard [studied in this paper, Responsible Care,] provides
some evidence [to regulators and prosecutors] that companies' actions are not wantonly
negligent"(King and Lenox, 1998:12). Similarly, a firm that has a history of non-
compliance with regulation is likely to seek registration to ISO 14001 in order to
demonstrate that it has reformed its management of environmental impacts.
Hypothesis 4: Firms that operate in industry sectors with higher average levels
of pollution will more often obtain registration to ISO 14001.
Hypothesis 5: Firms in more-heavily regulated industry sectors are more likely to
obtain registration to ISO 14001.
Hypothesis 6: Firms with a record of environmental regulatory non-compliance
will more often obtain registration.
Foreign market demands spur domestic adoption: US companies have been slow to
adopt the ISO 14001 standard relative to European and Japanese companies, adopting
a 'wait-and-see' attitude to determine whether the standard will become a competitive
requirement (McKiel, 1998:7; UNCTAD, 1997:11). In Japan, diffusion has been driven
both by local governments such as the Kanagawa prefecture, which grants regulatory
incentives to registered firms (OECD, 1998:22), and by private industry organizations,
such as the Keidanren, which represents over 1000 corporations from many industrial
sectors, and urges members to "utilize the [ISO 14001] standards as an effective means
of environmental improvement" (as cited in OECD, 1998:18). As a result, Japan is the
nation with the greatest number of registered organizations. In Europe, firms in both the
United Kingdom and Germany are rapidly adopting ISO 14001, followed closely by
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Swedish and Dutch firms. This suggests that US sites most likely to adopt the standards
are those which are subsidiaries of Asian or European companies, or organizations
engaging in trade in those areas.
Hypothesis 7: Early-adopter sites are more likely to be foreign-owned
subsidiaries of European and Asian firms than of US firms.
ISO 14001 Registrations
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Figure 3.2 Worldwide ISO 14001 Registrations, Showing Asian and European Lead
Source (Peglau, 199888)
3.3 Data, Measures and Methods
Data
To test the hypotheses presented in the previous section, data was brought together
from a variety of sources. The Technology, Business and Environment program at MIT
has developed a database linking the EPA's Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), its CERCLA
Information System (CERCLIS), Site Enforcement Tracking System (SETS), RCRA
Information System (RCRIS), Water Permit Compliance System (PCS) and legal action
data (DOCKET), with McGraw-Hill's ISO 9000 certification database, and the Dun &
Bradstreet $1 M Database (DUNS). (The discussion of data sources below is derived
from Lenox, 199889). ISO 14001 registration information for the US was collected by
contacting the various US registrars (see chapter 5), and from the Global Environmental
Technology Foundation's website (www.geff.org). This list has been supplemented by
inclusion of all the US facilities belonging to Ford Motor Company90 , IBM91 and Toyota
88 Peglau, R. ISO 14001 and EMAS Registrations Worldwide. Http://www.isoworld.com, Dec 8,1998.89 Lenox, M. Environmental Performance Indicator Database Summary, TBE internal document, 1998.
90 Ford. Education & global Action: ISO 14001: a globally consistent management approach to environmental issues.
http://www.ford.com/corporate-info/environment/EGA/isol400l.htm, 1998.
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These firms have declared that they will register all their sites by no later than 2001, but
had not completed adoption at the time this study was ended.
TRI: "Since 1987, the EPA has collected facility-level reports of the emissions of
over two hundred toxic chemicals for a large percentage of US manufacturing
firms ...Facilities must complete TRI reports if they manufacture or process 25,000 lb., or
use more than 10,000 lb., of any listed chemical during a calendar year, and employ ten
or more full-time people"(King and Lenox, 1998:17). The data set at TBE includes TRI
data from 1987-1996, covering over 38,000 individual facilities.
CERCLIS, SETS & RCRIS: The EPA also collects and logs under CERCLIS all
sites listed under the National Priority List for Superfund cleanup, from 1987 to present
(including 5,746 TRI-submitting facilities). On the SETS database is a list of all
Potentially-Responsible Parties identified under CERCLA regulation (covering over
5,000 company-level responsible parties). On RCRIS is a listing of the permits and
amount of the fines levied against permit violators, operating under RCRA waste
management permits (covering over 1,500 TRI facilities).
PCS: The EPA's water permit compliance system logs the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits given to facilities under the Clean
Water Act, as well as the number of permit violations by permit holders, and the
amounts of penalties levied against them (covering over 10,000 TRI facilities).
DOCKET: EPA's legal action data lists all lawsuits filed and concluded against
facilities in the US (covering over 3,000 TRI facilities).
ISO 9000: McGraw-Hill's ISO 9000 registration database is a listing of all
facilities registered to the quality management system standard by accredited registrars
(covering 6,527 TRI facilities).
Measures (variables are presented in bold type, in parentheses)
Facilities with lower levels of pollution relative to their industries: In order
to test the amount of 'pollution' generated by a facility, relative to the rest of its industry,
we must define both the meaning of 'pollution' and 'the rest of its industry' (The following
discussion relies on King and Lenox, 1998:18). The TRI database incorporates 246
chemicals, of a range of relative toxicities. To correct for these differences, each
chemical was weighted for its toxicity, using the 'reportable quantities' scale established
in the CERCLA statute. Each facility that filed a TRI statement was identified through its
TRI ID number, assigned by the EPA. "Aggregate releases for a given facility in [base
year 1996] were constructed by summing the weighted releases of the 246
chemicals."(ibid., 18). A production function (mirrel) was then estimated for industrial
facilities, yielding a facility's weighted emissions as a function of size of facility (number
of employees) and of industry sector (4-digit SIC code). "The environmental
performance of a facility (pollute) is then given by the residual, or deviation, between
observed and predicted emissions, given the facility's size and industry. Thus, if a facility
emits more than it 'should', given its size and SIC code, it will have a positive residual
91 Urioste, J. Global Procurement: ISO 14001 - Letter to Suppliers. IBM,
http://www.ibm.com/1BM/procurement/html/supplier.htm, april 13, 1998.
92 Toyota. "Toyota Adopts Environmental Standards for North American Manufacturing Operations".
http://www.toyota.com/times/manu/docs/iso14001.htm., May 22, 1997.
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and a positive score for environmental impact... [This measures] a facility's performance
relative to its sector"(King and Lenox, 1998:19). ISO 14001-registerd facilities who did
not report TRI data were assigned a pollute value of 'zero', the average for their industry
sector and size. Thus, 'pollute' is a measure of a facility's effluent per worker, relative to
the average of other facilities in the same SIC code. In this chapter, it is equivalent to
'emission intensity'.
Emission intensity of Industry: Using the emissions production function, based
on employees and industry sector, it was possible to determine emissions per employee
in each sector, and then rank the sectors in terms of 'emission intensity' (mIrrel).
ISO 9000 Registration & Foreign Ownership: ISO 9000 registration (iso9000)
and foreign ownership (foreign) are coded as binary variables for each facility, based
on the ISO 9000 and DUNS databases, respectively.
Heavily Regulated Sectors: Permitting requirements under both RCRA and the
NPDES are taken as proxies for substantial regulatory oversight. The more permits a
facility holds, the greater its regulatory burden (permits = rcra + npdes). The average
cost of compliance in an industry sector is also an important determinant of regulatory
stringency. These costs were taken from a recent study of compliance costs, by the
Council of Economic Priorities, or CEP (t-comply).
History of Regulatory Non-compliance: There are many different ways of
evaluating historical compliance. This study looked at:
* RCRIS site identifications linked to a facility's parent company (discover),
* RCRIS fines for RCRA permit violations (rcra-pen),
* DOCKET lawsuits against that facility concluded (conclud),
* DOCKET fines from lawsuits (penalty),
* PCS (permit compliance system) violations against the facility (pcs-cviol),
Facility size: This was measured using the log of total employees at each
facility, from DUNS.
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i. -acilities witn lower ieveis OT
pollution relative to their
industries.
-'oilute(TRI and DUNS) i oxicity ana empioyee-weignteaaggregate facility emissions
relative to industry average.
ISO14k-facilities lacking TRI data
are assigned their industry-avg.
2. Facilities that have already Iso9000 Facility registration to ISO 9000.
adopted ISO 9000. (ISO 9000)
3. Larger facilities are more lemploy Total employees in facility.
likely than smaller facilities. (DUNS)
4. Facilities that operate in mIrrel Average weighted emissions per
industry sectors with higher (TRI and DUNS) employee, for each 'industry
average levels of pollution. sector', as defined by 4-digit SIC,
relative to overall average.
5. Facilities in more-heavily permits Facility-specific sum of RCRA and
regulated industry sectors. (RCRIS, PCS) NPDES permits.
tLcomply Average facility compliance cost
(CEP) within SIC-based industry sector.
6. Facilities with a record of discover, conclude, Legal actions and fines for non-
environmental regulatory non- penalty, pcsvio, compliance levied against facility
compliance. rcra-pen by EPA.
(PCS, DOCKET, RCRIS)
7. Foreign-owned subsidiaries Foreign Facility owned by non-US based
of European and Asian firms. (DUNS) parent company.
Table 3.3 Summary of Hypotheses and Related Variables
Method of Analysis: To test the hypotheses posed in section 5.2, we used a
probit model. The probit probability model can be represented in the following form
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991:254):
Pi= F (a + b Xi) = F(Zi)
Thus:
Zi = a + b Xi
Our probit model assumes that, in this case, a facility obtains ISO 14001 registration if Zi
exceeds some value Zi*. The probit model assumes that Zi* is a normally distributed
random variable, so that the probability that Zi* is less than or equal to Zi can be
computed from the cumulative normal probability function:
Pi = F(Zi) = (27c) 0.5 zi e2/2 ds
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where s is a random variable, normally distributed with mean =0 and a variance =1. Pi
will thus lie in the interval (0,1). Pi represents an estimate of the conditional probability
that Zi will exceed Zi*, given some value of Xi. It is thus the conditional probability that
the facility will adopt ISO 14001, given, for example, that it already has
ISO 9000 registration (XiS 9000=1).
The independent variables affecting ISO 14001 registration likelihood are listed above,
in table 3.3. The total data set tested included all TRI-listed facilities, from which the ISO
14001 registered facilities were identified. The probit model then determined the
importance of each variable - the coefficient and the significance (P>lzl score) - in
explaining facility-level ISO 14001 registration. Because the data underlying the
variables themselves range considerably in their orders of magnitude (table 3.4c),
examining the relative magnitudes of their coefficients will not demonstrate their relative
significance. It is therefore the independent variables with the lowest P>lzl that are most
significant. Values of P>lzl range from 0 to 1. We have assumed in constructing this
dataset that all US facilities owned by Ford, IBM and Toyota will be registered to ISO
14001. We have made similar assumptions for Akzo Nobel and SGS Thompson, who
encourage, but do not require, ISO 14001 registration at their facilities. If a facility is
owned by any of these companies, for example, it will have a P>lzl = 0, indicating it is a
strong predictor of ISO 14001 registration. This can be seen below in table 3.4a.
3.4 Results: Early ISO 14001 Registration in the US
The probit results support several of the hypotheses. In brief, the bulk of registered
facilities are larger, more-regulated and dirtier than industry averages. They are more
likely to obtain registration if they are foreign-owned, or have ISO 9000 already.
Contrary to theory, however, it is firms that generate more effluent per employee within
their industries that are obtaining registration. These results will be explored in greater
detail below.
Relatively-low adoption costs drive early registration: It comes as no
surprise that larger firms, that already have well-structured management systems, are
more likely to adopt ISO 14001 than smaller, non-ISO 9000 ones. As shown in table
3.4a, below, we found based on 1996 performance data that of TRI-reporting facilities,
facilities with larger numbers of employees obtained registration disproportionately often
to ISO 14001 (H2, lemploye), as did those with ISO 9000 (H3, iso9000).
Reputational benefits spur adoption among the most emission-intensive
industries and among those who are most heavily regulated and monitored: Our
data suggests that facilities operating in industry sectors with higher average levels of
effluent per employee are more likely to obtain ISO 14001 registration (H4, mIrrel).
Also, more-heavily regulated facilities, as demonstrated by the number of permits they
hold, are more likely to obtain registration to ISO 14001 (H5, permits). It is not clear
whether a history of non-compliance is also a contributor to the registration decision
(H6, discover, conclud, penalty, pcscvio, rcra-pen).
Foreign market demands spur domestic adoption: It is readily apparent that
foreign ownership is a key determinant of ISO 14001 registration. This confirms the
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broadly-held sentiment that US firms are playing a 'wait-and-see' game, to determine
whether the standard will become a competitive requirement, or yield substantial
economic benefits (Krut and Gleckman, 1998:22; Thayer, 1996:1 193
Facilities that are emission intensive relative to their industry averages are
adopting ISO 14001: It was hypothesized that facilities that emit lower levels of
pollution per employee relative to their industries would more often obtain registration to
ISO 14001. This has not been supported by the data. In fact, it is more emission-
intensive facilities (pollute) that are most likely to obtain registration. It may be that
these facilities have lacked formal EMS in past, and are now adopting ISO 14001 in
order to improve their management practices.
Probit Estimates Number of obs
chi2(17)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
= 32399
= 715.81
= 0.0000
= 0.3438Log Likelihood = -683.13625
isol4K I Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5626788
1782263
1335408
0524614
1991025
1.263936
0005104
2098332
000012
2367494
6188968
2.439459
3.712157
1.604432
5.521374
3.739475
0001686
-3.110289
Note: 126 failures and 0 successes completely determined.
Results generated using Stata Software Package, Release 5 (1997)
Table 3.4 a Probit Estimates of Coefficients and Relative Significance of
Independent Variables in Predicting ISO 14001 Registration, Among
TRI-Reporting Facilities
93 Thayer, A. Chemical Companies Take a wait-And-See Stance Toward ISO 14000 Standards in Chemical and
Environmental News, April 1, 1996:11-14.
0853589
0449668
0223486
0173994
086991
4428879
0003801
0713577
8. 88e-06
0595794
1136217
3635688
6727111
2674904
4156092
7510996
0000877
.1228675
4.632
2 .004
4.015
1.055
0.329
0.894
0.617
0. 981
0.605
2.014
3.487
4.750
3 .558
4.038
11.325
3 .019
0.038
-27.274
0.000
0.045
0.000
0.291
0.742
0.371
0.537
0.327
0.545
0.044
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.970
0.000
2280779
0019598
045936
.0157431
.141896
-4721526
.0009796
.069884
.0000228
0032024
1735077
1.014296
1.075178
5558886
3 .892216
7952191
.0001752
-3.59192
iso9000
pollute
lemploy
m_1rrel
discover
conclud
penalty
pcs_cvio
rcra-pen
permits
f oreign
ibm
toyota
akzo
f ord
sgs
t-c ompl 1
_cons
3953783
090093
0897384
0183591
0286033
3958918
.0002346
0699746
5.38e-06
1199759
3962022
1.726878
2.393667
1.08016
4.706795
2.267347
3.34e-06
-3.351104
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT50
ISO 14000
Correlations between Independent Variables Influencing ISO 14001
Registration Likelihood
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| isol4K iso9000 pollute lemploy mlrrel discover conclud
-+-- -------------- -- -----------------------------------------------------------------
isol4KI 1.0000
iso9000| 0.0261 1.0000
pollutel 0.0193 0.0116 1.0000
lemploy 0.0546 0.0646 0.0069 1.0000
m_lrrell 0.0197 -0.0070 0.0039 0.0987 1.0000
discoverl 0.0336 0.0605 0.0721 0.0480 0.0670 1.0000
concludl 0.0032 0.0064 0.0171 0.0229 0.0530 0.0543 1.0000
penalty| -0.0037 0.0075 0.0140 0.0239 0.0391 0.0392 0.7246
pcs-cviol 0.0094 0.0328 0.0307 0.0169 0.0707 0.0846 0.0790
rcra-pen| 0.0042 0.0112 0.0112 0.0085 0.0250 0.0589 0.0516
permits| 0.0344 0.0853 0.0794 0.0962 0.0998 0.2395 0.0640
foreign| 0.0242 0.0416 0.0097 0.0394 0.0086 0.0469 0.0129
ibml 0.0788 0.0421 -0.0013 0.0319 -0.0141 0.0229 -0.0019
toyotal 0.0770 0.0072 -0.0065 0.0095 0.0049 -0.0047 -0.0010
akzoj 0.0364 -0.0074 0.0086 -0.0154 0.0091 0.0308 -0.0038
fordl 0.5588 -0.0090 0.0127 0.0542 0.0195 0.0355 0.0047
sgs| 0.0442 -0.0028 0.0033 0.0051 -0.0007 0.0138 -0.0008
t_comply| 0.0163 0.0314 -0.0002 0.0086 0.3507 0.1709 0.1308
permitsl 0.0344 0.0853 0.0794 0.0962 0.0998 0.2395 0.0640
| penalty pcscvio rcra-pen permits foreign ibm toyota
-+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
penaltyl 1.0000
pcscviol 0.0502 1.0000
rcra-pen| 0.0350 0.0062 1.0000
permitsl 0.0529 0.0934 0.0892 1.0000
foreign| 0.0173 0.0098 0.0042 0.0645 1.0000
ibml -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0007 0.0077 -0.0041 1.0000
toyotal -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0101 0.0282 -0.0002 1.0000
akzoj -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0013 0.0102 0.1074 -0.0009 -0.0005
fordf -0.0014 -0.0035 0.0091 0.0231 -0.0077 -0.0009 -0.0005
sgsi -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0072 -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0001
t_complyl 0.1006 0.1674 0.0452 0.1698 0.0491 -0.0049 -0.0010
permitsf 0.0529 0.0934 0.0892 1.0000 0.0645 0.0077 0.0101
akzo ford sgs tcomply permits
-------------------------------------------------------------
akzol 1.0000
fordl -0.0018 1.0000
sgs| -0.0004 -0.0004 1.0000
t_comply| 0.0335 0.0145 0.0008 1.0000
permitsl 0.0102 0.0231 0.0072 0.1698 1.0000
Table 3.4b
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Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min MaxVariable I
isol4K
iso9000
pollute |
lemploy |
m-lrrel
discover
conclud
penalty |
pcscvio
rcra-pen
permits |
foreign
ibm
toyota
akzo
ford
sgs
t-comply I
permits
Table 3.4c
.0047945
.0740683
.0020298
4.605158
1.737847
.1467372
.0072306
165.5981
.0232727
562.9238
.2757477
.034287
.0004406
.0001037
.0017364
.0015031
.0000777
149.3705
.2757477
.0690769
.2618854
.7072939
1.87515
2.08792
.3538483
.0877316
2878.868
.275899
18999.9
.5093411
.1819679
.0209855
.0101812
.0416343
.0387416
.0088173
370.8451
.5093411
Characteristics of Data Underlying
Registration Likelihood
0 1
0 1
13.0384
10.16585
10.58983
1
3
145000
12
1821000
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
4887.9
4
0
0
-7.122009
-9.21034
-7.824046
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1.2
0
Probit Analysis of ISO 14001
3.5 Conclusions
What implications do these results have for public policymakers ? The first implication is
that strong regulatory oversight appears to motivate ISO 14001 adoption. ISO 14001-
registered sites tend to generate more pollutants-per-employee than the average, or
operate in a more-polluting industry sector. Thus, those who adopt ISO 14001 do so
either to improve their environmental management or to disguise poor performance.
In terms of prevalence of ISO 14001 adoption in the US, by industry, our data suggests
that facilities who consider themselves in Transportation (SIC 37), Electricity, Gas and
Sanitary Services (SIC 49) or in Electronics, Industrial and Commercial Machinery and
Computers (SIC 36 and 35), are most likely to seek ISO 14001 registration. Because
registration is being led by large, influential firms such as Ford, Toyota and IBM, it is
reasonable to conclude that ISO 14001 registration may become a competitive
requirement within those industry sectors, like ISO 9000. Furthermore, many of those
firms are predominantly non-US based. This confirms the belief that the motivation to
adopt ISO 14001 is stronger in Europe and Asia than in the US, and that firms who wish
to compete in those locations may need to adopt the standard.
The empirical analysis performed in this chapter helps indicate why firms might obtain
registration to ISO 14001. However, it leaves unanswered the most important policy-
related question: What impact does ISO 14001 registration have on internal
management decisions that are relevant to environmental performance ? The following
chapter will explore the manner in which registered facilities have adopted ISO 14001,
by examining the impact of registration on management goals.
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Chapter 4: ISO 14001 Registration - Impact on Goal Setting9 4
4.1 Introduction
"Using ISO 14001 ...requires the creation of a system, a management programme, with
appropriate resources, to deliver the commitments and policy, objectives and targets set
by the organization."
-- O.A. Dodds, Chairman of the ISO TC207 (cited in ISO, January 1997"9)
"What gets measured gets managed and what gets managed gets done."
-- Les Grey's Management Rules-of-Thumb96
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of ISO 14001 registration on
internal management decisions, specifically on the designation of environmental
management goals. This chapter will show that, while ISO 14001 does not require
specific environmental performance commitments, it does require a systematic process
for developing and meeting management goals. The structure of ISO 14001 is such
that, assuming that third party oversight is adequate (an assumption that will be
challenged in detail in chapter 5), it should guarantee that organizations live up to the
goals they set for themselves. Links between ISO 14001 requirements and
organizational goal theory results suggest that goals established under ISO 14001 will
lead to meaningful action. The likely impact of ISO 14001 on environmental
performance is thus largely dependent on the nature of the resulting management
goals, and the process by which they are set.
Interviews with nine ISO-registered organizations suggest that organizational goals
established under ISO 14001 will be equivalent to, or less stringent, than prior to ISO
14001 adoption. However, the goals that are established will be more likely to lead to
attainment because they reflect greater specificity of roles and measures, greater
management commitment, broader participation in goal-setting, and greater
understanding of the organization's environmental and economic conditions. While firms
are no more likely to disclose substantive information regarding their performance
objectives, the implication of these results is that ISO 14001 implementation will likely
lead to a firm to improve its environmental performance and regulatory compliance.
4.2 Theory Shows ISO 14001 Management Goals Will Lead to Action
4.2.1 Goals Are Key to ISO 14001 Function
The most straightforward way to evaluate the impact of ISO 14001 on environmental
performance would be to measure it directly. Researchers cannot do that yet, for two
reasons. First, the standard, only two years old, may not have fully penetrated the
94 The author is once again indebted, this time to Vicki Milledge, for suggesting this means of analysis, and to Sandra
Rothenberg for generously assisting in its formulation
95 International Organization for Standardization (ISO). ISO Bulletin. (Tel+41 22 749 01 11).January 1997.
96 Grey, L. Developing a Technology-Based Business (Project Management Notes). cambridge: MIT, 1997.
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management systems of newly-registered organizations, who represent the majority of
registered sites. Thus, the changes that will occur, as plans are implemented and
corrective action is taken, have yet to materialize. Second, there is no requirement in
ISO 14001 that performance data must be divulged. The Multi-State Working Group, a
US-based effort between state and federal agencies, NGOs and several manufacturing
facilities, imposes a detailed reporting requirement on participating ISO 14001-
registered organizations, in exchange for guarding their anonymity (MSWG, 199897).
While this will no doubt provide valuable performance and other information on the
impact of the standard on participating facilities, it is an open question whether firms will
divulge such detailed information. It follows that, in analyzing the impact of the standard
on environmental performance, we may need to look at other, more readily-accessible
indicators.
What indicators might be used ? After a careful study of ISO 14001's requirements,
Naomi Roht-Arriaza concluded that, "to strengthen the standard's usefulness [to
regulators and interested members of the public], those interested in performance and
disclosure should differentiate among ISO 14001-compliant firms based on the quality
and content of their stated policies, especially the specificity and stringency of their
goals and their willingness to disclose adequate information [for oversight
purposes]"(Roht-Arriaza, 1996:6).
How does she reach this conclusion ? The following sections will suggest that the nature
of goals (content) established by an ISO 14001-compliant organization, as well as the
process by which they are set and communicated, will have important implications for an
organization's environmental performance.
4.2.2 Review of Aspects Identification and Goal-Setting Process
The structure of ISO 14001 is such that, assuming that third party oversight is adequate,
it should guarantee that organizations live up to the goals they set for themselves. The
following section provides a brief review of the goal-setting, implementation and
oversight activities within the ISO 14001 EMS standard. Readers should refer to chapter
2 for a more complete discussion of the standard's structure.
Management goals, or objectives, form the heart of ISO 14001, as depicted in figure
4.2.2a, below. The registered organization must identify and evaluate the significance of
all the environmental aspects of its operation over which it might reasonably be
expected to have some control, based on definitions laid out in its environmental policy
(ISO 14001, 4.3.1). Environmental aspects are defined by the standard as "elements of
an organization's activities, products, services, or physical resources that may have
potentially beneficial or harmful effects on the environment"(ISO 14001, 3.3; Martin,
1997:2298). Once its aspects have been identified, the organization must establish an
environmental management plan. The organization must set environmental objectives,
and targets, timetables and means for achieving those objectives, based on its
significant aspects, its legal requirements, its technological options, the views of
97 Multi-State working Group. Environmental Management Systems Voluntary Project Evaluation Guidance. NIST
NISTIR 6120), 1998.
8 Martin, R. ISO 14001 Guidance Manual. Oak Ridge National Laboratory: National center for Environmental Decision-
making Research, (Technical Report NCEDR/8-06), 1998.
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interested parties, and its business requirements (4.3.3). Important to the registrar here
is that the process used to identify aspects and rate their significance be consistent,
justifiable, and documented, without willfully ignoring significant issues (IISD, 1997:43)99.
Goals
Targets
& Timetables
Checking
& Corrective
Action
implementation I
Figure 4.2.2a ISO 14001 Management System Structure, Showing Centrality of Goals
to System Outcomes
SIgnificant Aspect Solid Waste Generation
Impact Waste of materials
Objective Reduce waste from materials used in manufacturing
Target and By 9/1/99, reduce scrap waste by 15% per unit
Measurement production, from 1995 base year.
Action Plan Identify and market valuable waste
Responsibility Facility manager
Documentation Quarterly Report
Budget $1,200 per year until 9/1/99.
Table 4.2.2b Example of Significant Aspect and Related Objective and Plan
The standard does not specify whether an organization needs to specify objectives and
targets for all its potential or actual significant environmental impacts. "At a minimum,
your compliance management system needs to include objectives and targets for
meeting legal requirements.. .that are currently not in compliance"(Knight and Ferrone,
CEEM:124). Environmental consultants suggest that "it makes good sense to select a
smaller number [of objectives].. .you are confident your facility.. .can manage to a
successful conclusion", as successes will reinforce the use of the EMS (Knight and
Ferrone, CEEM:126). However, the firm must be able to demonstrate to auditors that it
99 International Institute For Sustainable Development (lisd). Global Green Standards (Web-Based Edition). 1997.
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has not overlooked important aspects in the setting of smaller, achievable targets
(Knight and Ferrone, CEEM:126).
"Once objectives, targets and timetables are in place, management must designate
responsibility for achieving targets, [and] provide necessary resources (4.4.1)"(Roht-
Arriaza, 1997:3). "[The above-described] activities must be periodically monitored and
corrective action taken in cases of non-conformance [with targets and timetables]
(4.5)"(Roht-Arriaza, 1997:3). Corrective action should address the root cause of non-
conformances: "to mitigate any impacts"(4.5.2) and lead to "implementing or modifying
controls necessary to avoid repetition of the nonconformance"(A.5.2). In addition,
periodic management reviews are to evaluate the system's continuing effectiveness
(4.6). The existence of an adequate system may be self-certified, or a firm may seek
third party verification to certify that it conforms to the standard (Introduction, v-
vi)"(Roht-Arriaza, 1997:3). Third-party registration audits will ensure that all elements
specified by the standard are in place, employees are aware of their roles and
responsibilities, and the system is directed towards achieving the goals the organization
has specified for itself in its policy and objectives.
In summary, the identification and achievement of appropriate management goals is the
purpose of the ISO 14001 standard for EMS design. While not explicitly performance-
oriented, "it is intended that the implementation of an environmental management
system described by the specification will result in improved environmental
performance"(ISO 14001, A.1). The following section will identify potential links between
the system standard, goal selection, and performance outcomes.
4.2.3 ISO 14001 Helps Distinguish Between Official and Operative Goals
Management objectives may be characterized as either 'official' or 'operative' (Perrow,
cited in Milledge, 1995:11). "Official goals are those that are publicly stated by the
organization and are often vague or quite general. Their purpose is often symbolic and
provide the basis for the organization's ability to acquire legitimacy, allies, resources and
personnel"(Milledge, 1995:11). For example, Alex Trotman, CEO of Ford Motor
Company, affirmed in a 1996 publication that "it is Ford's policy that its operations,
products and services accomplish their functions in a manner that provides responsibly
for protection of health and the environment"(Trotman, 1996)100. From this statement,
we can infer a goal: Ford's operations, products and services should function in a way
that is protective of health and of the environment. This goal is 'vague' in that it does not
define 'protectiveness' in a way that provides clear direction.
"Operative goals are specific enough to direct the behavior of organizational members.
They provide cognitive guidance and the basis for operating decisions at lower level of
the organization"(Milledge, 1995:11). Returning to the Ford example, "With respect to
health and environmental concerns, regulatory compliance represents a minimum"
(Trotman, 1996:5). Here, the goal is clear and may be used as a decision criterion:
Ford's operations, products and services should, at minimum, meet all applicable health
and environmental regulations.
10 Trotman, J. Policy Letter No. 17: Protecting Health and the Environment. In Ford's Environmental System Pocket
Guide, 1996:5-6.
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In terms of operative goals, Bird distinguishes three types, to which I add a fourth (Bird,
1997:275-6):
" Monitoring objectives: These goals relate to the gathering and analyzing of data,
including such things as improving performance monitoring, or identifying input
substitutes. For example, IBM commit itself to "conduct rigorous audits and self-
assessments of [its] compliance with [its environmental] policy, measure progress of
[its] environmental affairs performance, and report periodically to the board of
directors"(IBM, 1998:32).
* Management objectives: These goals seek to increase the consistency of
environmental management. For example, IBM commits itself to "ensure that
personnel are properly trained and have appropriate safety and emergency
equipment"(IBM, 1998:32).
* Improvement objectives: These goals are oriented towards quantifiable input or
pollution reductions, though activities such as decreasing energy or materials use in
production, or decreasing hazardous emissions. For example, "IBM's corporate
conservation goal is to achieve annual energy conservation savings equivalent to 4
percent of IBM's yearly electricity and fuel use"(IBM, 1998:19)101
* Participation objectives: These goals seek to increase an organization's
contribution to social capacity and understanding of environmental issues, through
such means as support of local environmental initiatives, sponsorship of
environment days, encouragement of volunteer work or providing environmental
awareness training to the broader community. For example, IBM commits itself to
"participate in efforts to improve environmental protection and understanding around
the world and share appropriate pollution prevention technology, knowledge and
methods"(IBM, 1998:32).
According to Milledge, "some organizational theorists doubt that goals affect
organizational behavior in ways that are direct enough for the effects to be observed in
any meaningful way (e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Others argue that...in fact,
organizational goals determine what the organization is and must be taken into account
(Scott, 1987; Hall, 1991)....A major difficulty in organizational level studies of the
relationships between goals and performance is in determining the operative goals of
the organization. Statements of specific operative goals are difficult to
discover"(Milledge, 1995:11).
ISO 14001 facilitates the analysis of the impact of goals on performance. The standard
demands that firms' "objectives should be specific and targets should be measurable
wherever practicable"(ISO 14001, A.3.3). Implementation plans must include
"designation of responsibility for achieving objectives and targets at each function and
level of the organization"(4.3.4). These "roles, responsibilities and authorities shall be
defined, documented and communicated"(4.4.1). In fact, ISO 14001 registered
organizations are required to document these goals in their environmental management
manuals, so that they can prove to registrars that they have such goals in place (Bellen,
1998).
Based on this analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that ISO 14001-based objectives
statements will be documented and readily available. Second, these goals will include
designation of responsibilities, resources, metrics and timetables - making many of them
101 IBM. Environment & Well-Being: Progress Report. http://ww.ibm.com/ibm/environment, 1998.
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operative in nature. Third, ISO 14001-registered organizations will seek to achieve the
goals they specify for themselves in their policy and objectives statements, in order to
meet the requirement of continual improvement (see chapter 2 and section 4.2.2).
Assuming some firms are willing to make their goal statements available to outsiders,
these statements will therefore represent a valuable point of departure for research of
ISO 14001 impacts on environmental performance.
The following section will present the research methodology employed in this study.
4.3 Data, Method, and Limitations
4.3.1 Data and Method
Fourteen corporate and facility-level environmental managers in nine ISO 14001-
registered organizations were contacted and interviewed, as detailed in table 4.3.1,
below. For the sake of a balanced perspective, the owner of a small ISO 9000-
registered manufacturing company that had considered but then elected not to obtain
ISO 14001 registration, was also interviewed. Each telephone interview was
approximately 45 minutes long, and covered a range of questions related to goal
changes that will be detailed in section 4.4 (See appendix 1 for full list of questions and
interview summaries). In addition to examining the changes in goals subsequent to ISO
14001 registration, the aspects identification process, the rationale for ISO 14001
registration, the use of ISO 14000 tools other than the EMS, and supply chain
management issues were probed. Each interviewee agreed to participate under the
condition that the information be presented in generic format.
Co. Pseudonym Corporate Facilty' escription
Manae r Mona or
A Akoshi Al --- Asian Automaker
B Bendix B1 B2 European Chemical Manuf.
C Chips C1 --- American Aviation Co.
D Data --- D2 Asian Microelectronics Manuf.
E Eurotech --- E2, E3 European Microelect. Manuf.
F Fanta --- F2 Asian Microelectronics Manuf.
G Giant G1 G2, G3, G4 US Microelectronics Manuf.
H High --- H2 US Power Generator
I Impact 11 --- Small US Parts Manuf.*
J Jumbo J2 --- US Telecommunications Co.
* Considered obtaining registration to ISO 14001, but elected not to pursue it.
Table 4.3.1 Interviews with Corporate and Facility Level Managers
4.3.2 Limitations of Study
Evaluating the effectiveness of a management system standard in modifying internal
management decisions is a challenging research problem. It is difficult to establish a
causal relationship between adoption of ISO 14001, for example, and changes in
organizational objectives. In a recent paper, Harrison offers three helpful means for
evaluating the effects of an environmental regulation (Harrison, 1998:12):
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" Comparison to a Reference Point: This involves comparing observed behavior
with behavior in a 'base year' preceding the regulatory intervention. What changes
coincide with the implementation of the regulation ?
* Comparison of Effects: This involves determining the extent to which the
regulation leads to change. To what degree are the observed changes the result of
the program in question, and not the result from some other coincident regulatory,
social or economic force ?
* Comparison to Other Strategies: This involves determining what would have
happened if other interventions had occurred. Is the regulatory strategy in question
the 'best' (most preferable or most effective) means for achieving the desired
changes ?
This study will limit itself to comparing goals following ISO 14001 registration to those
existing previously (comparison to a reference point). In some cases, where comparison
was impossible due to lack of data, it will simply note the existence of a given
characteristic. The data gathered did not necessarily provide a clear sense of the goals
existant prior to ISO 14001 registration. Often, past goal statements had been erased,
were confidential, or personnel had changed. Furthermore, due to the small sample
size, it is clear that any conclusions drawn by this study cannot be considered
compelling verdicts. Much of the following discussion relies on managers' subjective
opinions, and thus can only provide indications of the likely impact of ISO 14001
registration on organizational goals.
4.4 Survey Results: ISO 14001 Impact on Management Goals
4.4.1 Stringency: No Change
"Which nation has more integrity: one that refuses.. .signature of a treaty, aware that it
may not be able to live up to its obligations; or the one that signs on with no intention of
enforcing a single word ?"
-Astrida Neimanis, letter to the London Economist, December 19, 1998102
Will organizations take on greater environmental responsibility following ISO 14001
registration ? One measure of an organization's commitment to environmental
management is the stringency of its management objectives. According to Ashford, an
environmental regulation is 'stringent' "either because compliance requires a significant
reduction in [emissions], because compliance using existing technology is costly, or
because compliance requires a significant technological change" (Ashford, 1996:7-8;
referring to regulation) 3. This theoretical definition of stringency is valid for internally-
established performance objectives (goals) no less than for those imposed on
organizations by external actors (e.g. regulators). Therefore, we can ask: are the goals
established by an ISO 14001-registered organization more stringent than those it had
prior to registration ?
102 Neimanis, A. Letters in The Economist, vol. 349, No. 8099, Dec. 19, 1998.
103 Ashford, N. The Influence of Information-Based Initiatives and Negotiated Environmental Agreements on
Technological Change. Presented at the International conference on the Economics and Law of voluntary Approaches in
Environmental Policy, November, 1996.
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This study did not seek to measure stringency using the theoretical definition presented
above. Instead, it relied on the subjective opinions of managers, who were asked:
Q: How are [the goals established following registration] different from what
you had in place prior to registration ? Do you think these goals will be difficult
to achieve? (Appendix 2).
The results, presented in table 4.4.1a, below, show that the (perceived) stringency of
goals has not significantly changed in the organizations that were studied. Some goals
were made more difficult, others less so. Still others were eliminated or replaced with
new objectives. One interpretation of these results is that an organization may use ISO
14001 to shield itself from pressure to raise its environmental standards. "Once a firm's
nature is effectively disguised [by membership in a communitarian agreement, such as
Responsible Care] and it has insured itself against future liability, each company has a
smaller incentive to reduce pollution"(King and Lenox, 1998:11).
Such a conclusion (that registration to ISO 14001 is allowing firms to avoid making more
substantive commitments to the environment) ignores important issues, relating both to
the content of the goals, and the process by which they are established. A deeper
reading of this result, incorporating real-world economic, technical and organizational
dynamics suggests that registered firms modify their goals in ways that will have
important positive environmental benefits.
ISO 14001 requires that organizations go through a careful process of identifying
significant aspects, and establishing objectives, targets and timetables 'appropriate' to
organizational needs, both economic and social. As better data is gathered and linked to
quality and financial management systems within the organization, it may be that
organizations actually identify areas where they are over-spending on environmental
issues, where previously-established goals are simply unattainable given technological
or budgetary constraints, or where other issues have greater salience than those
targeted by existing goals.
According to one registrar, a US automaker, while improving its information tracking
system as a requirement for ISO 14001 registration, identified a location where it was
operating a redundant water treatment plant. The primary source of the pollutants in that
waste stream had been closed some time earlier. It realized significant financial benefits
by reducing the treatment level (Bellen, 1998). Similarly, a manager at Eurotech noted
that the number of goals at her site had actually been diminished following registration,
from 29 in 1996, to 13 in 1997 (following registration), to 9 in 1998 (E2). "We needed to
reduce the number of objectives so that we could properly manage them using available
resources"(E2). The same manager noted that many of the corporate environmental
goals are very stringent. For example, Eurotech required each facility to use 50%
recycled water by the end of 1997 . "This has been very hard. We have not met it yet
because.. .it is a bit ahead of existing technology. [It will take an investment of] $2 million
to make it happen.. .and we are installing the first phase in 1999"(E2). This was echoed
by a manager at another Eurotech facility: "Three or four of the [corporate environmental
goals] are difficult for facilities to achieve"(E3).
104 Bellen, G. NSF Strategic Registrations. Personal Interview, Oct. 14, 1998.
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The stringency of management goals is also limited by internal organizational dynamics.
"It is one thing.. .to determine what must, should and could be done within an
organization in terms of environmental improvement, but quite another to determine
whether or not it would be possible to implement the changes in the context of the
organization's overall dynamics"(Bird, 1997:372)105. Environmental managers must sell
the goals within organization. "If objectives are the acid test of the sincerity of the policy,
it is crucial that they are implementable... Objectives do need to be both practical and
achievable if they are to act as an incentive for action"(Bird, 1997:372). For example, at
a Fanta electronics facility, goals have not changed in terms of stringency because: "We
don't want to set ourselves up for failure: If we can't meet our targets, we don't want to
be penalized"(F2).
Firms may have traditionally employed less-thorough methodologies for identifying
appropriate environmental goals. The systematic process of environmental goal-setting
called for by the ISO 14001 standard may lead organizations to hold goal stringency
constant, or even reduce it. On the surface, this may seem to indicate no net gain in
environmental commitment. However, increased understanding of technical, economic
and organizational constraints arising from the ISO process may help a firm more
realistically assess its capabilities. This study reveals, therefore, that 'no net change' or
even a reduction in goal stringency may signify an increased commitment to goal
attainment.
10 Bird, A. Establishing workable Environmental Objectives in Sheldon, C. (Ed.) ISO 14001 and Beyond. Sheffield:
Greenleaf Publishing, 1997:371-384.
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Y "[Akoshi] will establish.. .emissions standards more stringent than those set by law, and will achieve them in all vehicles: 1.
By 1998 - Surpass standards for diesel-powered light trucks. 2. By 1999 - Surpass standards for all gasoline-powered
NC No fundamental change: already have detailed management system based on Responsible Care (B2). However, are
finding lots of small to medium significance aspects, where procedures are unclear or not fully implemented. We then
correct those nuisances (B1).
--- Seeking to be "ahead of the curve". Benchmark not against regulatory requirements, but against performance of
competitors.
NC The corporate environmental goal statement requires each facility to use 50% recycled water by the end of 1997, vs. Q4 of
1996. "This has been hard. We have not met it yet because.. .it is a bit ahead of technology. $2M to make it happen ...and
we are installing the first phase in 1999"(E2). "Three or four of the [corporate environmental goals] are difficult for facilities
to achieve"(E3).
NC Goals have not changed (no change in stringency). "We don't want to set ourselves up for failure: if we can't meet our
targets, we don't want to be penalized".
NC "No fundamental change in goals set before and after ISO 14001 registration. Giant had a well-developed EMS in place
already'(G1). "Goals are a stretch, but not difficult to achieve. We have not made it to some goals, and have revised them
since. We have adapted the system to reflect our growing knowledge"(G2).
NC Goals largely focus on regulatory compliance.
Y = Interviewees stated that goal stringency increased following registration.
NC = Interviewees stated that 'no substantial changes' were observed in their environmental management goals following registration.
--- = Insufficient data.
Table 4.4.1a Impact of ISO 14001 Registration on Goal Stringency
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4.4.2 Characteristics of Environmental Management Goals
Given that changes in stringency alone are insufficient to determine the change in
organizational commitment to management goal attainment following ISO registration,
what other characteristics are relevant metrics ? How may changes in commitment to
environmental management objectives be measured ?
First, one could look at changes in the content of the goals themselves. Second, one
could look for changes in the process by which those goals are established. The
characteristics evaluated in this study are listed below in table 4.4.2. Each will be
defined and discussed in greater length below.
Coet-Rltd a Ghract4isics Prpceaq ltd olCaaceitc
Commitment to Regulatory Compliance Top-level Management Commitment
Comprehensiveness Participation in Goal-Setting
Specificity Transparency of Goals
Measurability
Pollution Prevention
Supply chain encouragement
Use of other ISO/EMS tools
Table 4.4.2 Characteristics of Environmental Management Goals
4.4.3 Content-Related Characteristics
Greater Commitment to Compliance: Adoption of ISO 14001 by an organization may
signify a greater commitment towards ensuring compliance with regulations. ISO 14001
requires that an organization's environmental policy "includes a commitment to comply
with relevant environmental legislation and regulations"(ISO 14001, 4.3c). Monitoring
and corrective action, management review, and independent registration audits are
intended to assist organizations in identifying and correcting the cause of non-
conformances, including non-compliance with regulations. "By correcting the
fundamental cause of the non-compliance, companies gain grater assurance of future
compliance"(Tucker and Kasper, 1998:8)106. EPA lawyer Brian Riedel emphasizes this
point: "While the ISO 14001 certification will not provide a 'talisman for compliance', the
ISO framework - setting objectives, procedures, measures and reviewing and improving
the framework - should better position [an organization] to meet or exceed regulatory
requirements. You are more likely to detect and correct violations if your company has a
workable system for doing so"(Riedel, CEEM:391). Through implementation of ISO
14001, firms simply may become more capable of assuring that they comply with
environmental regulation, and of doing so at lower cost to themselves.
This commitment to compliance is reflected in ISO 14001-registered firms'
management goal statements. Fujifilm management commit the firm to "assure that all
company facilities and operations consistently meet or exceed all applicable
environmental regulations"(Fujifilm environmental management commitment, cited in
106 Tucker, R. And Kasper, J. Pressures for Change in Environmental Auditing and in the role of the Internal Auditor
(ABI/INFORM edition). In Journal of Managerial Issues. 10(3), Fall, 1998:340-354.
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US-AEP, 1997:5). Through its interviews, this study found similar evidence of
compliance commitment. For example, Akoshi dedicates itself to "closely adhering to
environmental legislation" and establishing and achieving "emissions standards more
stringent than those set by law". It also found that Bendix committed itself to "reduce
incidents of reportable non-compliance" and "have zero notices of violations from
[regulatory] inspections". One Eurotech facility found, during ISO 14001 implementation,
that its monitoring of a regulated pollutant stream was only on a once-per-month basis.
If an accident led to a discharge in excess of regulatory requirements at any time other
than during that monitoring test, the facility would not detect it. In order to meet its 100%
compliance goal, therefore, the facility will implement a continuous monitoring system
(E2). These results support a conclusion that firms are using ISO 14001 to help improve
their compliance assurance.
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A Y "[Akoshi] will establish ...emissions standards more stringent than those set by law, and will achieve them in all venicies:
1. By 1998 - Surpass standards for diesel-powered light trucks. 2. By 1999 - Surpass standards for all gasoline-powered
vehicles..."
B Y Example of goals: "Reduce incidents of reportable non-compliance. Have zero notices of violations from inspections".
"Previous to ISO, we had the potential to modify our processes, and leave our environmental managers 'out of the loop'.
Permit violation would have resulted. Now, [the environmental management team] know what information we need to
know, and where to get it"(B2).
C Y Example goal: Take actions to limit to 0 the non-conformances to RCRA waste drum regulations (see figure 4.4.3a)
D --- Went from a 'compliance' focus to a proactive one. Now, we set our own requirements and see if we can achieve them.
E Y Corporate environmental goal statement commits Eurotech to "meet the most stringent regulations of any country in
which we operate, at all of our locations, worldwide." During ISO 14001 implementation, E2 discovered that its monitoring
of VOCs was on monthly basis. If an accident led to a slug discharge in excess of regulatory requirements, the existing
monitoring system would not detect it. In order to meet its 100% compliance goal, it will expand controls.
F Y "We do not have goals relevant to compliance because we are in compliance all the time. It is a pre-requisite for being in
business". (100% compliance goal)
G Y "[Giant facility G3] develops specific programs (Air, Hazardous Waste, Groundwater, Solid waste, Unplanned Releases,
etc.) designed to meet or exceed all applicable regulatory standards as well as corporate standards or.. .other local, non-
regulatory initiatives, where applicable"(Handbook G3).
H Y Many goals focus on compliance assurance: "No permit non-compliance findings during 75% of in-house
inspections"(Manual).
I Y Monitoring systems are now calibrated and used.
Table 4.4.3a Goals of ISO 14001-Registered Organizations Show Emphasis on Compliance Assurance.
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT 65
Increased Goal Specificity and Measurability: "The central tenet of individual level
goal setting and task performance theory is that specific, difficult goals result in higher
performance on a task than if the individual had no goal or a general goal"(Milledge,
1995:4)107. Therefore, an important question is whether ISO 14001 encourages firms to
set more specific, measurable goals than they might otherwise choose.
Q: How specific and measurable are your goals in terms of
responsibilities, timetables and performance metrics ? (Appendix 2)
ISO 14001 requires that "objectives should be specific and targets should be
measurable wherever practicable"(ISO 14001, A.3.3). It is therefore likely that
management goals set in the process of ISO 14001 registration will establish
more-specific responsibilities, timetables, targets and performance metrics than
existed prior to registration.
Interview results support this conclusion (see table 4.4.3b, below). For example, all of
the organizations contacted had established performance-oriented, quantitative targets,
with clear designation of responsible personnel (see figure 4.3.3b, following tables
below) . Eurotech, for example, modified its goals to reflect greater measurability. "A
previous goal was to 'reduce H2SO4 consumption'(E2,1996). Following ISO registration,
we committed to 'recycle more than 30% of the H2 SO4 consumed in the manufacturing
process in 1998"(E2, 1998). Giant noted a similar change: Each objective establishes a
target, timeframe, an 'owner' and a list of projects to be completed. Prior to ISO 14001,
objectives looked like: "let's reduce water consumption". Now: "we will reduce water
consumption, and here are the timetable, metrics and resources to do so. [Goal
statements are] more structured now so that objective evidence is in place to
demonstrate to [our] registrar that progress is occurring"(G1).
107 Milledge, v. Goal Setting and Task Performance at the Organizational Level: Studies of Emissions Reductions Goals
and Performance. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1995.
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT66
Y Design team ISO 14001 goals establish quantitied targets and timetables. i-or example, "ty zUUU, new volume
production models...will use half or less the amount of lead...than that now being used (1997)".
Example of goal: "achieve 30% reduction in hazardous waste generation by 1997 relative to 1996"
Example of goal: 80% reduction in hazardous waste generation versus 1988 baseline.
"15% reduction of all chemical use at this site during 1998".
Goals are largely quantitative at both sites, and referenced to previous years' performance. For example, "a previous
goal was to 'reduce H2SO4 consumption'(E2,1996). Following ISO registration, we committed to 'recycle more than 30%
of the H2SO4 consumed in the manufacturing process in 1998"(E2, 1998).
Example aoal: Reduce use of solvents in audio speaker production plant by 10% in 1998.
Example goals: G1, G2, G3, G4 - Reduce energy consumption by 4% per year. G3 - Recycle 50% by weight of all non-
hazardous waste.
H~iiji Y Highly quantified goals: "<150 ug/m3 (24 hr.avg.) PM 10 air emissions"(Manual).
Table 4.4.3b Part 1: ISO 14001 Registration Increases Measurability of Environmental Goals
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT
ISo 14000
67
A Y Responsibilities are spelled out in organizational structure: "Six persons, under the jurisdiction o tne neaa OT
environmental matters, will be placed in charge of the six areas of concern".
B Y "Training let everyone know of policy, objectives, their individual responsibilities, and the consequences if they do
something wrong. Goals are posted where people can see them"(B1).
C Y Each site sets site-specific goals and objectives, with the responsible parties, completion dates and review dates spelled
out (see figure 4.4.3b, below).
D Y Responsibilities are very specific - Personnel are allocated to each project.
E Y "It is every employee's responsibility to ensure compliance with operating specifications and procedures in order for the
site to maintain compliance with regulatory and permit limitations"(E3: publicly available EMAS environmental statement).
F Y "Timetables and responsibilities are more specific now."
G Y Each objective establishes a target, timeframe, an 'owner' and a list of projects to be completed. Prior to ISO 14001,
objectives looked like: "let's reduce water consumption". Now: "we will reduce water consumption, and here are the
timetable, metrics and resources to do so. More structured now so that objective evidence is in place to demonstrate to
registrar that progress is occurring"(G1).
H Y Compliance responsibility clearly indicated: "Equipment operators, Operations, Lab Techs..."(Manual).
I Y We train our employees, get alignment on purpose, document procedures. "If you don't have a record it doesn't exist".
Table 4.4.3b Part 2: ISO 14001 Registration Increases Specificity of Roles and Responsibilities in Goal Statements
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Figure 4.4.3b Goal Statements Show Specific Objectives,
Facility EMS Goal Tree).
Targets, Projects and Responsibilities (from Chips Unlimited
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More Comprehensive Goals: An organization's environmental goals define its
perceived scope of responsibility. An important question, therefore, is whether ISO
14001 registration leads the organization to broaden its notion of environmental
responsibility, to include both regulated and unregulated environmental issues.
Q: Are you setting goals for regulated and unregulated aspects ?
ISO 14001-registered organizations must consider both regulated and unregulated
aspects in setting management goals. "When establishing and reviewing its objectives,
an organization shall consider its legal and other requirements, its significant
environmental aspects...and the views of interested parties"(ISO 14001, 4.3.3). Based
on a series of workshops between European environmental managers, held by the UK-
based Institute of Environmental Management, a consensus emerged that "if a
stakeholder believes that an impact is important, then it is significant"(Bird, 1997:373) .
Interview results suggest that through the aspects identification and goal-selection
process mandated by ISO 14001, organizations will take responsibility for a
broader array of environmental impacts than that required of them by regulation.
For example, Akoshi managers are grappling with previously unmanaged' areas: "the
ISO program requires a factory to produce formal rules and procedures for dealing
specifically with environmental issues... Do you turn lights off when you leave the office
on Friday afternoon ? Does somebody check the compressed air hoses for leaks when
they're not in use?" Giant has found that, in addition to setting goals for its regulated
aspects, and common unregulated aspects (e.g. energy consumption, solid waste),
facilities are targeting specific local issues. For example, "water consumption is a big
issue in California" so a California-based facility has set a water use reduction goal
(G2). Eurotech has also found that different sites have different priorities (see figure
4.4.3c, below). In all cases, each firm is tackling a broader array of impacts than those
specified by regulation.
. Bird, A. Establishing Workable Environmental Objectives in Sheldon, C. ISO 14001 and Beyond. Sheffield: Geenleaf
Publishing, 1997:371-384.
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A Y Set goals for municipal waste and energy use reduction. "The ISO program requires a factory to produce formal rules
and procedures for dealing specifically with environmental issues ...Do you turn lights off when you leave the office on
Friday afternoon ? Does somebody check the compressed air hoses for leaks when they're not in use?.. .More
involved plans deal with reducing steel scrap."
B --- ---
C Y "The [ISO 14001 registration] process has caused our main site to look at issues such as energy...Non-regulated
impacts are being considered".
D --- ---
Y Sites have non-regulatory noise, energy, paper use , and water use goals arising from pre-ISO management system.
F Y Goals include energy consumption, materials use, paper consumption, and recycling of batteries.
G Y In addition to regulated aspects, as well as unregulated aspects (energy consumption, solid waste), facilities target
specific local issues. "Water consumption is a big issue in California" so G2 has set a water use reduction goal (G2).
H Y Have identified some non-regulatory issues that are subject to objectives. "Employee interest" led to objective of
"100% recycling of used oil"(Manual).
I Y A goal that arose from stakeholder concerns translated into savings: neighbors and employees complained about oil
on shoes. As a result, we realized we were losing $20,000 of oil a year. Installation of improved centrifuge recovers
$5,000 worth of oil. New plant has been designed to reduce losses.
Table 4.4.3c ISO 14001 Registration Stimulates Comprehensive Management Goals
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Phoenix Facility
- Reduce energy use 5% vs. 97
- Reduce water use 30% vs. 97
- Reduce VOCs by 90% vs 97
" Reduce paper use 10%
- Recycle >30% of sulfuric acid
- Reduce non-hazardous
landfilled waste bylO% vs. 97
- Reduce landfilled hazardous
waste by 10% vs. 97
- Maintain noise levels at site
perimeter to 60 db(A)
" Verify that site's acid
scrubbers are operating at
95% efficiency through tests
California Facility
- Reduce energy use 5% vs. '97
- Reduce water use 10% vs. '97
- Recycle water 60%
- Reduce paper use 10 %
- Recycle/reuse chemicals 30%
- Increase solid waste recycling
75% vs. '97
- Reduce hazardous waste
generation 5% vs. '97
- Reduce noise levels at site
perimeter to 60 db(A)
- Decrease reportable accidents
to <1/100 employees
Figure 4.4.3c Comparison of Public Goal Statements from Eurotech Sites E2 and E3, Showing Different Prioritization of Efforts.
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More-Formalized Pollution Prevention Efforts: Pollution prevention, as defined by the
EPA, places an emphasis on reducing pollution at the source, and on recycling waste
that cannot be prevented. "Disposal or other release into the environment should be
employed only as a last resort... Pollution prevention is potentially the most effective
method for reducing risks to human health and the environment.. .[and] the most cost
effective method of environmental protection"(EPA, 1997:1-2)109. This notion of pollution
prevention is advanced in the belief that "preventing pollution, rather than controlling it or
cleaning it up, could provide both environmental and economic benefits"(ibid.:1). A
question, therefore, is whether ISO 14001 acts as a catalyst for the promotion of
pollution prevention activities.
Q: To what extent are you focusing on pollution prevention ? Are you
rethinking manufacturing processes, or changing products, as a result of
ISO registration ?
Registration to ISO 14001 compels an organization to commit to 'prevention of
pollution'. As defined in the standard, this is "use of processes, practices, materials or
products that avoid, reduce or control pollution, which may include recycling, treatment,
process changes, control mechanisms, efficient use of resources and material
substitution"(ISO 14001, 3.13). This definition does not emphasize prevention over end-
of-pipe control. However, it may stimulate a self-examination of production processes,
inputs and products that leads to greater preventative efforts than existed prior to
registration, or the formalization of existing efforts. Formalization of efforts may reflect a
greater organizational commitment to prevention.
Interview results suggests that the emphasis on documentation and on prevention of
pollution do compel firms to formalize and place greater emphasis on pollution
prevention activities. For example, at High Power, the environmental engineer has been
granted the authority to shut the plant down if he believes that people, equipment or
environmental safety is compromised. According to the facility manager, such authority
"was unheard-of prior to [ISO 14001 registration]". Giant had Pollution Prevention efforts
prior to ISO 14001. According to one facility's environmental manager, they are now
better integrated with the management system (G3; see fig. 4.4.3d, below). While it
does not appear that new pollution prevention efforts have emerged subsequent
to ISO 14001 registration, those efforts that were underway prior to registration
have been formalized and granted greater encouragement.
109 EPA. Pollution Prevention 1997: A National Progress Report - Executive Summary. Washington: Office of Pollution
Prevention and Toxics, 1997.
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A Y "The recyclability of vehicles will be raised gradually until it reaches 90% by 2000".
B Y "Had 97% emissions reductions since 1989. Not much left to gain through efficiency. Therefore, must change process.
New emissions-free storage tanks are being installed ($11 M capital investment)".
C Formalize "Beginning to incorporate 'Design for Environment & Safety' into our thinking through pilot projects. ISO 14001 helped us
formalize efforts that were underway, and emphasize them...increasing dialogue between engineering and environmental
management".
D Y Forcing our suppliers to develop chemicals that etch our semiconductors in a cleaner way. A cleaner input will give us a
cleaner product, both in terms of the environment and in terms of quality. If it is cleaner, it will be easier to clean off,
therefore saving us money and time.
E Y E2 subject to state regulatory requirement to file a pollution prevention plan. E3 "is striving to recycle 80% of our
byproducts. We also use recyclable or reusable packing material when possible"(E3 EMAS statement).
F Y We have not changed any products, but are beginning to rethink our processes. For example, the speaker plant
reworked its process to reduce adhesive use, and thus hazardous waste.
G Formalize "Achieve pollution prevention through the reduction, recycle, reuse or elimination of chemicals used by focusing on those
projects with the greatest potential for results. State results with reference to production index ...[by] July 1999"(Handbook
G3). Had Pollution Prevention efforts prior to ISO 14001, but now better integrated with management system.
H Y Environmental engineer now has authority to shut the plant down if s/he feels people, equipment or environmental safety
is compromised. "That was unheard-of prior to [ISO 14001 registration]." Installation of solventless parts washer in order
to reduce solvent use by 25% by 1999.
J - -
Table 4.4.3d ISO 14001 Registration Leads to Formalization and Encouragement of Pollution Prevention Programs
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Figure 4.4.3d Pollution Prevention Goals at Giant G3, Showing Specific Roles and Responsibilities (Handbook G3)
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT
Objective 1 Pollution Prevention - Hazardous Waste Generation
Target Achieve continuous improvement in the reduction of hazardous
waste generated from Giant's manufacturing processes relative to
production volumes.
Owner R. Kohli / B. MacBrien
Time calendar year 1998 relative to calendar year 1997
Means
- Identification of projects that have potential for reduction, recycle,
reuse or elimination of focus chemicals.
- Establish appropriate teams
- Determine technical feasibility
- Determination of cost-effectiveness
- Implementation strategy (budget, management approval, etc.)
Objective 2 Waste Management - Non-Hazardous Waste
Target Recycle 50% by weight of non-hazardous waste generated
Owner B.MacBrien
Time calendar year 1998
Means etc.
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Supply Chain Encouragement, but not Requirement: A heatedly-contested issue
among ISO 14001 proponents and critics has been the question of supply-chain
management. It is well-known, as in the case of quality management, that "supplier
relations and supply-chain management can affect industrial and environmental
performance in different ways. On the one hand, manufacturers have at times used their
suppliers as a vehicle for improving their own environmental records by out-sourcing
toxic elements of their production processes, essentially pushing waste and toxins down
the supply chain. On the other hand, new models of supplier relationships.. .create
opportunities for joint approaches to improve productivity and prevent pollution. For
example, the emphasis on just-in-time delivery seeks to reduce both inventory and
waste...Increasing co-involvement in product development...provides opportunities for
the design of new products and processes that are both more efficient and
environmentally benign"(Florida, 1996:9)110.
Q: Will you require your suppliers to adopt ISO 14001 ?
ISO 9001 explicitly requires firms to use only similarly-registered suppliers (Krut and
Gleckman, 1998:7). By contrast, ISO 14001 requires only that an organization take into
account those environmental aspects over which it can be expected to exert some
control (ISO 14001, 4.3.1), which may include placing requirements on suppliers "only
as far as the supplier's performance is likely to have an impact on the firm's ability to
comply with its stated target and goals"(UNCTAD, 1997:11). It seems, therefore, that
ISO-compliant organizations will require their suppliers to pay more attention to
environmental issues, perhaps encouraging the adoption of an EMS conforming to
ISO 14001 specifications, but without requiring registration.
Interview results support this conclusion. For example, at Bendix Chemicals, ISO 14001
is "no supplier requirement, but [they] are encouraging it. As part of [their] ISO
registration, [they] identified suppliers/contractors that are critical to [their] environmental
safety, and [must now] ensure they have the appropriate level of competence"(B1).
According to the corporate environmental manager, "We must show our registrar
documented evidence that the contractors know what they are doing"(B1). At Data
Microelectronics, the "corporation is asking suppliers to move towards registration.
[Data] will even help them develop their program, if necessary. Each year, we send
evaluations to our suppliers telling them what the quality and environmental parameters
are that we want to seem them focus on". Eurotech has sent letters to its key suppliers,
requiring them to obtain either EMAS or ISO 14001. Suppliers with an EMS in place will
receive "preferential treatment", one factor among many supplier evaluation criteria.
110 Florida, R. Lean and Green: The Move to Environmentally-Conscious Manufacturing (ABI/INFORM version). In
California Management Review, 39(1), 1996:80-105.
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A N may De a poss1D111ty in tne tuture, Dut not requiring registration now. some pians unaerway inciuae -worKing wim a
supplier to alter the chemical composition of a raw material".
B Encourage "No supplier requirement, but we are encouraging it. As part of ISO registration, we have to identify suppliers/contractors
that are critical to environmental safety, and ensure they have the appropriate level of competence. We must show our
registrar documented evidence that the contractors know what they are doing"(B1).
C N Have not required it yet, but would if their customers start to require it. Rumor that NASA is considering adoption of ISO
14001, in which case registration offers a competitive edge (C1, C2).
D Encourage Corporation is asking suppliers to move towards registration. [Data] will even help them develop their program, if
necessary. Each year, we send evaluations to our suppliers telling them what the quality and environmental parameters
are that we want to seem them focus on.
E Y According to internal documents, Eurotech has sent letters to 86 key material suppliers in June '97 indicating that it will
continue to use them only if they are either EMAS or ISO 14001 validated not later than the end of 1998. In response to
that letter, 74 suppliers commenced ISO 14001 registration process and 24 initiated EMAS efforts. It has sent a similar
letter to equipment suppliers, of whom 17 have initiated registration processes, to one or the other standard. Facilities
"plan to give preference to suppliers and vendors who are registered, beginning 1999"(E2).
F --- ---
G Encourage "As part of its environmental leadership, [Giant] is also encouraging its suppliers to align their EMS's to ISO 14001 and
pursue registration under it. The company believes this will...assist it in selecting environmentally responsible
suppliers"(Giant ISO 14001 promotional pamphlet). Company sent out a letter to 100 suppliers encouraging ISO 14001
adoption.
H N Coal mines are suppliers. They have asked manager about intentions, but he has not yet decided.
Table 4.4.3e ISO 14001 Registration Leads to Supply-Chain Encouragement
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Organizations are not yet Employing Other ISO/EMS Tools: The ISO 14000 series is
intended to include a range of environmental management tools complementary to the
EMS standard, including standards for Lifecycle Assessment, Environmental
Performance Evaluation, and Eco-labeling. Are EMS-registered firms using these other
tools, as well ?
Q: What other tools from the ISO 14000 series are you employing or
plan to employ ?
The interview results suggest that, at least among those firms surveyed, firms are not
using the other ISO 14000 tools (see table 4.4.3f).
A N None.
B N None.
C Y Beginning to explore Lifecycle Analysis (LCA).
D N None.
E N None. Looked at Environmental Performance Evaluation, and is studying
the Lifecycle Assessment standard, but no current plans to use either
standard.
F N Not yet, but probably will in the future.
G N None.
H N None.
I N None.
J N None.
Table 4.4.3f Registration Does Not Necessarily Lead to Use of Other
ISO 14000-series Environmental Management Tools
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4.4.4 Process-Related Characteristics
Top level management commitment: Commitment from top management to
environmental goals is essential to their attainment. According to a meta-analysis of 70
studies, performed by Rodgers and Hunter in 1991, "when top management
commitment [to organizational goals] was high, the average gain in productivity was
56%, but when commitment was low, the average gain was only 6%"(as cited in
Milledge, 1995:17).
Q: Is an ISO 14001-registered organization's environmental policy
endorsed by the CEO or other senior-level manager ?
ISO 14001 requires evidence of top-level management commitment: According to the
standard, "the environmental policy is the driver for implementing and improving the
organization's environmental management system so that it can maintain and potentially
improve its environmental performance. The policy should therefore reflect the
commitment of top management to compliance with applicable laws and continual
improvement. The policy forms the basis upon which the organization sets its objectives
and targets.. .The organization's top management should define and document its
environmental policy..."(ISO 14001, A.2). Environmental goals will therefore likely
reflect top-level management commitment, following ISO 14001 registration.
Examples of high-level corporate commitment to environmental goal attainment in ISO
14001-registered firms are widespread. For example, as cited earlier, Alex Trotman,
CEO of Ford, personally signed the firm's environmental policy statement. Trotman
attests that "with respect to health and environmental concerns, regulatory compliance
represents a minimum.. .The issue of cost alone does not preclude consideration of
possible alternatives.. .Company products, services, processes and facilities are planned
and operated to incorporate objectives and targets which are periodically reviewed so as
to minimize to the extent practical the creation of waste, pollution and any adverse
impact on health or the environment"(Trotman, 1998:5). At Bendix Chemicals, the "top
level commitment to the environment [is] communicated to all employees", according to
the corporate environmental manager (B1). At Fanta and at High Power, senior
managers were actively involved in the goal-setting processes. These examples indicate
a more active commitment towards environmental management from senior personnel.
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A Y Corporate decision to obtain registration at all North American sites by 2001.
B Y "Top level commitment to the environment, communicated to all employees"(B1).
C Y Corporate goal is to become an environmental leader. CEO and corporate EHS staff established corporate -level goals.
Each operating unit must establish goals and objectives to achieve the corporate goals.
D Y Demonstrated through corporate-wide ISO registration decision, and through supplier assistance program.
E Y According to its corporate environmental goal statement, "[Eurotech] believes firmly that it is mandatory for a TQM driven
corporation to be at the forefront of ecological commitment, not only for ethical and social reasons, but also for financial
return, and the ability to attract the most responsible and performant people".
F Y Senior management involved in goal-setting.
G Y "[Giant environmental] policy is a company-wide statement that governs actions within [Giant]. [Giant] policies are issued
only by [Giant's] Chief Executive Officer"(Handbook).
H Y Plant manager drove process because he believed it would reduce his potential to end up in jail.
I Y "We agree that management commitment is a prerequisite to EMS implementation"(Presentation).
Table 4.4.4a Impact of ISO 14001 Registration on Management Commitment
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Broader Participation in Goal-Setting but no Gain in Goal Transparency: ISO
14001 was created with stakeholders in mind, "to assure interested parties that an
appropriate environmental management system is in place"(ISO 14001, Introduction, vi).
Managers perceive the ISO structure, particularly the independent audits, as adding
legitimacy to their environmental efforts to external stakeholders. According to Giant,
"benefits of ISO 14001 include more structure, harmonization of systems, and objective
third party audits"(G1). A manager at Data "wanted [the] independent audit, in order to
assure customers and the public of our environmental effort"(D2). The corporate
environmental manager at Bendix believes that "third party verification offers
advantages over Responsible Care, which is not as credible to external stakeholders
because it lacks third-party verification"(B1). Important questions to ask, therefore, are
whether ISO 14001 catalyzes external participation in goal-setting, and yields goals that
are made transparent to external stakeholders.
Q: Were any outside stakeholders involved in goal-setting ? Do you
make any of your goals public ?
ISO 14001 does not require that organizations consult their stakeholders directly in
establishing goals (external participation), nor that they make those goals public
(transparency). By going the additional step of publicizing its objectives, or involving
outsiders in its decision process, an organization facilitates external oversight, and
creates additional pressure on itself to 'deliver on its promises'. Social psychologists
have acknowledged the power of public commitments to drive performance: "Whenever
one takes a stand that is visible to others, there arises a drive to maintain that stand in
order to look consistent.... For appearances sake, then, the more public a stand, the
more reluctant we will be to change it"(Cialdini, 1993:82111 ). It is understandable, then, if
firms are reluctant to involve external stakeholders in goal-setting, or disclose their goals
to them. The Coalition on ISO 14000 Implementation (C12) is an industry group
representing the automotive, steel, petroleum and paper manufacturers associations,
whose views can be taken as representative of the major American industrial
organizations. In a recent statement, the C12 noted that while "interested parties
do.. .have an interest in the environmental performance of an organization. However,
that legitimate interest.. .cannot be equated with a right to involvement in the internal
deliberations of a company"(C12, 1998:61m).
While ISO 14001 requires that an organization "consider processes for external
communication on its significant environmental aspects"(ISO 14001, 4.4.3), it is not
required to make substantive public commitments. Interviews indicate that firms are
not disclosing greater amounts of goal, or performance-related information to
their publics following ISO 14001 registration (see table 4.4.4b, Part I, below). Of
those firms that were interviewed for this study, only EMAS-registered Eurotech
publicized its facility-level goals.
While it must establish a means for incorporating the views of interested parties in its
goal-setting process, the ISO 14001-registered organization is not required to formally
invite them to participate. "When establishing and reviewing its objectives, an
m Cialdini, R. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (Rev. Ed.). New York: Quill, 1993.
112 Coalition on ISO 14000 Implementation (C12). Position Statement on the ISO 14001 EMS Standard. (Available
through Sidley & Austin, 202-736-8118), June 23, 1997.
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organization shall consider the legal and other requirements.. .and the views of
interested parties"(ISO 14001, 4.3.3). Interview evidence indicates that firms are not
likely to involve outside stakeholders in the goal-setting process, unless they
were already doing so prior to registration (see table 4.4.4b, Part I, below). Data, for
example, involved representatives from state and local environmental commissions in its
goal-setting processes only because such cooperation had occurred prior to ISO
registration.
Firms do seem to be involving a broader group of participants within the
organization in the aspects identification and goal-setting processes (see table
4.4.4b, Part 11, below). Almost all sites made use of cross-functional team efforts to
identify aspects and establish goals. As one manager at Giant put it, ISO "gets
environmental management out of the hands of the half-dozen environmental
professionals and out to the people who really affect the environment"(G2). This was
echoed by the facility manager at High Power, who noted "If the environmental engineer
got run over by a car six months ago, we would have been dead. Not anymore. Now, we
know who is responsible for each action. [Now, we have a] greater emphasis on
procedure, and less on [the] person"(H1). The net effect of this broader participation
may be incorporation of many community interests in goal statements (since employees
are also community members), identification and reduction of previously unrecognized
waste streams, and perhaps a natural trend towards external participation, in the future.
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A N None.
B N Independent of ISO, perform Responsible Care audits. Audit team composed of competitors, consultants, & community
members (B1). Have Community Advisory Panel, but they were not involved in registration decision (B2).
C N None.
D Y Both the state environmental commission and the municipal environmental commission (with representatives from
community groups, other businesses, and regulators) were involved in the goal-setting process.
E N None.
F N None.
G N None. Goals are set by internal teams.
H N None.
Jn --- M--
A N Environmental policy is publicly available. Was published in local newspaper, at one site. Goals and other information
not made public.
B N Publish annual community environmental update.
C Corp. Corporate-level goals are available on homepage.
N Goals are not publicized outside of the company, but were communicated to the state and municipal environmental
commissions (including regulators and community representatives).
E Y Both corporate and facility-level goals and performance data are available to the public.
F Y Our policy is public. Our goals are not public, but we will tell you, if you ask.
G Corp. Policy is public. Corporate environmental goals and performance is available on-line. Some facilities may make goals
public in "not-so-distant future"(G2).
N Policy is public.
Table 4.4.1b Part 1: Impact of ISO 14001 Registration on Participation, and Transparency of Resulting Goals to
External Stakeholders, Showing No Additional External Stakeholder Participation, and No Additional Transparency
of Goals.
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Gross-functional team brainstormed each process, assembly line, permit requirement, community complaint. Aspects ranked based on
volume of waste, toxicity, regulated requirements, probability of accident.
Cross-functional team from operations, maintenance, research and waste water treatment met and brainstormed potential impacts based
on 15-page checklist. Ranked them in a matrix based on magnitude of harm, probability, reportable permit violations, community
concerns, management cost (B1, B2).
Outside consultant helped internal cross-functional team to identify ten aspects within each activity, and rank them based on regulatory
requirements, noise, air emissions, waste water, potential for accidental release, recycling, energy use, solid waste, esthetics.
Cross functional teams looked at inputs and products. Determined significance based on corporate environmental goals, state and
municipal environmental commissions' input, benefit vs. cost.
Varied between sites. At E2, cross-functional team looked at each environmental medium, all waste streams, and assigned a risk score
(probability x severity) for each impact, using corporate environmental goal statement as a guideline (see fig. 4.3e). At E3, did not use a
ranking system. Instead, performed a qualitative review of operations and environmental aspects. An aspect was considered significant if
the facility represented one of the top five waste generators or resource users in the area, if it violated permit requirements, if it posed an
offsite health risk, or if it exceeded the guidelines established in the corporate environmental goal statement(E3) .
F2 looked at inputs and outputs, raw materials, products and wastes. They held general meetings with line employees, managers and
supervisors to brainstorm aspects and obtain group buy-in. Used 'modified failure mode analysis' to rank priorities, based on regulatory
requirements, long term toxicity, hazardous vs. Non-hazardous wastes, likelihood and magnitude of impact, and cost of control. Selected
top 3-5 aspects to develop objectives and targets.
Differed between facilities. G2 environmental staff looked at operations and brainstormed potential impacts from activities and services.
Used professional judgment of assembled staff to determine significance of aspects. If corporation felt it was significant, G2 did too. G3
cross-functional team developed a matrix (probability x magnitude of aspect) to rank aspects. Also, regulatory requirements, corporate
significance. G4 cross-functional team followed similar process to G3.
Cross-functional team, with help of consultant, were trained and tasked to develop aspects list based on all processes and activities.
Ranked significance based on personal judgments about impacts to air, water, land, flora, fauna, and human health.
A cross-functional team....brainstormed environmental aspects from several perspectives: listed purchases..., tried to identify all waste
streams, interviewed stakeholders.
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT
J Corporate office developed a Management Information Systems tool to facilitate aspect selection and significance evaluation, dependent
51|2|on risk, cost, severity, EH&S concerns.
Table 4.4.1b Part II: ISO 14001 Aspects Identification and Goal-setting Process, Showing Cross-Disciplinary Employee
Participation, and Consideration of Broad Range of Environmental Impacts.
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4.5 Summary of Results and Conclusions: Positive Impact on Goals
This chapter has presented an assessment of the impact of ISO 14001 registration on
the content of, and process by which, environmental management goals are
established. Table 4.5 (below) summarizes the results (interview questions may be
found in Appendix 2). While the firms interviewed did not change the stringency of their
goals, they appeared to be increasing their commitment to goal attainment, as
demonstrated by increased senior management commitment, more measurable goals
and more specific designation of roles and responsibilities. Almost all of the firms
surveyed established compliance assurance-related goals, and indicated that improving
their compliance record was an important driver for registration. While firms typically had
environmental management goals that went beyond regulated substances, and included
aspects such as water use and energy, they were also setting goals that indicated
sensitivity to local environmental conditions and community interests. Interview results
showed that firms are encouraging their suppliers to conform to ISO 14001, without
necessarily requiring registration. Firms did not increase the availability of their
environmental goals and performance information to outsiders, in the wake of
registration. Firms likewise did not increase outside stakeholder involvement in their
goal-setting processes, but did broaden employee participation. Interviews indicated that
pollution prevention efforts were formalized and given greater encouragement,
subsequent to ISO registration.
In conclusion, ISO 14001 registration does strengthen firms' environmental
commitments, by helping them prioritize and set more-attainable goals, over a broader
range of environmental impacts, and involve a broader constituency of employees in the
goal-setting process, with greater institutional support. The study presented in this
chapter indicates that ISO 14001 positively impacts organizations' environmental goals,
both in terms of their content, the process by which they are derived, and the likelihood
of their attainment. Assuming the third-party oversight mechanism is credible, these
results suggest ISO 14001 will have environmental benefits.
The following chapter will examine the credibility of the registration mechanism.
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Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N N
B NC Y Encourage Y Y Y --- Y N N N
--- Y N Y Y Y Y Formalize Corp. N Y
D --- Y Encourage Y Y --- --- Y N Y N
NC_ Y Y Y Y Y _ Y Y N N
F _NC Y --- Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
NC Y Encourage Y Y Y Y Formalize Corp. N N
NC Y N Y Y Y _ Y N N N
--. y -... --- Y Y Y --- --- --- N
--- -.... ..-- --.. --- --- --- --- --- --- N
Y = Yes. Interview comments or related documentation suggest greater presence of this characteristic than prior to registration.
N = No
Encourage = Encourage suppliers to adopt EMS, which may include ISO 14001, without requiring registration.
NC = No Change
Formalize = Incorporate employee-initiated or informal pollution prevention efforts into management structure (objectives, resources, documentation, etc.)
Corp = Corporate goals are publicly available, but facility-level goals are not.
Table 4.5 Summary of Interview Results: ISO 14001 Registration Impact on Goals
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Chapter 5: Registration: Credible Oversight Mechanism ?
5.1 Introduction: ISO 14001 Is What the Registrars Say It Is
"If audits were effective and recognized as such both by regulators and by the public,
reduced regulatory oversight would clearly be appropriate, with resulting reduced
regulatory transaction costs."
-- Paul Kleindorfer, Wharton School at University of Pennsylvania
The purpose of the following chapter is to describe the framework for third party
registration of ISO 14001 conformance, and evaluate its credibility, based on interviews
with US registrars. The design of ISO 14001 is such that, assuming that third-party
oversight is adequate, it should guarantee that registered organizations live up to the
goals they set for themselves (see chapter 2). While organizations are responsible for
determining their policy and objectives, the ultimate responsibility for interpreting and
enforcing the requirements of the standard fall to the registrars. The meaning of
registration to observers is thus largely dependent on the credibility of the third party
registration auditing mechanism.
Method: For the purposes of this study, credibility will be evaluated based on the
process whereby auditors gain accreditation to grant registration, the registration
auditing protocol, the required competencies of the registrars, their ability to sanction
non-conformances, and their consistency in interpreting the requirements of the
standard and applying sanctions for non-conformance. As profit-seeking private actors,
registrars may have incentives to monitor at less-than-optimal levels, in spite of the
accreditation process. The information presented in this chapter, except where
otherwise noted, is derived from interviews with representatives from seven of the
twelve US-accredited registrars, as well as from the Registrar Accreditation Board.
Through examples developed in the course of those interviews, this chapter will offer
anecdotal evidence demonstrating that the current third-party auditing structure may not
operate as a credible oversight mechanism.
Why Self-Declaration Was Not An Explicit Focus of This Study: This study did not
examine the impacts of self-declaration. It may be that organizations who adopt ISO
14001 without the additional step of external registration modify their internal
management decisions to a similar extent as those who do undergo third-party
evaluations. However, without third-party verification of a firm's management system, or
some other form of objective data disclosure, the regulator gains no greater assurance
of environmental benefits than through existing regulatory structures. There is thus no
justification for granting regulatory incentives.
A 1996 EPA-funded study by the National Science Foundation (NSF) looked at self-
assessments and EMS registration audits of ISO 14001 implementation in 18 US
organizations. The results showed, not surprisingly, that "there were significant
differences in how the organizations and independent auditors evaluated [their
implementation of ] the requirements of ISO 14001...Since 24% of all the requirements
were evaluated lower by the independent assessors, and only 6% were evaluated
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT 87
higher, these findings suggest that (p. 4) ... [self-declaring] organizations might have
the tendency to evaluate their systems higher than would independent
[registration] auditors (p. 8)"(Diamond, 1996)113. Thus, it is not necessary, for the
purposes of this study, to consider in depth the impact of self-declaration of ISO 14001
conformance on goal-setting.
Ominous Parallels with Ship Classification: A key issue in evaluating any regulatory
mechanism is the question: 'compared to what' ? This section presents a brief
illustration of the marine vessel classification industry. Over a century old, this industry is
the source from which much of the structure of the independent verification audit
employed in ISO 14001 is derived, and is illustrative of the potential for conflicts of
interest to undermine the credibility of third party verification (from Furger, 1997:462-
464)11.
Marine classification societies, such as Bureau Veritas and Det Norske Veritas, "rely on
income generated by services provided to shipowners"(Furger, 1997:462). There are
many classification societies competing with each other for shipowner clients.
"Competitive practices introduce the possibility that, at times.. .may produce [two types
of] failures. The first type refers to inadequate practices by a small number of
intermediary organizations.. .The second type, institutional failure.. .can be characterized
by a sharp decline in the credibility of a certain institution, for example, the entire
classification industry"(Furger, 1997:462).
"Over the last twenty years, several factors have shaken the credibility of the
classification industry. The marine industry is characterized by a multiplicity of
classification societies, none of which has a monopolistic power... Many shipbuilders
responded to the challenge [posed by economic recession in the early 1980's]...by
drastically reducing operational expenses. Often, such reductions were possible only by
avoiding classification requirements. This could be achieved simply by changing
classification society, if the current one was perceived as too strict. This practice was so
common that it became known in the industry as 'class hopping'. In fact, marginal
classification societies exist for the sole purpose of selling an international certificate of
compliance... Lax survey standards and questionable structural design decisions
undermined not just the credibility of some classification societies, but the viability of the
classification system as a whole. At the end of the 1980's, the classification system was
facing a serious institutional crisis. Suspicious insurers [initiated].. .a series of
unscheduled surveys... Many of the ships surveyed were found to be substandard, and
often in very poor technical condition. Nevertheless, they were carrying certificates of full
compliance and were registered with leading or major classification societies".
The loss of classification credibility has led to several responses in the 1990s. In 1996,
the International Association of Certification Societies made mandatory of its members:
ISO 9000 certification, the establishment of a database for substandard vessels, and the
commitment to require from shipowners "the fulfillment of outstanding classification
requirements before entering a new classification society"(Furger, 1997:466). It remains
113 Diamond, C. Environmental Management System Demonstration Project - Final Report. (Available online at
http://www.nsf-isr.org). Ann Arbor: NSF International, 1996.
114 Furger, F. Accountability and Systems of Self-Governance: The Case of the Maritime Industry" In Law & Policy Vol.
19, No. 4, October 1997.
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to be seen whether such measures will result in the restoration of insurers' confidence in
the classification system.
As this chapter will demonstrate, the ISO 14001 verification structure shares many
parallels with the ship classification system. ISO 14001 registration is a competitive
industry, among many of the same actors as in the classification industry, and creates
some of the same incentives for competing on the basis of reduced oversight.
5.2 ISO 14001 Registration: Signal of What ?
History of Environmental Audits -- from Compliance Audits to 'System' Audits:
Environmental audits have traditionally been aimed at assuring regulatory compliance.
Auditing ISO 14001 implementation represents a change in focus, towards management
system audits. A recent Price Waterhouse survey found "that 90% of the corporations
responding [to the survey] conducted audits for the purpose of detecting violations
before they could be detected by government inspectors. Only 65% of the companies
used environmental audits to assess environmental management systems"(as cited in
Tucker and Kasper, 1998:8)'5.
Compliance audits have traditionally been performed by experts with environmental
science or engineering backgrounds, and provided only a 'snapshot' of regulatory
performance at the time of the audit (Tucker and Kasper, 1998:8). Management
systems auditors, by contrast, most frequently come from an accounting background.
According to system audit proponents, in comparing an EMS audit to a compliance
audit, "verification of compliance with laws and regulations is borne by the system which
is in place throughout the year, as opposed to being borne by the audit... EMS audits
seek to discover ...why the non-compliance is occurring. By correcting the fundamental
cause of the non-compliance, companies gain greater assurance of future compliance;
whereas, correcting one violation yields less assurance of preventing a future
recurrence" (Tucker and Kasper, 1998:8).
Environmental regulators worldwide have become interested in the EMS and external
systems audit approach for two primary reasons (Tucker and Kasper, 1998:5). First,
periodic audits of a management system may improve the compliance stance of the
organization, by generating more complete and consistent information about regulatory
requirements and environmental performance, and by signaling to employees a top
management commitment to addressing environmental issues. Second, it may help
regulators make more efficient use of scarce resources. Auditors may take on some of
the oversight responsibilities and thus reduce an agency's monitoring expenses, as well
as identify 'better performers'. Likewise, implementation of a common system may help
a regulator better track an organization's performance over time, and compare it against
other, similarly-managed organizations.
The regulatory interest in such approaches has been expressed in several forms. In
Europe, the European Union promulgated its Eco-Management and Audit Scheme
(EMAS), "a voluntary system whereby companies determine their baseline
115 Tucker, R. And Kasper, J. Pressures for change in Environmental Auditing and in the Role of the Internal Auditor
(ABl/INFORM edition). In Journal of Managerial Issues. 10(3), Fall, 1998:340-354.
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environmental impacts for specific industrial sites, establish an environmental policy,
goals and timeline, and institute a management system to continuously improve
environmental performance... [including] an environmental effects statement they release
to the public after verification by a certified third party"(Nash and Ehrenfeld, 1998:492).
Firms participating in EMAS may receive regulatory benefits. For example, in the
German state of Saxony, the government and industry associations have signed an
agreement "that will simplify rules for permits and regulatory procedures for industrial
sites that participate in EMAS" (Cutter, September ,1998:2)1 6.
In the US, the EPA has begun to examine how auditing can be used to complement and
perhaps in some cases, replace, regulatory requirements. In 1986, the EPA
promulgated an auditing policy in which neither the confidentiality of the audit results
was guaranteed, nor were firms assured that the EPA would not pursue an enforcement
action against those who voluntarily disclosed regulatory violations (Tucker and Kasper,
1998:6). Recognizing the potential chilling effect on public disclosure such a policy might
have, in 1995, EPA announced "Incentives for Self-Policing". Under this policy,
according to EPA lawyer Brian Riedel, the agency agreed to "greatly reduce civil
penalties and limit liability for criminal prosecution for regulated entities.. .for violations
that are discovered through a compliance management system or environmental audit,
and that are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected, provided other.. .safeguards
are met...The policy does not apply to violations that result in serious actual harm or
may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the
environment"(Riedel, 1997: 377).
"In addition to participating in drafting ISO 14000,...the EPA has embarked on several
initiatives where they encourage companies to use environmental auditing, such as the
Environmental Leadership Program (ELP) and Project XL"(Tucker and Kasper, 1998:5).
Among the goals of the ELP program were "advancing the design of EMSs... [and]
providing performance assurance through third-party certification"(Reiley, 1997:563)11.
For example, EPA Region 1's ELP Startrack program "involves third-party certification of
a company's environmental performance focusing on EMSs, compliance audit programs
and pollution prevention...in exchange for benefits such as fewer inspections, reduced
reporting, expedited permitting and reduced penalties"(Riedel, 1997:386). Two of the
twelve Project XL proposals received by EPA in 1996 involved ISO 14001 (Lucent's
proposal, which was approved; and Anheuser-Busch's, which was not) , as were two of
the ELP proposals (Gillette and Salt River) (Freeman, CEEM:382; Riedel, CEEM:401).
From a public policy viewpoint, then, it is important to understand what kind of
information an ISO 14001 registration audit provides.
116 Cutter. German Agreement Offers Regulatory Relief for EMAS participants. In BATE's ISO 14000 Update, September
1998:2.
117 Reiley, R.A. Environmental Law and Business in the 21t century: The New Paradigms - ISO 14000 and its Place in
Regulatory Reform in Iowa Journal of corporate Law, Spring, 1997: 535-569.
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Purpose of ISO 14001 Registration Audits
"Demonstration of successful implementation of this international standard can be used
by an organization to demonstrate to interested parties that an appropriate
environmental management system is in place"
-- Introduction, ISO 14001
Third party registration to ISO 14001 aims to provide objective confirmation to interested
outsiders that a firm has in place an EMS "appropriate" to its needs. As Patrick
Aurrichio, ISO 14001 Program Manager for Corporate Environmental Affairs at IBM,
explained in a recent interview, in reference to a firm's EMS, "You can tell people, 'We
have a beautiful baby', but it doesn't really mean anything until someone else
agrees"(Aurrichio, 19981 ). Similarly, according to a recent interview, Scott Martin,
president of custom manufacturer Quality Chemical, believes "the value of ISO 14000
surpasses that of Responsible Care: 'ISO is third-party certified, Responsible Care is
not"'(as cited in Sissell, September, 1998:46)
A second purpose of third-party registration audits is to provide external, non-regulatory,
oversight of environmental management. For example, Mark Mansfield, plant manager
for a Pacificorp power generation plant in Wyoming, wanted registration because he
liked the concept of the formal external audit. In the US, power plant managers are
criminally-liable for undisclosed regulatory non-compliances, justifying beyond-
compliance precautions, such as external audits. "The audits help sustain attention",
which is important in ensuring consistent monitoring of environmental performance, and
keeping Mansfield out of jail. This is echoed by a recent statement by Brian Steelman,
EHS director for Ciba Specialty Chemicals. "I didn't start out as an ISO 14000
cheerleader, but what I've found is that people tend to let these management systems
drift unless someone kicks you in the tail - that motivation by internal and external audits
tends to keep the system current"(as cited in Sissell, September 1998:46)11".
Credibility of ISO 14001 Registration Depends on Registrars' Application of the
Standard: It would seem that the implementation of ISO 14001 depends on the
registrar's interpretation of the standard's requirements, and its ability to enforce
conformance to that interpretation. Following this reasoning, establishing ISO 14001 as
a credible signal of environmental commitment on the part of companies is dependent
on the credibility of the third-party oversight mechanism. To external stakeholders,
registrars must be consistent in the interpretation of the standard and have meaningful
sanctioning power. Conflicts of interest must be contained by oversight mechanisms.
More specifically, in order to evaluate the meaning of registration, stakeholders would
want to see:
* An objective process for accrediting registrars, specifying minimal auditing
requirements, required auditor expertise and standards of professional practice.
* Consistent interpretation of the standard's requirements, including 'compliance' and
'continual improvement'.
m Aurrichio, P. ISO 14001 Program Manager, Corporate Environmental Affairs, IBM, Personal Interview, October xx,
1998.
119 Sissell, K. "certification: An Essential Element" in chemical Week. 160(36):46, September 30, 1998.
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" The existence of punishments that are substantial enough to force 'cheaters' to
conform to the standard or lose registration.
* Consistent application of those sanctions to punish cheats.
ISO 14001 Credibility as a Signal of
Environmental Management Commitment
Consistency of Interpretation
and Application of Standard's
Requirements
Registrar Credibility** Power to Impose Sanctions
for Non-Conformances
**taking as an assumption Conflicts of Interest
that non-conformances
will be discovered.
Figure 5.2 Credibility of ISO 14001 Registration Depends on Registrar Consistency,
Sanctioning Power, and Conflicts of Interest.
The remainder of this chapter will explore each of these aspects, to determine whether
ISO 14001 registration offers a credible oversight mechanism for ensuring that
registered firms are 'doing what they claim'.
5.3 Who are the Registrars and What is Registration ?
As described in chapter 2, each ISO-member country must establish an accreditation
board, which may or may not be linked to the government of that country. In the US, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) - affiliated with the Department of
Commerce - has recognized the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the
Registrar Accreditation Board (RAB), jointly, as the sole accreditation body. "Both UKAS
in the United Kingdom and Raad Voor Accreditatie (RvA) in The Netherlands have
similar agreements with their respective governments"(Tibor and Feldman, 1997:332).
Internationally, accreditors largely determine whether to recognize the accreditation of
foreign registrars. The national accreditation bodies jointly established the European
Accreditation of Certification, a harmonized interpretation standard, to facilitate mutual
recognition through consistent application of accreditation (Tibor and Feldman,
1997:332). As of yet, there is no internationally-accepted standard for mutual
international recognition of registrations (Krut and Gleckman, 1998:59).
Who are the accreditation bodies in the US ? The ANSI is the "administrator and
coordinator of the US private sector voluntary standardization system...Founded in 1918
by five engineering societies and three government agencies, the Institute [is] a private,
non-profit membership organization.. .The Institute represents the interests of its nearly
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1,400 company, organization, government agency, institutional and international
members through its headquarters in New York City and.. .Washington, DC. ANSI does
not itself develop American National Standards; rather it facilitates development by
establishing consensus among qualified groups... .ANSI was a founding member of the
ISO and ...is one of five permanent members to the governing ISO Council.. .As part of
its responsibilities.. .ANSI accredits US Technical Advisory Groups (TAGs) ...The US
TAGs' primary purpose is to develop and transmit, via ANSI, US positions on activities
and ballots of the international technical committee... .Since the work of international
technical committees is carried out by volunteers from industry and government, not
ANSI staff, the success of these efforts often is dependent upon the willingness of US
industry and the US government to commit the resources required to ensure strong US
technical participation in the international standards process."(ANSI, 1998)2.
The RAB, based in Milwaukee, WI, is the organization directly responsible for operation
of the accreditation programs. Founded in 1989 as an "affiliate of the American Society
for Quality Control... it is a not-for-profit that derives its income from accreditation and
certification operations"(Foster, 1997:135)121. The RAB board of directors is made up of
representatives from industry (corporate EH&S representatives from Ford, Monsanto,
Lucent, Louisiana Pacific and Texas Instruments) and government (including a
representative from the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance of the EPA)
(Quality, January 1997)12.
In the US, the National Accreditation Program (NAP), operated jointly by ANSI and RAB,
is an expansion of a similar program the two have offered jointly for ISO 9000. The
NAP's direct responsibilities are (ANSI, 1997)123:
* Accreditation of organizations to register to the ISO 14001 standards
" Accreditation of ISO 14001 auditor training course providers.
* Processing of registrar applications and formation of accreditation audit teams.
What is the accreditation process ? "Accreditation is the initial evaluation and
periodic monitoring of a registrar's competence"(Tibor and Feldman, 1997:330).
Registrars achieve their accreditation through a process similar to that of an
organization seeking registration: document review, interviews, a formal assessment
and periodic surveillance audits, all by auditors from ANSI/RAB (Munn, CEEM:366 ).
First, a lead auditor is designated to review a prospective registrar's application. As
described by Mike Ross, President of the EMS group at the RAB, there are about 30
pages of detailed questions to be answered in the initial application. Questions cover the
structure of the applicant's organization, its internal auditing process, its procedures for
subcontracting, ensuring confidentiality, appeals, claims and disputes, and the expertise
of its personnel.
120 ANSI. An Introduction to ANSI. Http:\\web.ansi.org, 1998.
1 Foster, S. "Registrars, Accreditation and ISO 14001" in Marcus, P. And Willig, J. Moving Ahead With ISO 14000. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997:125-143.
1 Quality. RAB revamps Board to include EMS representation. In Quality. 36(1):18, January, 1997.
123 ANSI. ANSI/RAB National Accreditation Program (NAP) EMS Council. http:\\web.ansi.org., 1997.
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Applicants must comply with the requirements spelled out in the ISO standards: "ISO
14010 defines the principles common to all environmental audits; ISO 14011 defines the
procedures for an EMS audit; and ISO 14012 defines the qualification criteria for an
environmental auditor"(IISD, 1996:47-8). Auditors must undergo formal auditing training,
demonstrate discretion and objectivity, possess a minimum of twenty days of on-site
experience auditing management systems within the last three years, and have
substantive knowledge of environmental science, facility operations, and applicable legal
requirements (IISD, 1996:50). "At anytime in this process, non-conformances [with the
ISO standards as well as the national standards developed by ANSI/RAB] will be noted
and sent to the applicant for correction"(Ross, 1998).
Within ANSI/RAB is an EMS council, made up of representatives from government
agencies (EPA, DOE, NIST), industry (Caterpillar, Westinghouse and Lockheed-Martin),
NGOs (the Environmental Law Institute, and the Community Nutrition Institute) and
accredited registrars. This council reviews audit reports, looks at non-conformances and
corrective actions, then votes on whether to grant accreditation to the registrar (Ross,
1998). Once granted accreditation, registrars are audited once or twice a year to ensure
consistency. Full reaccreditation is required every four years (Ross, 1998).
For ISO 9000, each registrar is accredited to conduct registrations only within a limited
scope of industrial classifications, so that it may leverage its knowledge and
understanding of specific industries, within a range bounded by the first four digits of the
SIC code. For ISO 14001, on the other hand, ANSI/RAB decided that industry-specific
knowledge was not as relevant, since environmental impacts may not be common
across an industry sector. Thus, each registrar may conduct registrations provided it has
auditors whose substantive industry knowledge shares the first two digits of its SIC code
with that of the organizations being audited (Hansa, 1998 ).
Who are the Registrars, and what is Registration ? The history of independent
verification auditing has two origins. The first dates back to the emergence of the naval
classification field, in the late nineteenth century. "Classification societies were created
in the eighteenth century by the London insurance market as a means to assess marine
risk"(Furger, 1997:459). The early ship inspection services, such as those offered by Det
Norske Veritas (DNV), Lloyd's Registry, Bureau Veritas, TUV and ABS, offered
investors independent verification of ship design, construction and maintenance
practices, according to the classification society's rules (Furger, 1997:456). The second
origin of independent verification audits emerged from the international accounting
firms, such as KPMG, and Arthur Anderson, who developed attestation services for
financial disclosure statements. "The auditor's opinion does not say that the financial
statements are more accurate than those of competing companies, only that they reflect
basic accounting principles and are likely to be reliable enough for their intended
purpose of informing third parties as to the company's financial performance"(Uzumeri
and Mustafa, 1997:5). These two streams have gradually merged, as a firm's product,
and the process by which it is produced, have become more closely linked through
quality management systems. Thus, public accounting firms, such as KPMG, have
begun offering quality management systems audits (Uzumeri and Mustafa, 1997:5).
Likewise, auditors whose services have more traditionally focused on tangible products
have begun auditing management systems. For example, Bureau Veritas established its
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ISO 9000 registration division (BVQI) in 1988 (ibid.). With the development of ISO
14000, many of the same organizations that offered ISO 9000 registration have moved
rapidly to develop EMS auditing capabilities.
Currently, there are twelve US-accredited ISO 14001 registrars. Ten more are in the
application process, and ANSI/RAB is still receiving applications (Ross, RAB, 1998).
Registrars range widely in terms of character, size and experience. For example, DNV,
whose US ISO 14001 registration service is based in Houston, was established in 1864
in Norway, as a maritime ship classification society. Today it has over 300 offices in 100
countries, with over 4,000 employees, and its services include setting rules for ship
construction, as well as safety and quality assurance (DNV, 1998) 4. By contrast,
Advanced Waste Management Systems, based in Tennessee, is an environmental and
engineering services company, specializing in such areas as expert testimony, and
compliance assurance auditing (AWM, 1998). It is thus far the only environmental and
engineering services firm to participate in the US National Accreditation Program.
ANSI/RAB Accredited ISO 14001 Registrars
American Bureau of Shipping Quality Evaluations Inc. (ABS)
Advanced Waste Management Systems (AWMS)
Bureau Veritas Quality International (BVQI)
Det Norske Veritas Certification Inc. (DNV)
International Approval Services, Inc. (lAS)
KEMA-Registered Quality, Inc.
Lloyd's Register Quality Assurance (LRQA)
National Science Foundation International Strategic Registrations, (NSF)
SGS International Certification Services Inc. (SGS)
TUV Management Service (TUVM)
TUV Rheinland of North America, Inc. (TUVR)
Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (ULI)
Table 5.3a US Accredited Registrars as of September 1998
The purpose of the registration audit is to determine whether an organization's EMS "is
designed and implemented to satisfy its policy commitments and the various ISO 14001
criteria"(Potts, CEEM: 331). During a registration audit, the registrar audit team reviews
documents, interviews personnel, and inspects the registered sites, to determine
whether the organization's management system conforms to the requirements spelled
out in the ISO 14001 standards. ISO 9000 audits typically take several days, depending
on the number of employees, and it is estimated that ISO 14001 audits will follow the
same format (see table 5.3b, below). Conformity to the standard requires an
organization to demonstrate to auditors through records and on-site inspections and
interviews that all key elements are in place, and function as intended. Non-
conformances will be noted by the registrar. Following any audit, the registrar has three
options: to confirm, to conditionally confirm, or to deny registration. The initial
registration process takes approximately seven months, from initial application through
final approval, to allow time for corrections to be made and confirmed (Bellen, 1998).
124 DNv. Webpage. Http:\\www.dnvda.com, 1998.
125 AWM. Webpage. Http:\\www.awm.net, 1998.
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1-15 2 1
6-30 4 1
31-60 5 1.5
61-100 6 1.5
101+ 8 2
Table 5.3b Estimated Onsite Time Requirements to Complete An ISO 9000
Registration or Surveillance Audit (Bellen, 1998).
Registration audits may be either 'surveillance-style' or comprehensive. A surveillance-
style auditing program will evaluate pieces of the management system every 6 months.
Each audit will focus on different aspects of the system, with the goal of covering all
aspects of the system at least once in each three-year cycle. Alternatively, an
organization can elect to undergo comprehensive audits every three years, covering all
aspects of the management system (Daugherty, 1998; Abarca, 1998).
Once a firm has been approved, the registrar places it on a list of registered firms.
Currently, there is no centralized, publicly-available list of registered facilities; Each
registrar has its own list, with variation in the types and quality of the information
presented (mailing addresses, contact numbers, SIC codes, and product descriptions
are often provided). Some lists are available online on the World Wide Web. Others
must be requested directly from the registrars themselves. The Global Environmental
Technology Foundation (GETF) offers the most-complete publicly-accessible list
covering the majority of US registered facilities. This list, however, does not provide
contact information, nor does it describe the scope of the management system
registration, the date of registration, or the identity of the registrar. All of this information,
as well as the firms' environmental policies, should - according to the standard - be
publicly available.
Upon granting registration, the registrar will also allow the firm to display its
endorsement, or 'mark of conformity', in advertisements and publications (see figure
5.3b, below). "A mark of conformity is an indication that the item is in conformance with
a specific standard, and its use is granted exclusively as a result of the certification
process.. .In its most basic sense, conformity assessment is simply confirmation that
something does what it is supposed to do"(Urman, CEEM:347, 346) .
AW
Figure 5.3b Registration and Accreditation Marks of Conformity From AWMS, 1998
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What Registrars Look for in EMS Audit: As outlined in chapter 2, the ISO 14001
standard requires a firm to have in place a policy and management goals, to implement
a plan for achieving those goals, to monitor its effectiveness and correct the root causes
of deviations, and to periodically review the policy and goals to ensure their continuing
appropriateness. It requires three policy commitments: to compliance with applicable
regulatory and 'other' obligations, to 'prevention of pollution' and to 'continual
improvement' of the management system. The standard does not require that a firm be
'in compliance' with legal requirements when it achieves registration. "Non-compliance
with applicable law will not defeat certification to the standard, so long as the non-
compliance was registered by the management system and proper procedures are
followed to abate the problem"(Roht-Arriaza, 1996:5; see also Bell, 1997:78). Likewise,
the standard does not require a firm to place a preference on source reduction over
end-of-pipe treatment in 'preventing pollution'.
'Continual Improvement' is arguably the 'heart' of the standard. Depending on how it is
defined by registrars, it may drive performance improvements. In the standard,
Continual Improvement is defined as "the process of enhancing the EMS to achieve
improvements in overall environmental performance, in line with the organization's
environmental policy"(ISO 14001, 3.1). This process may be "either achieving
objectives, broadening the scope of the management system, or reducing the cost of
environmental management"(Abarca, ABS, 1998). One registrar explained: "We look for
a definition by the company of 'continual improvement'. In audits, we look for a clear
indication of a process of actions aimed to meet targets, implementation of those
actions and monitoring of the results, suggesting the target will likely be met."(Howe,
DNV, 1998). A firm that fails to demonstrate continual improvement is out of
conformance with the standard.
Some examples of continual improvement are (Auerbach, KEMA, 1998) adding
environmental content to employee training; hiring a consultant to help better
understand environmental impacts; having the environmental manager now report
directly to the CEO, where before s/he did not; better record keeping or measurement
systems; systems changes, such as utilizing more environmentally-sound materials in
the production process. It is not, at least according to the same registrar, waste
reduction resulting from the elimination of a product line for financial reasons (Auerbach,
KEMA, 1998).
Detecting and Correcting Non-conformances: In general, should an organization fail
to demonstrate conformance to the standard, this is considered a non-conformance,
and the registrar may either grant conditional approval, with the understanding that the
non-conformance will be corrected by a designated date, or deny registration. If the
problem repeats itself over time, the procedures, resources or scope of EMS are
insufficient or inappropriate, and the registrar will want to see them modified. While non-
conformances are allowed if they stem from an absence of effective technology, or
'force majeure' (a major accident) (Ellis, AWMS, 98), the registrar may suspend
registration in the case of a pattern of such non-conformances, indicating a failure of the
EMS itself.
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Corrective action and regulatory compliance are intrinsically linked by the standard,
according to some advocates of the standard: "Corrective action must be initiated when
any non-conformance is detected"(Bell, 1997:78). Since regulatory compliance must be
a goal in the environmental policy, non-compliance is a non-conformance, and controls
may need to be implemented to prevent recurrence, depending on how the standard is
interpreted in practice. "If the registrar finds a non-compliance to regulation, she wants
to know, 'Is there a system in place to identify, react and attack the root cause ?' If your
system does not adequately address how to handle the non-compliance, this is a
systemic failure"(Ross, 1998). It should be noted that registrars are required to report
non-conformances to firms, but are required to keep confidential to outsiders any
discovered incidences of regulatory non-compliance (Ross, 1998).
Firms may use several strategies for correcting non-conformances. One means is to
correct the 'root cause' of the non-conformance, such that the non-conformance occurs
less frequently, or is eliminated (Abarca, ABS, 1998). A second would be to reduce the
stringency of objectives, on the grounds that previous goals were 'inappropriate' (Ellis,
AWMS, 1998). "Easier-to-achieve goals, objectives and targets are an acceptable way
to bring yourself back into conformance"(Daugherty, BVQI, 1998). Third, goals could be
set low to begin with, or worded such that growth in production - waste increases
overwhelming gains from efficiency - does not lead to non-conformance (Abarca, ABS,
1998).
In summary, interviews indicate the potential for differences in interpretation between
registrars of requirements such as 'continual improvement' and 'corrective action'. If
variation in interpretation of such central concepts does occur, it would have profound
impacts on the implementation of the standard, and hence the credibility of ISO 14001
registration.
Casting Doubt on Consistency - The Audit Confidentiality Problem: The issues
surrounding audit confidentiality provide an illustrative case study, showing that
interpretation of the standard may vary among registrars. The confidentiality of audit
results has been a contentious issue throughout the development of the standard, and is
far from settled. "Audits often turn up shortcomings or reveal other information that
companies prefer not to have disclosed to government agencies, competitors, or the
public. Many European countries pushed for a requirement that companies be externally
audited with reports of those audits provided to the public, as required under EMAS.
Companies from the United States, on the other hand, argued that the standards should
not require disclosure of audit results. [They] feared that a required disclosure could be
used against them within the more aggressive US legal and regulatory system. [They]
argued that if they could not protect against disclosure, they may be forced to abandon
implementation of ISO 14000 altogether rather than risk opening up their environmental
shortcomings to outsiders' scrutiny. [This] position has technically prevailed... Unless
otherwise required by law, audit information and documents need not be
disclosed"(Mullett, 1997:395)12.
126 Mullett, G. ISO 14000: Harmonizing Environmental Standards and Certification Procedures Worldwide in Minnesota
Journal of Global Trade, Winter 1997:379-396.
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While ISO 14001 registrars are not compliance auditors, they know the applicable
regulations, and will likely become aware of non-compliances during registration audits.
Registrars seek data to confirm that adequate monitoring is occurring, and that the
management system is updating itself periodically. Compliance auditors seek only to
determine if the facility is in compliance at the time of the audit. Registrars will therefore
seek notation of incidences of non-compliance, and expect to see corrective action
where such incidences do occur. Failure to initiate corrective action following non-
compliance represents a non-conformance (Hansa, SGS, 1998).
Registrars are requires to report the audit results to the company, but to keep them
confidential otherwise. In spite of the registrars' confidentiality rules, audit results can be
subpoenaed as evidence in legal proceedings. Some companies have hired registrars
through their legal counsel, in order to guard results under attorney-client privilege, and
thus render them 'attorney work products', with greater legal protection. However,
auditors need to see 'objective evidence' that appropriate procedures are in place
(Hansa, SGS, 1998). Some companies have suggested offering 'affirmative statements'
signed by lawyers and executives, in lieu of data or documents, stating that appropriate
procedures are in place. One registrar, at least, believes this is acceptable: "Executives
are signing responses to the [registration] auditor in lieu of showing papers. We feel we
can still maintain the quality of the registration process"(confidential 1, 1998). Another
registrar offers a different perspective: "[Registration] auditors must see information -
not affirmative statements that say [companies] have evaluated their compliance and
taken appropriate corrective action. We need to see objective evidence that a system is
in place. Otherwise, the organization is not entitled to registration"(confidential 2, 1998).
ANSI/RAB have left interpretation of this issue to the registrar and the client organization
(Ross, RAB, 1998).
Using an executive's attestation in lieu of 'objective evidence' of corrective action is
open to abuse. Registrars seem to have conflicting resolutions of the confidentiality
versus 'objective evidence' requirements of the ISO 14001 standard. This result
suggests the presence of significant conflicts-of-interest inherent in the registration
auditing process, with disturbing implication for the consistency of interpretation in other
areas of the standard.
5.4 Sanctions for Non-Conformance, Conflicts of Interest and
Constraints on Registrars
"The auditor will always find something."
- Gordon Bellen, Environmental Management Systems, NSF
"Authority matters; for beneath all the industry's intramural debates over the
details... .simmers a much more fundamental challenge -- striking the right balance
between communitarian values and individualistic ones, between.. .collective authority
and freedom of choice" - Joseph Rees (1997:49)12.
127 Rees, J. The Development of communitarian Regulation in the Chemical Industry. Unpublished Draft, 1997.
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Sanctions: Because of the possibility that bad actors will adopt ISO 14001 to disguise
their poor performance, shirking the required efforts, some form of sanctioning
mechanism must be in place to penalize non-conformance. "Without strong coercive
mechanisms, communitarian regulation will fall victim to adverse selection and moral
hazard" (King et. Al., 1998:3). This section will explore the range of sanctions available
to ISO 14001 registrars, and the presence of conflicts-of-interest, which may preclude
their use.
ISO 14001 registrars have described five specific sanctions used in practice. They are:
" Denial of initial registration. The firm is required to meet all elements of the
standard in order to qualify for initial registration. According to the RAB, "accredited
registrars have refused initial registration in some circumstances"(Ross, 1998).
" Notification of minor non-conformances. The registered firm is required to submit
a written plan describing how it has corrected the root cause of a minor non-
conformance and implemented procedures to prevent recurrence (Bellen, 1998). Its
implementation will be verified during the next routine surveillance audit.
* Major Non-conformance Re-audit. The detection of a major non-conformance
requires an additional audit in one month's time to determine if the root cause is
being addressed. Because of the high cost in terms of resources and manpower in
undergoing an audit, a firm will likely take the steps necessary to correct the non-
conformance, to avoid costly repeated audits.
" Suspension of Registration. A pattern of major non-conformances suggests a
systemic flaw in the EMS or in its implementation. In either case, the registrar may
suspend registration until such time as the root causes of these non-conformances
are addressed.
" Withdrawal of Registration. Continual major non-conformance is grounds for loss
of registration. It appears that while ISO 9000 firms have lost registration in the past,
the situation has not yet arisen among ISO 14001 companies (Ross, 1998; Bellen,
1998).
Conflicts of Interest: There are several factors that may contribute to an uneven
application of the standard's requirements and sanctions for non-conformance. These
stem from the close relationship between the registrars and their clients, the lack of
public accountability in the sanctioning process, the incentive on registrars to offer
consulting services to clients, and their incentive to reduce oversight stringency, either
as a means to lower costs, or to attract clients.
Most registrars see themselves as 'facilitators' and 'partners' with their clients (Bellen,
NSF, 1998; Auerbach, KEMA, 1998). As one registrar put it, "We need to guard against
a 'police' mentality"(Bellen, NSF, 1998). This cooperative spirit may make companies
more receptive to opening their books, but may also discourage the registrars from
imposing sanctions to control non-conformances.
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In terms of public accountability, none of the above sanctions, including suspension or
withdrawal, are required to be publicized. Each registrar gives out certificate registration
numbers sequentially, enabling interested stakeholders to determine the identities of
suspended facilities by comparing past and current lists of registered sites. However,
there is no easily-accessible and complete list of past and present registered facilities,
even in the US. Oversight is further complicated by the level of accessibility and quantity
of information provided by registrars as to their client organizations. For example, some
registrars place all of their registration information, including contact names and
telephone numbers, SIC codes and scope of registration, online. Others provide only the
name of the facility, and the list must be requested directly from the registrar.
Registrars are private companies in business to make a profit. Short of accepting bribes
for looking the other way (a possibility raised in Gleckman and Krut, 1998:60), the
registrars face three important conflicts-of-interest.
* Incentives to offer Value-added Consulting Services: Registrars have knowledge
of industry best-practices, accumulated from monitoring the implementation of the
ISO 14001 EMS in a variety of organizations. That information is valuable to firms in
seeking to conform to the EMS requirements at least-cost, or in finding means to
realize financial gains from environmental programs (Kleindorfer, 1996:14) . In the
US, however, registrars are precluded from disclosing that information to firms for
which they act as third-party overseers - e.g. consulting (Ross, 1998). Interpretation
of this rule varies somewhat. For example, one registrar "does not consult, in any
way, shape or form" but does identify real or potential weaknesses in the system
(Hansa, 1998). By contrast, another will provide firms with contacts at other clients
(Howe, 1998). IBM has found a way to partially defuse the 'no-consulting' rule by
registering all of its sites, worldwide, through a single registrar. Under this
arrangement, the registrar can help "point out areas that are useful"(Cibulsky, IBM,
1998). By offering consulting services to some clients, a registrar may compromise
its impartiality.
" Incentives to be less stringent than competitors: By revoking its registration of a
non-conforming business, a registrar may jeopardize future business, both with that
firm, and with other firms who prefer to shop around for the least-stringent monitor.
"It is evident that, without effective control by the accreditation bodies, registration
could be easier to achieve by choosing one registrar over another"(Sunderland,
1997:134). In the past, when ISO 9000 registration has been denied to companies,
they frequently do seek a different registrar, rather than revise their system (Bellen,
NSF, 1998). However, according to one registrar, "there is enough business that we
can afford to let the bad ones go"(Auerbach, KEMA, 1998).
Is there evidence of registrars lowering standards in order to attract clients ? The
confidentiality issue, explored above, may be an example of just such a conflict of
interest being played out. In that case, if one registrar takes companies at their word
- through an executive's attestation of conformity - it offers enhanced confidentiality
relative to other registrars.
* Incentives to reduce cost, by monitoring less than competitors: In striving to
provide the lowest-priced service, a registrar may see a financial advantage in
performing a minimal - perhaps insufficient - amount of oversight.
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Constraints on Registrars: Offsetting these ethical hazards, a registrar is subject to
four constraints that seek to prevent rubber-stamping. First, a registrar is audited by the
accreditation board of its home country, through the process described earlier in this
chapter (Ross, RAB, 1998). Second, the registrar is required to establish an
independent internal supervisory board, with representatives from various interest
groups - including government agents, registered firms, and other registrars, to act as
an appeal panel in the case of disputes between registrar and client (Ross, 1998;
AWMS, 1998). Third, the registrar must develop and use an in-house guidance
document, detailing its interpretation of the standard's requirements (Ross, 1998).
Finally, the registrar is precluded from registering substandard systems by its need to
maintain its reputation. If word got out that it was the registrar of choice for firms whose
environmental performance was continually sub-par, and constantly facing public and
regulatory actions, purchasers would refuse to buy from suppliers carrying that mark of
conformity. This would jeopardize the registrar's future stream of revenues: "Denying
registration is a concern for future business, but it is not as important as our reputation
of integrity. If that is ever compromised, the desirability for our registration is severely
diminished"(Hansa, SGS, 1998).
In summary, while registrars have several sanctioning tools at their disposal, such tools
may not be employed, due to the cooperative nature of the registrars' relationship with
clients, a lack of public accountability, and an incentive to monitor less than ones'
competitors.
5.5 Credibility: Analysis and Conclusions
Environmental regulators in the US are considering privatizing some aspects of
regulatory oversight. The motivation for this 'devolution of accountability' is to make
more effective use of regulatory resources to target the worst performers. If it were
possible to use private third parties to monitor the better performers, regulators would
go a long way towards overcoming many of their resource constraints. "While [private
third-party audits] cannot and should not remove the responsibility for environmental
compliance and enforcement activities from public agencies charged with such activities,
it can provide increased resources to accomplish these activities efficiently through the
market"(Kleindorfer, 1996:3).
However, because "they have a legal mandate to assure compliance with applicable
laws and regulations, [regulators] cannot simply relinquish enforcement responsibilities
to the market"(Kleindorfer, 1996:25). In order for such a system to succeed it must be
seen as credible, meaning both capable of sanctioning cheats, and consistent in its
oversight and application of those sanctions. "Voluntary approaches must be carefully
designed to limit free-riding and strategic behavior by firms and to generate public
credibility and support. This requires that.. .they include credible independent
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement, and provisions for sanctions in the event
of non-compliance"(Leveque, 1997:2).
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain in detail the accreditation and
registration processes, and highlight the areas of greatest tension between private
interests and public ends. In short, it looked at the accreditation process, the
consistency of application of the standard's requirements by registrars and the nature of
sanctions available for the enforcement of those requirements. Private system audits do
offer organizations stimulation to follow through on internal commitments, without the
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adversarial threat of legal enforcement sanctions. Based on brief interviews with a range
of US registrars, it appears that there is an objective process for accreditation, requiring
registrars to demonstrate a minimum level of expertise and experience, oversight, and
significant organizational commitment. The heart of the accreditation system - each
registrar looking over their peer's shoulder, and each depending on their own reputation
to draw in new business - does offer substantial protection from 'races to the bottom'.
On the other hand, the consistency of interpretation of the standards between registrars
is called into question by the anecdotal evidence of a variation by registrars in their
treatment of 'affirmative statements'. Second, while there is a wide array of sanctions
available to registrars, ranging from cooperative (notifications) to punitive (withdrawal of
registration), the consistency of application of these sanctions is an open question. No
registered firm has yet been suspended for failing to conform to the ISO 14001
standard.
What is clear is that public accountability could be significantly be bolstered without
changing the fundamental structure of the standard.
* There is little accountability of the accreditation boards and registrars to the public.
There is no readily-accessible public database of past and present registered
companies and their registrars, and no means provided for public actors to ensure
consistent application of the standard's requirements, other than NGO and EPA
participation in the accreditation board's registrar review process.
* There are substantial incentives for registrars to lower their standards or consult in
order to win greater market share. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that firms do
have different interpretations of key components of the standard.
Third party environmental management system audits may be a powerful tool for
steering private interests towards socially-preferable ends. The first party (the company)
hires a third party (the registrar) to guarantee its performance to a second party (the
regulator, the public, or another company). The audit may powerfully complement the
efforts of public regulatory agencies, helping them to better monitor companies at
reduced costs. However, this 'devolution of accountability' needs to be carefully
managed and designed, to prevent organizations from disguising their true performance
under the veil of an independent endorsement of their management system.
The following chapter will explore in greater detail the notion of privatizing some of the
EPA's oversight responsibilities, and stakeholder responses. Are there precedents for
this type of privatization ? Under what conditions is it legal ? What sorts of incentives
have regulators offered in the past ? What proposals have been advanced for
incorporating ISO 14001 in regulatory reform schemes ?
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Chapter 6: Regulatory Reform and Stakeholder Perspectives
6.1 Introduction
"The United States can shift its basis of environmental protection from clean-up and
control to anticipation and avoidance.. .To move beyond our existing command-and-
control system, we will need a system which is built on performance, fairness,
accountability and partnership. The ISO 14000 standards appear to have these
characteristics.. .ISO 14000 resonates with the philosophy of the Clinton/Gore
administration."
--John Gibbons, Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy128
The purpose of this chapter is to describe regulatory reform initiatives based on the
granting of regulatory flexibility, the risks to participating firms and regulators, and
stakeholder perspectives on the use of ISO 14001 in such initiatives. Various strategies
may be used for identifying organizations that warrant reduced governmental oversight.
ISO 14001 may represent one such indicator, if it leads organizations to make
meaningful environmental commitments (chapter 4) and if third-party registration acts as
a credible oversight mechanism for holding the organizations accountable for delivery on
those commitments (chapter 5). Regulatory strategies incorporating ISO 14001 will need
to be structured such that they meet stakeholder concerns about legitimacy and
accountability. Likewise, they will need to be sensitive to industry's desire for flexibility,
fairness, and voluntarism.
6.2 An Alternative Path for Better Performers ?
"A synoptic approach to regulatory reform would begin by asking what the problems are,
which are the most serious, which can be addressed most easily, and then would target
limited reform resources in those areas which would yield the most productive change."
-- Cary Coglianese, Harvard University, 1998.
"For three years, EPA has pursued an unprecedented agenda for consistently delivering
cleaner, cheaper, smarter results from environmental and public health programs."
-- EPA Spring 1998 Regulatory Preamble 12 9
In chapter one, this study defined command-and-control regulation, and developed a list
of its most commonly-cited critiques. These include:
e Inefficiency * Lack of Transparency
" Contentiousness e Inflexibility
" Unenforceability e Balkanization and Fragmentation
Regulatory reformers in the current administration have sought to address the criticisms
levied above through several means. According to its 1998 regulatory agenda preamble,
the EPA is seeking to bring about improvements in several areas including greater
public access to information, more flexibility to obtain better results, stronger
128 Gibbons, J. ISO 14000: Environmental Standards for Change. ANSI
http://web.ansi.org/public/isol 4000/new/gibbons 1 3.htm). Dec 14, 1995.
EPA. Regulatory Agenda Preamble. (http://www.epa.gov/epahome/agenda98.htm). spring, 1998.
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT104
ISO 14000
partnerships with diverse stakeholders, more compliance assistance, and 'less
paperwork and red tape'(EPA, 1998:2). Table 6.2, below, shows the link between
'regulatory reinvention' efforts at the EPA, and the critiques of command-and-control
regulation specified above.
Critiques of Technology- 'Regulatory Reinvention' Efforts at EPA, 1997
Based Standards
Efficiency Eliminated unnecessary requirements (1,300 pages of regulation,
representing 20M hours of regulatory burden);
"Increased Efficiency Through Electronic Reporting"
Transparency 'Plain English' Regulations; Expanded TRI Reporting
Legitimacy "Conditioning [flexibility] on a record of proven performance and
accountability'; Pharmaceutical industry air toxics rulemaking in
"partnership with affected stakeholders"
Adaptability Multimedia rule (issued for pulp and paper industry) "allows
companies to delay compliance ...if they commit to installing more
advanced technologies"
Compliance Assurance Establishing compliance assistance centers; "Reducing penalties for
companies that show good faith towards finding, publicly disclosing
and correcting environmental problems"
Comprehensiveness "Voluntary partnership programs... represent an attractive
opportunity to address a broad range of environmental issues...that
may not be amenable to traditional regulatory approaches"
Source: EPA Annual Report on Reinvention, 1997'u
Table 6.2 EPA Reinvention Efforts Address Critiques of Traditional Technology-
Based Regulatory Controls
Many parties have initiated efforts to fundamentally reconceptualize regulation in light of
these criticisms. They begin with the premise that 'better' performers deserve 'better'
treatment. In 1995, the National Academy of Public Administration was directed by
Congress to review EPA's regulations. "This congressional mandate resulted in the
report 'Setting Priorities, Getting Results' [which].. .concludes that.. .Congress should
pass legislation encouraging firms to exceed compliance requirements in exchange for
more leniency in how to meet regulatory standards, and the environmental control effort
should be integrated with, rather than based upon, the current single media
approach"(Reiley, 1997:565).
Similarly, the National Environmental Policy Institute, in a 1995 report, "recommended
the creation of an alternative regulatory track based on 'environmental excellence'. The
report states, 'Regulated entities that commit to environmental excellence principles,
implement comprehensive management systems and strive to continuously improve
their performance should be able to opt out of the command-and-control system into a
more flexible, consistent regulatory scheme'(as cited in Feldman, 1997:12 ). In 1996,
the Aspen Institute convened "a series of conferences among diverse stakeholder
representatives" from industry and the environmental advocacy community , culminating
in their recommendation of an "Alternative Path.. .allowing more flexible and efficient
compliance methods in return for achieving superior environmental performance and
130 EPA. Annual Report on Reinvention. (http://www.epa.gov/reinvent/annual97/incent.htm), 1997.
131 Feldman, I. "ISO 14000 can Underpin a New 'Dual Track' Regulatory System" in Environmental Business Journal,
January 1997:11-15.
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involving stakeholders more directly in the information sharing and decision making
process"(Aspen, 199613).
After reviewing these and other reform recommendations, Reiley (1997) reports: "A
consensus has emerged.. .The federal government should continue to set minimum
standards to maintain a level playing field. Permits should be facility wide, and in some
cases, industry wide.. .Technology-based standards should be replaced, wherever
possible, with performance-based standards... Pollution prevention should be a part of
any company's long-range planning... Finally, incentives should be enhanced for
companies with good performance records"(Reiley, 1997:567).
Many efforts are underway to reform environmental regulation. However, the link
between the 'solutions' posed and the underlying problems being addressed is not
always explicit. A framework is needed to understand and categorize regulatory reform
proposals, and link them to the problems they seek to ameliorate.
6.3 Regulatory Flexibility: Goals, Means and Enforcement
In 'Alternative Path' proposals, regulatory flexibility would be given to better performers.
What is regulatory flexibility ?
A regulation typically prescribes a performance goal and a means for attaining that goal.
Regulatory Flexibility allows qualifying actors to receive variances either in the
performance 'goal' they must achieve, or in the 'means' which they must employ to
achieve that goal. The premise supporting the granting of regulatory flexibility, in the
words of President Clinton, is that "in many cases, companies know their business a
whole lot better than the government does"(referring to Project XL, as cited in Steinzor,
1998:111). Vice President Gore expands this definition of Project XL: "We enter into a
bargain with businesses. When they say 'We'll exceed the standards', we say, 'Give the
EPA a way to measure the progress and then throw away the rule book altogether'(as
cited in Steinzor, 1998:111). Through flexibility, it is argued, firms will be able either
to achieve the same performance results at lower cost, or achieve better
performance than before at the same cost.
Increasing
Means
Flexibility
Increasing Goal Flexibility
Figure 6.4 Matrix of Regulatory Goal and Means Flexibility Options, Relative to
Technology Standards
Goal flexibility refers to the allowable deviation from a mandated performance level.
Means flexibility refers to the method used to achieve that performance goal. In the 2x2
matrix of 'regulatory flexibility' presented above (figure 6.4), quadrant I represents
132 Aspen Institute. The Alternative Path: A Cleaner, Cheaper Way to Protect and Enhance the Environment. (Web-
based edition), 1996.
133 Reiley, R. Environmental Law and Business in the 21st century: The New Paradigm - ISO 14000 and its Place in
regulatory Reform. In Iowa Journal of Corporate Law, Vol. 22, Spring, 1997.
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regulation that permits neither goal nor means flexibility. For example, by requiring lead-
free gasoline, the EPA allowed industry no flexibility in the determination lead emission
goals, nor in how they would achieve those goals.
Quadrant 11 encompasses regulation allowing flexibility in the means to achieve the
designated emission goal. One example is a cap-and-trade permit scheme, such as the
interrefinery lead phase-down credit trading system established by the EPA in order to
"allow gasoline refiners greater flexibility during a period when the amount of lead in
gasoline was being significantly reduced"(Hahn, 1989:101)134. This scheme allowed
refiners to trade lead content credits (calculated against their base year production
level), amongst themselves in order to achieve the overall lead production target. In this
case, participants are not limited to using a specific technology to achieve the
performance goal, and may 'pay their neighbors' to reduce lead content, rather than
perform the reduction themselves, allowing them to achieve the performance result at
reduced cost.
Goal flexibility, represented in quadrant Ill, covers efforts to prescribe a methodology
without requiring firms to meet a specific performance level. This study found no such
examples.
Quadrant IV represents regulatory approaches utilizing both goal and means flexibility to
drive pollution reduction. An example of this approach is the Dutch environmental
covenant model (Glachant, 1994:43-45), in which an industry group and its regulators
negotiate an overall emissions target, and allocate resulting responsibilities among
member firms. Implicit in this model is the threat of direct regulation, should the
covenant signatories' overall performance be insufficient to meet the environmental
quality objectives of the regulators.
The scope of the regulatory flexibility to be granted is bounded by the definitions of the
regulatory objective, the responsible party, and the time during which the flexibility is
valid. Thus, flexibility may be granted on a pollutant-by-pollutant vs. multi-pollutant, and
single medium vs. multi-media basis. The opportunity to participate may be granted to a
specific site, a range of sites within a region, an industry sector, or to all industrial
sources in the country. The waiver granted may be given for a limited time span and be
non-renewable, or have a longer time horizon and the opportunity for renewal.
Under current US law, compliance with regulation is non-negotiable. Firms are legally
required to comply with regulation, regardless of whether the same results may be
more-efficiently achieved through other means. According to a recent communique by
Carole Browner, Administrator of the EPA, "Our first obligation is to fulfill the statutory
responsibilities we have been given by Congress. That generally means developing
environmental standards through regulation, and ensuring compliance through a series
of permits, inspections, and enforcement actions"(Browner, 1993:4)15. For that reason,
goal flexibility may legally exist only where firms agree to go above and beyond
performance levels established statutory minimums.
134 Hahn, R. Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders. In
Journal of Econ. Perspectives, vol. 3, no. 2, Spring 1989:95-114.
135 Browner, C. Pollution Prevention Policy Statement: New Directions for Environmental Protection, to All EPA
Employees. EPA, June 15, 1993.
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Means flexibility is allowed under US law. It is frequently codified in statutes through
Innovation Waivers (Ashford et. Al., 1985). "Generally, the waivers extend deadlines by
which industry must install pollution control equipment to meet emission permit
limitations. Development of an innovative idea that is not an operational reality often
requires trial periods and substantial time, during which a firm can incur penalties from
violations of emissions or effluent standards. The innovation waiver exempts industry
from penalties during trial periods and offers it the prospect of cost savings derived from
a superior technology"(Ashford et. Al., 1985:444) 6. Innovation waiver provisions exist
under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and RCRA. However, the administration
of such waivers by the EPA may be inconsistent due to ambiguity of definitions,
misplacement of authority, and a lack of attractive incentives for innovation (see Ashford
et. Al., 1985:451, 457).
The EPA also has the ability to grant some enforcement flexibility. It has a certain
degree of discretion as to whom it chooses to cite for non-compliance, how far it will go
to prosecute them, and what level of penalties it will pursue. In the case of Heckler v.
Chaney (470 U.S. 821, 837-38, 1985), for example, the court made "a distinction
between agency action, which is reviewable, and inaction, which is not. As Chaney
states, agency non-enforcement decisions are 'generally unsuitable for judicial
review'... [unless] an agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a general policy'
that is [shown to] amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities"(Breger,
1998:349).
The EPA's enforcement discretion is offset, to some extent, by public right-of-action
laws, allowing private interests to bring a violator to trial if the EPA has not responded to
non-compliance. The Clean Air Act, the Solid Waste Disposal Act, the Safe Drinking
Water Act and other statutes each codify 'citizen suit provisions' (Breger, 1998:344).
Thus, many flexibility initiatives are not protected from citizen suits, even if they are
approved by EPA. For example, "unless legislation is enacted authorizing Project XL,
site specific agreements that contain exemptions from existing requirements are
vulnerable to challenge in citizen suits"(Steinzor, 1998:140). As an unidentified EPA staff
member opined in an internal newsletter, "If it isn't illegal, it isn't XL"('What's up with
Project XL:3/11/96', EPA, as cited in Steinzor, 1998:147).
In summary, regulators may offer regulatory flexibility in the form of variances in goals,
means, or enforcement. In the US, this flexibility is limited by the EPA's mandate: to
ensure regulatory compliance. Thus, many regulatory flexibility initiatives are vulnerable
to citizen suit challenges.
136 Ashford, N., Ayers, c. and Stone, R. Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation. In Harvard Environmental
Law Review, vol. 9,1985:419-466.
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6.4 Corporate Participation in Regulatory Reform: Added Risk,
Additional Incentives
"Incentives for participation in [reinvention] programs ...need to be tangible and
significant. At minimum they should offer reduced transaction costs.. .To be more
attractive, programs will provide direct economics incentives which mitigate the future
costs of pollution control."
--Dan Beardsley, Global Environmental Management Initiative 37
Regulatory flexibility may offer firms an opportunity to meet or exceed social obligations,
at reduced cost. However, participating firms take on additional risks. In addition to the
opportunity cost of the capital and manpower needed to participate, industry faces
greater regulatory uncertainty, more stakeholder scrutiny, more-invasive reporting
requirements, and sometimes, increased liability exposure. In addition to goal, means,
and enforcement flexibility, therefore, the EPA may need to offer other incentives to
attract participants and offset their risks.
According to Steinzor, "incentives can.. .either save -- or produce extra -- money, or
achieve some other tangible benefit for the participating firm or group. If companies are
able to save money on production or compliance costs, or to obtain a tax benefit or
government subsidy, [avoid] liability for cleanup costs or private damages, escap[e]
enforcement actions, and [keep].. .a company's public image..[un]tarnished", then they
have incentives to participate (Steinzor, 1998:154-5).
A 1996 GEMI survey of three state reinvention initiatives yielded the following
(incomplete, but representative) list of incentives for industry participation (Beardsley,
1996), in addition regulatory flexibility:
" Fast-Track and Lower-Cost Permitting: accelerated permit consideration;
consolidated (multi-media) permit applications; longer term permits; replacement of
permit applications with self-certification of compliance; reduction of permit fees.
* Reduction in Site Inspections, and Reporting Burdens: simplified reporting
requirements; integrated inspections programs and reduced frequency of inspection.
* Investment Incentives and Reduced Fees: credits for use in emission trading; tax
credits for pollution prevention investment; credits for investments that can be
banked against future charges by agency (for payment of penalties, permit charges,
etc.); % reduction of emission fees; technical assistance (including financial support
for hiring of consultants).
* Enhanced Relationships and Reputation: public recognition by agency; improved
relationship with regulator.
* Reduced Liability Exposure: enhanced audit privilege. In Minnesota's
Environmental Auditing Program, for example, "while Department staff can obtain
access to audit results, persons other than the government cannot use audits in
legal proceedings if the company complies with the corrective action
schedule"(Beardsley, 1996:15).
137 Beardsley, D. Industry Incentives for Environmental Improvement: Evaluation of US Federal Initiatives. Global
Environmental Management Initiative (GEMI), 1996.
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Some of these incentives, where they reduce transaction costs, increase operational
flexibility, and improve image, are considered quite significant by participating firms
(Beardsley, 1996:25). For example, "substituting one permit for the existing system is
dramatic [in New Jersey]. In one case 100 air permits have been consolidated [into one];
in another, 75 permits for all media are now combined... Facilities expect to see major
efficiencies in the amount of time spent on permit preparation in the future"(Beardsley,
1996:12).
These incentives may be insufficient to stimulate adequate participation. Concerning the
Common Sense Initiative and Project XL, one study found that "incentives for program
involvement are weak to begin with, and the risks of [citizen suit] litigation and other
failures are high.. .Companies are increasingly discouraged by unexpectedly high
transaction costs of participation. Investment of staff time can be enormous. There is
frustration over the length of the review process and confusion over the role of
stakeholders... Costs of participation, in other words, are beginning to outweigh
incentives"(Beardsley, 1996:3). This may explain why, though the EPA expected
between 100 and 500 proposals when it launched Project XL in 1995, it had only
received 46 applications by June 1997, of which 12 were rejected because they
demanded inappropriate performance (goal) flexibility (Steinzor, 1998:126).
Many critics point to the incentives listed above as examples of how the existing system
should be corrected, and argue that they should not be limited to a subset of firms. "For
example, it would be inappropriate to limit reductions in unnecessary reporting or
monitoring to ISO 14000 organizations. No organization should be subject to
unnecessary requirements"(C12, 1997:3). When designing regulatory flexibility
strategies, therefore, the designer may need to distinguish between true 'incentives'
(those that offer justifiable benefits to participants in exchange for 'superior
performance', for example), and those aspects, such as consolidated permitting, that
might improve the efficiency of the underlying regulatory scheme.
6.5 Regulatory Participation in Reform: More Risk for 'Better' Results
The intention of a two-tier regulatory scheme is to provide incentives for firms to become
environmentally proactive through granting regulatory flexibility to better actors. In
granting regulatory flexibility to a firm, the regulator risks two undesirable outcomes.
First, the regulators' ability to assure compliance with traditional command-and-control
regulations through monitoring and sanctioning is necessarily finite. However,
technology-based control regulations may be directly observed during inspections,
facilitating oversight. The addition of regulatory flexibility therefore complicates the
oversight process. Thus, the regulator risks reduced environmental performance,
because the participating firm exploits diminished oversight in order to reduce its
compliance costs.
Second, it may be that the firm cooperates to the fullest of its ability, yet the resulting
environmental performance improvements or cost-savings are insignificant, thus
failing to justify the flexibilities granted and agency resources invested in the
initiative.
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How can the regulator minimize the risk of undesired outcomes ? In other words, how
can 'better performers' be identified ? "To justify the investment of resources in
developing an Alternative Path agreement, candidates will be screened..."(Aspen,
1996). The Alternative Path group recommended the following criteria for identifying
organizations that merit entry to a more flexible regulatory framework: "Commitment and
ability to manage for environmental excellence... [demonstrated by] pursuit of a proactive
corporate environmental policy; a strong public record of environmental leadership,
innovation and achievement; responsiveness to community and worker health concerns;
and incorporating pollution prevention, life-cycle product stewardship, and design-for-
environment applications into core business practices"(Aspen, 1996).
In practice, regulators have utilized criteria such as those listed below (Beardsley, 1996):
" Absence of recent enforcement or compliance problems.
" Documented proof of in-place internal environmental management systems and
pollution prevention programs.
* Participation and compliance with other voluntary environmental programs, such as
EPA's 33/50 Program or Green Lights Initiative.
" Commitment by the top facility official that s/he intends to achieve the goals set forth
in the plan.
* Internal compliance auditing programs.
" Demonstration of "historical environmental leadership"(Project XL participation
criterion, cited in Steinzor, 1998:134).
Enhancing compliance assurance during the actual operation of such schemes is vital.
Firms may be required to justify their regulatory flexibility entitlements through greater
performance disclosure, third party verification of claims, or other means. For example,
in order to qualify for Project XL, "a company must propose alternatives that (a) produce
environmental performance superior to that which would be achieved under current
regulations; (b) be 'transparent' and accountable, so that citizens and regulators can
examine assumptions and track progress; (c) not create worker safety problems or
result in environmental injustice; (d) enjoy the support of the surrounding community;
and (e) be binding and enforceable"(Freedman and Caffee, as cited in Breger,
1996:332).
At last, we see where ISO 14001 fits in regulatory reform initiatives: the presence of a
third-party verifiable EMS, in which top management commits to compliance, prevention
of pollution, and continual improvement, may constitute evidence of 'environmental
leadership', and thus grounds for the granting of regulatory flexibility and other
incentives. For example, the NEPI report on regulatory reform "specifically mentions the
ISO 14000 standards as one of the environmental excellence criteria to be used in the
development of an alternative regulatory track"(Reiley, 1997:566). The next section will
explore the argument for using ISO 14001 as a criterion for participation in reform
initiatives.
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6.6 ISO 14001 and its Role in Regulatory Reform
Registration to ISO 14001 may represent an indicator of environmentally proactive
management, if it leads organizations to make meaningful environmental commitments
(chapter 4) and if third-party registration acts as a credible oversight mechanism for
holding the organizations accountable for delivery on those commitments (chapter 5).
According to a recent Department of Energy study, the relationship between adopting an
EMS and regulatory compliance has been characterized in three ways: "Advocates claim
an EMS encourages more consistent compliance and improved environmental
performance. . [They] believe that an EMS can essentially replace key elements of
regulatory oversight, such as inspections or permits. The more cautious view holds that
an EMS harmonizes and complements oversight.. .[The most cautious] view holds that
no change in the regulatory oversight approach is appropriate [because]...eliminating
the conditions that are regulated will lead to a reduction in oversight"(DOE, 1998:7)13.
Among those in the first and second camps, ISO 14001 is seen to offer a unique
opportunity. Because it was designed mainly by industry representatives (chapter 2),
and follows the model of the widely-adopted ISO 9000 standards, it has greater
legitimacy in the business community than many other, similar EMS initiatives. It is
internationally accepted, partly because it makes no performance requirements.
Therefore, a multinational may implement it in a similar manner, though with varied
performance targets, in all of its locations, achieving consistency and economies of
scale in its management practices. Lastly, in spite of considerable criticism alleging bias
in its development process, the standard has had input from many regulatory and
environmental advocacy groups, and that input is expanding in its upcoming revision
phase (chapter 2). Finally, third party registration auditing may increase the standard's
legitimacy to external stakeholders above that of other, similar initiatives, such as
Responsible Care (see chapter 5).
Among the most vocal proponents of ISO 14001 use in 'Alternative Path'-style
regulatory schemes is Ira Feldman, a vice-chair of the US Sub-TAG to ISO, and past
director of the Environmental Leadership Program, a regulatory flexibility initiative, at
EPA. Feldman argues that (1997:12): "Although ISO 14001 registration is not evidence
of environmental excellence, in combination with other corporate environmental
commitments, such as auditing, benchmarking, monitoring, and external voluntary
reporting, an excellence program begins to take shape. ISO 14001...encourages
companies to take a holistic approach to environmental management. The
documentation.. .requirements... could provide a basis for integrated monitoring...[and] a
consolidated reporting mechanism. A commitment to ISO 14001 also comes with a
requirement to aim for pollution prevention, ...a commitment to compliance and to
document conformance with voluntary obligations [e.g. goals]... Finally, third party
verification will provide a comfort level to stakeholders, and could form the basis for
privatizing inspections for a subset of the regulated community".
Other analysts have drawn similar conclusions: "Market-based implementation of a
management system standard, as embodied in ISO 14000, might provide considerable
138 Department of Energy (DOE). EMS frameworks for the Federal Sector in the US. Interagency working Group on ISO
14000,1998.
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leverage in efficiently.. .assuring compliance with regulatory or industry best-practice
standards for environmental performance (p.10)... If the EMS objectives and policies
clearly state the company's plans for compliance with a set of regulations, then an audit
of the EMS under ISO 14001 will yield valuable information to both the public ad the
regulator on the company's compliance with these regulations (p.19)"(Kleindorfer,
1996).
The EPA is cautiously evaluating the utility of ISO 14001, among other EMS schemes,
for regulatory reform. According a recent policy statement, "the EPA encourages the
use of EMSs that focus on improved environmental performance and compliance, as
well as source reduction (pollution prevention) and system performance.... Through
initiatives such as Project XL and the Environmental Leadership Program, EPA is
encouraging the testing of EMSs to achieve superior environmental performance.... EPA
is working in partnership with a number of states [through the Multi-State working
Group, or MSWG] to explore the utility of EMSs, especially those based substantially on
ISO 14001, in public policy innovation"(Hansen, 1998) 139. The Multi-State Working
Group has invested much effort in seeking revision of the EMS standard to better
respond to stakeholder and regulatory desires for greater accountability, environmental
performance minimums, and an emphasis on pollution prevention over pollution control.
Others seek to build onto ISO 14001 additional controls, creating a form of 'ISO-Plus'. In
EPA Region 1, "[The Startrack program is] a groundbreaking experiment to privatize
compliance assurance for leading companies. Built on the ISO 14000 model, the region
will be empowering third parties to certify three basic components 1) an environmental
management system modeled on ISO 14001; 2) facility environmental compliance and
pollution prevention audits; and 3) a commitment to correct certain violations within an
established timeframe"(EPA, 1997:2-9).
At the State level, numerous pilot projects are underway with similar intent. For example
(EPA, 1997)140:
* Colorado: "The Department of Public Health and Environment has included ISO
14000 as a possible criterion in a proposal that would reduce government oversight
and provide financial incentives to companies who excel in environmental
performance"(4-1).
* Kentucky: "[The state] is facilitating ISO 14000 training through... workshops,...
teleconferences,... conferences and lecture series statewide"(4-4).
* Minnesota: The Office of Attorney General is sponsoring statewide EMS training
initiatives, one for larger businesses, the other for smaller ones. It is also making "an
effort to identify the risk reduction and competitiveness advantages of good EMSs
and to inform bankers, insurers and investors of these advantages. ISO 14001
registration and implementation could conceivably be used as a tool in measuring
likely improved performance"(4-6).
* New Mexico: "The Green Zia program will recognize [organizations].. .that have met
specific criteria for achieving environmental excellence... .The criteria for receiving
recognition will be developed with input from regulators and industry representatives,
and will include ISO 14001 conformance"(4-8).
139 Hansen, F. EPA Position Statement on EMS and ISO 14001, and a Request for comments on the Nature of the Data
to be Collected from EMS/ISO 14001 Pilots. (http://www.epa.gov/reivent/ems/emsfr1.htm). Federal Register, vol. 63, No.
48, March 12, 1998.140 EPA. ISO 14000 Resource Directory. EPA/625/R-97/003, October 1997.
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In summary, there are several arguments for why ISO 14001 might be a useful tool for
use in developing an alternative regulatory track for better performers. As a result,
regulators are rapidly developing regulatory flexibility pilot initiatives that take ISO
conformance as a keystone for participation. Some are also seeking revision of the
standard itself. An important question in the race to develop programs such as these is
their implementability. Who supports these initiatives? What are the perspectives of the
key stakeholders with respect to use of ISO 14001 in regulatory reform efforts ? Should
the existing EMS standard be reformed as well ?
6.7 Stakeholder Analysis: Defining Appropriate Policy Responses to
ISO 14001
"Defining a regulatory regime as a specific mindset, [that regime] represents a particular
way of understanding or conceiving of environmental problems and the subsequent
choice of regulatory goals, instruments and institutional settings. In this new emerging
regime, environmental problems.. .are not simple externalities that are easily
internalized, but an integrated part of the workings of the economic system.. .Without the
active cooperation of the affected parties - business as well as other actors - it will be
impossible to realistically define long-term policy goals."
Susse Georg, Copenhagen Business School
The intent of this section is to lay out the areas of consensus and controversy with
respect to the use of ISO 14001 in regulatory reform efforts. Specifically, what
constitutes a legitimate, desirable use of ISO 14001 in conjunction with regulatory
flexibility for key stakeholders ? The viewpoints of industry, environmental advocacy and
community organizations, regulators at the federal and state levels, of consultants and
registrars, and of the ISO, will all be briefly summarized.
Industry
The bulk of industry stakeholders are, in principle, supportive of the combination of
regulatory flexibility and ISO 14001. Most believe that the current regulatory system is
unnecessarily burdensome and adversarial. "Not surprising is the business preference
for self-policing....[which one executive thinks], 'philosophically is a better system...I
think a society which operates through a combination of self-policing with appropriate
performance standards and periodic audits... is the most cost-effective
system...Fundamentally [though] it depends on the honesty of [industrial sources]"(cited
in DiMento, 1986:82).
That said, most industry actors are concerned about fair treatment, and do not want to
be penalized for environmentally-proactive initiatives, such as comprehensive audits.
"Organizations that voluntarily implement an EMS such as ISO 14001 are potentially
subjecting themselves to increased liability in the existing US legal
system...Governments should respect privilege/disclosure statutes and policies that
protect companies"(C12, 1997:3). They want "tangible and significant" incentives for
participation in such programs (Beardsley, 1996:1), primarily reduction in transaction
costs, and potentially, regulatory exemptions (Steinzor, 1998:138). They also believe
that ISO 14001 should remain voluntary, and organizations should not be penalized for
failing to implement it (C12, 1997:1). Even if they do implement it, firms feel entitled to
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seek to reduce environmental costs, rather than to seek a higher standard of
performance: "It is perfectly legitimate for an EMS to focus solely on compliance"(C12,
1997:4).
Transparency and public participation are sensitive issues as well. While stakeholders
should be involved in regulatory reform efforts, "EPA should be careful to separate the
role of interested parties in the development and implementation of public policy and the
role of interested parties in.. .the internal deliberations of private companies.. .An
EMS.. .should not be found wanting because it did not meet some preconceived notion
of the appropriate level of interested party involvement or public communication"(C12,
1996:6). Following this reasoning, "some corporate participants are pressuring EPA to
curtail sharply the influence of multi-stakeholder negotiations, arguing in the context of
Project XL, for example, that public interest representatives should be confined to an
advisory role"(Steinzor, 1998:170).
In terms of revising the standard, "ISO 14001 was adopted with broad
international.. .consensus. [Because it is still new] conclusions can [not yet] be drawn
about its potential strengths [or] weaknesses.. .Governments should not unilaterally
revise, add to, or provide detailed guidance on ISO 14001"(Cl2, 1997:2,4).
The industry position on these issues is summed up best by Larry Slimak, chairman of
the American automobile Manufacturers Association. "The US has the most open public
reporting requirements of any nation in the world. Why build more reporting into the
standard ? Also, Ford [for example] has decided to go to ISO 14001 as a voluntary
business decision.. .[it is] intended primarily for voluntary internal improvement of
environmental management"(Slimak, 1998141). Industry believes that it should have the
opportunity to determine whether ISO 14001 makes business sense before being forced
to adopt it by government regulation, or see it change from a potentially-beneficial
management tool to a less-competitive tool for correcting shortcomings of existing
environmental policy.
Community and Environmental Advocates
There are two major constituencies whose views would be significant in any regulatory
regime centered around ISO 14001. First is the professional national environmental
advocacy organizations (EAOs). Second is the volunteer citizen activist groups in the
community surrounding any facility being considered for regulatory flexibility. Each
would bring slightly different interests and concerns to the table.
"First, national environmentalists have the same interests as prospective industry
participants in a transparent set of standards that allow them to evaluate precisely how
they could benefit [from regulatory flexibility initiatives].. .[Second], the environmentalists'
interest in significantly superior environmental performance [as a precondition of
participation] often conflicts with industry's interest in reducing compliance costs by
achieving regulatory exceptions"(Steinzor, 1998:178). However, some EAOs have
shown themselves open to reducing regulatory burden: Recently, the president of the
NRDC collaborated in that manner: "If there were truly redundant reporting requirements
that were burdening industry while not creating any new information or any
environmental gains, NRDC...challenged industry to point them out and then supported
their elimination"(Adams, NRDC, 1997).
141 Slimak, L. Chairman, C12; American Automobile Manufacturers Association. Personal Interview, Oct. 21, 1998.
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This raises an important issue with regards to 'flexibility'. Environmentalists are
concerned that regulatory reforms will weaken the current system. They want assurance
that, in acting as the facilitator between EAOs and industry groups, EPA will not
abdicate its role as guardian of the public trust. For example, a recent statement by the
president of the NRDC illustrates this perception: "We [NRDC participants] were
disappointed that regulatory strengthening was not championed by the EPA during the
early Common Sense Initiative discussions as a crucial tool for pollution prevention.
Anti-regulatory views set the tone... In this atmosphere we.. .[attempted] to wring the
most environmental benefit possible out of non-regulatory alternatives and various
streamlining and reform proposals. Our point is not that these latter proposals are
meritless, but rather that the lack of support for [stringent] regulatory approaches unduly
constrained the available policy options"(Adams, NRDC, 1997).
In terms of the reform of ISO 14001, environmentalists are mostly united. From their
perspective, ISO 14001 represents an inappropriate departure by the ISO, from the
realm of private transactions into the realm of public safety (Seifert, 1998). Furthermore,
the ISO 14001 development process largely excluded environmentalists, due to the high
cost of participation (see chapter 2). Therefore, environmentalists mistrust the legitimacy
of the standard, and want meaningful participation in the ISO process, as well as in any
regulatory flexibility program structured around the standard. "The environmental
community in the US... [has] no official position yet. However, in Europe... .the European
Environmental Bureau, which represents the bulk of the environmental community there,
has come out against ISO 14000. It sees it as an industry-dominated effort to displace
stricter EU regulations (McCloskey, 1996142). Second, the environmentalists are
concerned that the public, confused by corporate advertising claims, will equate ISO
14001 registration with environmental preferability, and want to see controls enacted to
limit this behavior (See chapter 2 critiques; Seifert, 1998143; Hauselmann, 1997).
In the context of both ISO 14001 use and regulatory reform with the EMS at its heart,
EAOs are unable to fully play the role of public interest watchdog. They lack the
resources necessary to negotiate flexibilities on a site-by-site basis, should flexibility
applications became widespread. Therefore, they seek to negotiate at an industry-sector
level, or to obtain assistance and financial aid, in order to participate meaningfully in
negotiations (Steinzor, 1998:179).
Community activists have different priorities which are far more personal than
professional environmental advocates (Steinzor, 1998:180-3). Activists are under even
greater resource constraints than national organizations, and as individuals are
constrained by other commitments, including family demands and the need to work for a
living. They lack the technical expertise of the environmental professionals.
Furthermore, they are members of the community in which a given site is being
considered for flexibility, and therefore have great personal stakes in the outcomes of
local flexibility negotiations. This includes both assuring protection of health (theirs, their
family and friends), and in not unduly constraining the company upon which many of
their neighbors may depend for occupations. The activist interest coincides with the
professional environmentalist, in that they both mistrust the legitimacy of the ISO 14001
142 McCloskey, Michael. ISO 14000: An Environmentalist's Perspective. Chairman, Sierra Club.
http://www.ecologia.org/iso14000/opcom/sierra.htm). April 26, 1996.
4 Seifert, D. NGO Working Group on ISO 14000. Personal Interview, Oct. 28, 1998.
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standards, and need funding and technical assistance to participate meaningfully in
negotiations. In order to judge for themselves the efficacy of any regulatory agreement,
"local activists place a high value on.. .gaining access to information about emissions or
health effects"(Steinzor, 1998:183). They would largely be uninterested in the debate
over reform of the ISO standard, unless it was shown that registration was being
misused by local industrial firms. Most important from their perspective is to ensure the
regulator does not abdicate responsibility as the final decision maker.
State and Federal Regulators
The various states and the EPA have drawn different conclusions with regard to the
following issues. First, they disagree over whether flexibility should be granted for
'compliance at lower cost' versus 'superior environmental performance'. For example,
the Federal level is more cautious than the States about the appropriate role of ISO
14001. "At this time, EPA is not basing any regulatory incentives solely on the use of
EMSs, or certification to ISO 14001" emphasizing a commitment to superior
environmental performance as a prerequisite for XL and other flexibility initiatives
(Hansen, 1998). On the other hand, the State/EPA agreement on EMS pilot projects
allows the States to relax that requirement: "A commitment to achieve a higher level of
performance is not necessary but may be a component of some pilots"(EPA, 1998:
s.2)".
Second, regulators have enacted different policies regarding audit confidentiality
privilege. At the Federal level, EPA allows no 'privilege', but reduces or eliminates
gravity-based penalties for non-compliances that are disclosed and promptly corrected
(Riedel, CEEM:392). States, by contrast, have allowed audits varying degrees of
confidentiality (e.g. Minnesota example, above). In either case, both are supportive of
regulatory reform efforts with ISO 14001 as a criterion for participation.
In terms of advocating changes in the standard, regulators are of two minds. On the one
hand, they want to see widespread diffusion of the standard because of its potential to
'raise all boats'. At the same time, they recognize the inherent flaws in the standard
(lack of performance minimums, no guarantee of regulatory compliance, no preference
for pollution prevention). Many of the Multi-State Working Group proposals are aimed at
redressing these perceived flaws. However, they appear conscious of the potential to
'chill' diffusion of the standard through placement of too many constraints.
Consultants and Registrars
For this constituency, the possibility of increased registration and devolution of
regulatory oversight represent a major potential source of income. For that reason, it is
not surprising that consultants and registrars are enthusiastic cheerleaders for
incorporation of ISO 14001 in regulation. In fact, one consultant who specializes in
assisting firms with ISO 14000 implementation titled a recent paper "So Long!
Command and Control...Hello ISO 14001 !!!"(Smith and Patchak, 1997 145).
144 EPA. EPA and State Regulatory Framework for EMS Pilot Projects. May 14, 1998.
145 Smith, W. and Patchak, R. (CH2M) So Long! command and Control...Hello! ISO 14000. CH2M homepage, 1997.
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6.8 Chapter Summary
Registration to ISO 14001 may represent an indicator of environmentally proactive
management, if it leads organizations to make meaningful environmental commitments
(chapter 4) and if third-party registration acts as a credible oversight mechanism for
holding the organizations accountable for delivery on those commitments (chapter 5).
As a result, regulators are rapidly developing regulatory reform initiatives that take ISO
conformance as a keystone for granting regulatory flexibility. Flexibility may be given to
help sites achieve the same performance results at lower cost, or achieve better
performance than before at the same cost. In granting flexibility, the regulator takes on
additional risk that the regulated actor will reduce its environmental performance, or that
the performance benefits will not justify the flexibilities given. Many flexibility initiatives
are illegal under existing laws, and could be challenged under citizen suit provisions.
Regulatory strategies incorporating ISO 14001 will therefore need to be structured such
that they meet stakeholder concerns about legitimacy and accountability. Likewise, they
will need to be sensitive to industry's desire for flexibility, fairness, and voluntarism.
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Chapter 7 Summary and Policy Recommendations
This chapter summarizes the preceding analyses and makes policy recommendations
for the revision of the ISO 14001 standard, and for its use in US regulatory strategy.
7.1 Summary
ISO 14001 is:
> A management system that organizations may use to control their environmental
performance using a 'quality' approach.
> An internationally recognized standard whose implementation may be verified by
private third party registrars.
> Not a guarantee of environmental preferability. A firm may be registered to the
standard without being in regulatory compliance.
ISO 14001 is, however, likely to become a market entry requirement in many industries.
Only two years old as this study is completed, globally, there are now over 6,000
registered sites, more than 200 of which are in the US (Peglau, 1998). Many sites are
owned by highly influential corporations such as Ford and IBM. Its 'sister' standard, ISO
9000, has become an international market condition, with over 130,000 registered sites
worldwide.
Depending on the nature of registered facilities, the impact of adoption on management
objectives, and the credibility of third party oversight, ISO 14001 may have a positive
impact on environmental performance. As a result, state and federal environmental
agencies are debating the use of ISO 14001 registration as a qualifier for regulatory
flexibility. This report concerns itself with identifying a best course of action for US
regulators for achieving the greatest environmental benefit from this emerging
management tool, as illustrated in Figure 7.1, below.
Impact of Credibility of
Adoption on Private Third Party
Management Oversight
Objectives Appropriate Role
of
ISO 14001
in Public Policy
Nature of Facilities
That Have
Adopted Standard
Figure 7.1 Appropriate Response of the Environmental Regulator to ISO 14001
Depends on:
. The Nature of the Registered Facilities
" The Impact of Registration on Internal Management Decisions
. The Ability of Registrars to Ensure Accountability
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Nature of Early Adopters: Big, Foreign, ISO 9000-Registered and Highly-Regulated
In chapter 3, a statistical analysis of TRI and other data from over 30,000 US
manufacturing facilities was used to identify the common characteristics of those
organizations who have obtained registration in the US. A probit analysis revealed that
facilities are more likely to obtain registration if they are :
> Larger facilities, owned by companies such as Ford, IBM and Toyota.
> Under Asian or European ownership.
> Registered to ISO 9000 (quality management system).
> Generators of more effluent per employee (are 'dirtier') than their respective industry
averages.
> Highly regulated (operate under one or more permits), and compete in industrial sectors that
generate a higher amount of effluent per employee.
These findings support several conclusions:
1. Strong regulatory oversight appears to motivate adoption.
2. ISO 14001 adoption will be driven by Asian and European pressure.
3. Small facilities are less likely to adopt the standard than larger facilities.
Structure of ISO 14001: Setting, Attaining and Revising Management Goals
In chapter 2, the history and structure of ISO 14001 was briefly summarized, along with
the major critiques against it. The International Organization for Standardization, a
federation of the world's national standards-setting bodies, developed the ISO 14001
EMS standards in order to prevent the emergence of trade-distorting national and
private alternatives. Critics of the standard maintain that the process by which it was
developed excluded environmental advocacy organizations and developing country
representatives from having input. Furthermore:
> A lack of performance requirements may make the standard meaningless as an indicator of
environmental commitment.
> Firms may therefore misuse third-party registration to signal to the public that their products
are 'environmentally preferable'.
The ISO 14001 standard is designed to enable organizations to systematically establish,
attain, and revise environmental management objectives (see figure 7.2, below).
Figure 7.2 ISO 14001 Management System Structure, Showing Centrality of Goals
to System Outcomes
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Registration and Goal-Setting: Likely to Have Positive Impact on Performance
In chapter 4, ten case studies based on interviews with senior environmental managers
demonstrated that ISO 14001 registration is likely to improve environmental
performance through its impact on management objectives.
The stringency of goals before and after registration remained roughly equivalent.
However, it was observed that registration strengthened firms' environmental
commitments, by helping them prioritize and set more-attainable goals, over a
broader range of environmental impacts, and involve a broader constituency of
employees in the goal-setting process, with more institutional support for goal
attainment.
In spite of these positive indications, however, organizations did not increase their
disclosure of environmental performance-related information following ISO registration.
Nor were they more likely to involve external stakeholders in the goal-setting process.
Private Third-Party Registration Auditing: Credibility Could Be Enhanced
If audits were effective and recognized as such both by regulators and by the public,
reduced regulatory oversight might be appropriate, allowing regulators to concentrate
limited resources on weaker actors, and ISO 14001-conforming facilities to save some
of the cost of demonstrating regulatory compliance.
ISO 14001 allows firms to self-audit their conformity to the standard's requirements,
rather than employ a registrar. This self-declaration, however, would not be sufficient
justification for regulatory flexibility. A 1996 EPA-funded study by the NSF indicated that
"24% of all the [ISO 14001] requirements were evaluated lower and only 6% were
evaluated higher [by independent auditors]. These findings suggest that... [self-
declaring] organizations might have a tendency to evaluate their systems higher than
would independent [registration] auditors". Thus, self-declaring organizations lack
sufficient credibility to justify reduced regulatory oversight.
Third party registration has greater credibility because it may be more objective than
self-declaration. The meaning of registration to observers is largely dependent on the
credibility of the third party registration auditing mechanism. In order to be credible to
external stakeholders, registrars must be consistent in their interpretation of the
standard and have meaningful sanctioning power. Conflicts of interest must be
contained by oversight mechanisms (see figure 7.3, below). In chapter 5, interviews with
seven accredited US registrars indicated that the credibility of registrars is weakened
by the potential for inconsistent interpretation and for conflict of interest.
Registered organizations are required to demonstrate to their registrar, through records
and on-site inspections and interviews, that all key elements in the standard
specification are in place, and function as intended. Any non-conformances to the
standard will be noted, and the organization's management will be notified. Subsequent
inspections will ensure not only that the non-conformance has been corrected, but that
the root cause has been addressed so that repeat of that non-conformance is less likely.
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ISO 14001 Credibility as a Signal of
Environmental Management Commitment
Consistency of Interpretation
and Application of Standard's
Requirements
Registrar Credibility** Power to Impose Sanctions
for Non-Conformances
**taking as an assumption Conflicts of Interest
that non-conformances
will be discovered.
Figure 7.3 Credibility of ISO 14001 Registration Depends on Registrar Consistency,
Sanctioning Power, and Conflicts of Interest.
Once the registrar approves a firm's EMS as conforming to the ISO 14001 standard, it
places that organization on its list of registered facilities. Registration is valid for three
years, after which it must be renewed. Currently, there is no centralized, up-to-date,
publicly-available list of registered organizations.
Registrars have at least five sanctions available, though this study found that only the
first three have been used. Use of the sanctions is not publicized.
> Denial of initial registration
> Notification of non-conformance
> Major non-conformance re-audit
> Suspension of registration
> Withdrawal of registration
As private companies in business to make a profit, registrars face three conflicts of
interest that may prevent them from applying sanctions:
> Incentive to offer value-added consulting services to clients, which is not allowed in the US,
but may be done in other countries.
> Incentive to be less stringent than competitors, thereby appealing to those organizations
seeking the least stringent application of the standard's requirements in order to minimize
their costs.
> Incentive to minimize costs, by monitoring less than competitors.
This study found that, in spite of possible conflicts-of-interest, the accreditation process
offers a strong mechanism for the registrars to maintain mutual accountability for the
consistency of their registration approach.
> The accreditation board, a council made up of representatives from industry, government,
and other accredited registrars, assures consistent registration through audits and periodic
surveillance of in-field registration practices.
> Each registrar is required to establish an internal supervisory board, with representatives
from various interest groups - including government agencies, registered firms, and other
registrars. They also produce an internal interpretation document, clarifying their
understanding of the standard's requirements.
> Each registrar is dependent on its reputation of integrity for continued business. If it became
known that a registrar consistently registered sub-standard systems, it would damage its
reputation and that of its clients.
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Registrars interpret some components of the standard differently: For example,
the registrar is required to keep confidential, to all except its client, the results of audits.
However, during the course of registration audits, registrars are likely to discover
regulatory non-compliances, if these have occurred. Under federal law, they are
required to furnish this knowledge to regulators, when subpoenaed.
Some registered organizations have hired registrars through their attorneys, in order to
guard audit results under attorney-client privilege. Others have offered 'affirmative
statements' to their registration auditors, stating that appropriate procedures are in
place, without supplying further data or documents. At least one registrar believes this is
sufficient evidence. Other registrars do not.
Regulatory Flexibility: ISO 14001 Alone Does Not Offer Sufficient Assurance
Chapter 6 probed the range of regulatory flexibilities legally and implicitly available for
use in regulatory reform initiatives in the US, and summarized stakeholder interests with
respect to use of ISO 14001.
In regulatory reform initiatives, goal flexibility refers to the allowable deviation from the
mandated regulatory performance standard. Means flexibility refers to the variance
allowed in the method used to achieve that performance standard. Enforcement
flexibility refers to EPA's allowable discretion in choosing not to sanction non-compliant
actors, limited by citizen-suit provisions in many statutes.
In 'Alternative Path' regulatory reform proposals, regulatory flexibility would be given to
better performers, in exchange for a commitment to 'superior environmental
performance', relative to the existing regulatory scheme. Such flexibility might also be
given to those who commit to achieving equivalent performance at lower cost.
Regardless of whether equivalent performance may be obtained more efficiently through
other means, under current US law, firms are legally required to comply with regulation.
Thus, many regulatory reform initiatives may be illegal and open to citizen suit
challenge.
Firms that participate in regulatory reform initiatives often take on new capital costs,
increase regulatory uncertainty, and may increase their liability exposure. To offset
these risks and secure their participation in reform initiatives, regulators offer firms
additional incentives, such as:
> Fast-track, lower-cost permitting
> Reduced site inspections and reporting burdens
> Investment incentives, financial subsidies, and reduced fees
> Enhanced relationships and public recognition
> Reduced liability through enhanced audit confidentiality protection
Likewise, the regulator exchanges some of its ability to monitor compliance, in exchange
for a commitment to 'better' performance. The regulator therefore risks two undesirable
outcomes:
> Reduced environmental performance, because the firm exploits reduced oversight in order to
reduce its cost of compliance.
> Less-than-anticipated improvements, either in cost savings or environmental performance
gains, that do not justify the provision of the flexibilities and incentives granted.
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In order to assure that only 'better performers' obtain regulatory flexibility, and reduce
risk of undesirable outcomes, regulators have used the following screening criteria:
> Absence of recent enforcement or compliance problems
> Presence of an environmental management system, such as ISO 14001
> Participation in other EPA voluntary initiatives, such as 'Green Lights'
> Commitment by top management towards goal attainment
> Internal compliance auditing program
> Demonstration of historical environmental leadership
EPA and the states are cautiously weighing the utility of ISO 14001 as a criterion for
regulatory flexibility qualification. The EPA Region 1 Startrack program, the Multi-State
Working Group, initiatives in Colorado, New Mexico, Minnesota and New Mexico, all
indicate that regulators believe:
> ISO 14001 registration alone is insufficient grounds for granting regulatory flexibility to a
facility.
> The standard could be used as the basis of a structure with sufficient protection, if coupled
with a strong compliance record, a disclosure requirement and a commitment to 'superior
environmental performance'.
Stakeholder Perspectives on ISO 14001 Revision and Use in Regulatory Reform
Industry does not want a revision to ISO 14001 that will affect its ability to choose performance
and information disclosure levels. They are concerned about taking on additional liability by
adopting the standard and therefore want audit confidentiality privileges. They do not want to be
penalized for failing to implement the standard. They support regulatory reform, but do not feel
that 'superior performance' should be a requirement for participation.
Environmental Advocacy Organizations would like the ISO 14001 standard, and the process
by which it is designed, to be revised. They want minimum performance requirements, controls
placed on its use in advertising, and greater public accountability and disclosure. Incentives for
EAOs to participate in regulatory reform initiatives are: superior environmental performance
commitments, greater access to performance data, and economic assistance.
Community Activists also favor greater disclosure, mistrust ISO 14001, and need financial and
technical help in order to participate meaningfully in regulatory reform negotiations.
Regulators at the EPA are more conservative than those at the State level regarding the use of
ISO 14001. They do not grant audit privilege to registered organizations, whereas some states
have granted such privileges. The EPA wants commitments of 'superior environmental
performance' in exchange for participation in regulatory flexibility initiatives, whereas some
regulators at state level have not made this a requirement. Both, however, are committed to
regulatory reform a see ISO 14001 as a useful tool in that respect.
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7.2 Policy Recommendations and Questions for Further Research
This study began by asking: what is the appropriate regulatory response to ISO 14001
in the US ?
On the one hand, it was demonstrated that:
> ISO 14001 is likely to be broadly adopted, driven by Asian and European demand.
> Firms that adopt the standard are likely to improve their environmental performance.
Those that are out of compliance are more likely to be aware of their non-
compliance.
> Private third-party registration auditing has the potential to play a very useful role in
regulatory reform, allowing limited government resources to more efficiently be
deployed.
On the other, it was learned that:
> ISO 14001 registration is not a guarantee of regulatory compliance.
> Third party auditing is susceptible to conflicts of interest.
This study therefore concludes:
ISO 14001 registration, alone, is inadequate justification
for granting regulatory flexibility to a firm.
However, diffusion of the standard may have numerous benefits. In order to make more
effective use of the existing ISO 14001 standard to promote environmental protection, it
is recommended that regulators:
A.1. Enhance the Accountability of Registered Facilities
> Establish a centralized, publicly-accessible database to facilitate the monitoring
of registered companies. While registrars are required to disclose their registered-
firm lists, and firms are required to disclose their environmental policies, this
information must currently be requested directly from individual firms. The
information is thus scattered, and inconsistent in presentation and content. It is
therefore difficult to identify firms that have been suspended or lost registration due
146to non-conformances
> Enact advertising standards, to prevent firms from representing their registration
as a sign that their products and services are environmentally preferable.
> Survey stakeholder interests, and provide results to registered firms. During
the aspects identification process, firms are required to take stakeholder interests
into account. EPA could host regional stakeholder dialogues to define the
environmental aspects of greatest salience in a given area, and pass the results on
to registered firms in the area, in order to promote preventative efforts directed
towards the most relevant aspects.
146 Basic information should include the following: firm, facility name, scope and date of registration, registrar, Sic code,
contact information and environmental policy.
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A.2. Encourage the Diffusion of the Standard
> Offer small businesses, and firms that compete in Asia and Europe, financial
and other incentives to adopt the standard, such as low interest loans, technical
assistance and mentoring from larger registered firms.
> Work with insurers, investors and lenders to promote registration and to study
financial benefits and costs of adoption.
Industry representatives allege that attempts to modify ISO 14001 to include
performance requirements (such as regulatory compliance) might lessen the standard's
desirability. If so, regulators must balance competing interests: between broader
diffusion of a 'weaker' standard, and more-limited diffusion of a more stringent one. In
order to avoid chilling the adoption of the standard, regulators should not seek
substantial revisions to ISO 14001, except in the following areas:
B.1. Support Stakeholder Participation in Standard Development
> Environmental advocates should be more meaningfully represented in the ISO
14001 development process. EPA may need to offer funds to support their
involvement, or encourage foundations to do so. This will enhance its ultimate public
legitimacy.
B.2. Continue to Play a Leading Role in Standard Development
> EPA should continue to play a leading role in the standard development
process, so that it remains informed of, and participates in, any substantial
modifications to the standard.
In addition to ISO 14001 registration, complementary controls need to be placed on a
firm to justify granting it some regulatory flexibility. Regulators interested in employing
ISO 14001 in regulatory reform initiatives should therefore do all of the above, as well
as:
C.1. Establish Minimum Performance and Transparency Requirements
> Commitment to 'Superior Environmental Performance' is a necessary pre-
requisite for participation.
> Participating firms should be required to disclose goals and performance-
related data, to facilitate monitoring and oversight.
> Participating firms should have a record of historical environmental leadership
and compliance.
> Stakeholders and regulators should be participants in the aspects
identification and goal-setting processes.
C.2. Give Firms Substantial Incentives to Participate in Reform Initiatives
> Grant audit confidentiality protection to participating firms, so that regulators
may obtain access to audit results, but others may not use those results in legal
proceedings, unless the company fails to comply with its corrective action schedule.
> Grant participants additional regulatory incentives, such as fast-track permitting,
reduced site inspections and reporting burdens, investment incentives, reduced
fees, and public recognition.
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C.3. Enhance Registrar Accountability
> Prevent firms from 'shopping around' to find the least-stringent registrar by
requiring them to correct all non-conformances identified by the current registrar
before switching to a new one.
> Require publication of the registrars' internal, interpretive documents, so that
interpretations can be compared between registrars.
> Encourage registrars to invite an environmental advocate onto their internal,
supervisory boards.
> Reject the use of 'affirmative statements' as a substitute for 'objective evidence'
of conformity.
> Consider giving registrars partial liability for a registered client's failure to
correct a non-conformance that leads to substantial endangerment of human
health and the environment. This will create an incentive for registrars to sanction
their clients in order to prevent repeated non-conformances.
There are many avenues of research on ISO 14001 that should be further explored:
> Do organizations 'shop around' for the least-stringent registrar ? This could be
studied by examining the experience of ISO 9000 firms and registrars.
> Is there a link between registration, goal-setting, and environmental performance ?
> What aspects of the standard are most challenging for firms to implement ?
> What conditions do registrars use for suspending or withdrawing registration ?
> Under what conditions could a registrar lose its accreditation ?
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3M
3M
ABB
Acushnet Rubber
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Allied Signal
Alumax
Analog Devices, Inc.
Apple Computer
ASMO North
Carolina Inc.
Becton Dickinson &
Company
Becton Dickinson &
Company
BF Goodrich
Aerospace CSD
BOC Gases
BOC Gases
Borg-Warner
Branson Ultrasonics
Corporation
Brent America, Inc.
Brent America, Inc.
Brewer and
Associates
I: ISO 14001 Registered Companies Database
Facility name
3M
3M Dental Products Division
(Irvine)
ABB Power T&D Co., Inc.
Acushnet Rubber Company, Inc.
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Akzo Nobel
Allied Signal (DoE facility)
Alumax (Goose Creek facility)
Analog Devices, Inc. (Wilmington
Manufacturing facility)
Apple Computer's Sacramento
Operations Center
ASMO North Carolina Inc.
(Statesville facility)
Becton Dickinson & Company
Becton Dickinson & Company
BF Goodrich Aerospace CSD
BOC Gases
BOC Gases
Borg-Warner Automotive,
Air/Fluid Systems Corporation
Branson Ultrasonics Corporation
Brent America, Inc.
Brent America, Inc.
Brewer and Associates
City
Aberdeen
Irvine
Florence
New Bedford
Edison
Axis
Pasadena
Deer Park
LeMoyne
Kansas City
Goose Creek
Wilmington
State
South Dakota
California
South Carolina
Massachusetts
New Jersey
alabama
Texas
Texas
alabama
Missouri
South Carolina
Massachusetts
Zip Code Telephone
29501
8817
36505
77507
77536
803 665-4144
508-998-4000
732-985-6262
334-675-1310
281-474-0301
281-479-841 1x223
35234? 334-675-1310
64131 816-997-7304
803-572-5342
Contact Name TRI ID#
Debbie Watson
Richard Bowie
Dianne Krilly
kay higby
Martin Wuensche
Hank
Staniscewski
Kay Higby
David Huyett
Andy Ducan
California
Statesville North Carolina 28625-8504 704 878-6663 Bruce Stevens
Sandy Utah
Franklin Lakes New Jersey
Murray Hill
Kittery
Dixon
Danbury
Lake Bluff
La Mirada
Grand Prairie
Florida
New Jersey
Maine
Illinois
92713MSRGC17132
29501BBPWRI95ME
02742CSHNT744BE
08817KZCHMMEADO
36505KZCHMUSHIG
77507KZCHM 13000
77536TXSLK730BA
64131 SDPTF2000E
29445LMXFSHIGHW
01887BLGDV804WO
28677SMNRT1804C
84070DSRTM9450S
07417-1880 201 847-6844 Matthew Bigley
33122CLVLN6445N
207.475.3102 Jim Merriam ?08846RCGSS172BA
3904
61021
Connecticut 06813-1961 203 796-2274 Peter Feisthamel
Illinois
California
Texas
60044
90638
75050
847 295-1660
714 739-2821
214-641-8020
06813BRNSN41EAG
Robert Siegel 60044CHMCL901SH
90638RDRCGSS172BA
Laurie Miller
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IN
Company
Camoplast
Rockland Ltd.
(Plattsburgh
facility)
Cannon Business
Machines, Inc.
Cannon Business
Machines, Inc.
Carrier Transicold
(Athens facility)
Ciba Speciality
Chemicals
Ciba Speciality
Chemicals
Clairol
Color and
Composite
Technologies Inc.
(Sidney facility)
Compaq
Comtech (Waupun
facility)
Condea Vista
Company
(Baltimore facility)
Cooper Industries
(Melrose Park
facility)
Cortec Corporation
Crystal Bottle
Water Company
(Phoenix)
Daikin America,
Inc.
Dana
Denso
Manufacturing
Denso
Manufacturing
Denso
Manufacturing
Facility name City
Camoplast Rockland Ltd.
(Plattsburgh facility)
Cannon Business Machines, Inc.
Cannon Business Machines, Inc.
Carrier Transicold (Athens facility)
Ciba Speciality Chemicals,
pigment
Ciba Specialty Chemicals ,
pigment
Clairol
Color and Composite Technologies
Inc. (Sidney facility)
Plattsburg
Newport News
Costa Mesa
Athens
Wilmington
Stamford
Sidney
Americas'Materials Recovery Operation (Digital
Equipment Corporation)
Comtech (Waupun facility) Waupun
Condea Vista Company (Baltimore Baltimore
facility)
Cooper Industries (Melrose Park Melrose Park
facility)
Cortec Corporation St Paul
Crystal Bottle Water Company Phoenix
(Phoenix)
Daikin America, Inc. Decatur
Dana Corporation Vinita
Denso Manufacturing Maryville
Denso Manufacturing Battle Creek
Denso Manufacturing Athens
State Zip C
New York 12901
Virginia
California
Georgia
Delaware
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Ohio 45365
New Hampshire
Wisconsin
Maryland 21226
)de Telephone Contact Name TRI ID#
706-357-7225
23606CNNVR 12000
92626CNNBS3191R
30601 CRRRT7000L
19804CBGGYJAMES
06922CLRLN I BLAC
53963CMTCH401 IN
410-355-6200 David Mahler 21226VSTCH3441F
Illinois
Minnesota
arizona
alabama
Oklahoma
Tennessee
Michigan
Tennessee
55110
49015
37303
612-429-1 100x 116 'Art Ahlbrecht
205-306-5000
423) 981-5228
616 965-3322
423-981-5228
W. Wayne Brown
Michael Myszka
W. Wayne Brown
85017CRYST3302W
35601DKNMRSTATE
37801NPPND1720R
49015NPPNDONEDE
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Digital Audio Disc
Corporation (Terre
Haute facility)
Duracell North
Atlantic Group
Eaton Corporation
EG&G
Optoelectronics
(Salem facility)
Elf Atochem
(Carrollton facility)
Epson Portland Inc.
(Hillsboro facility)
First Environment,
Inc.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Facility name
Digital Audio Disc Corporation
(Terre Haute facility)
Duracell North Atlantic Group
Eaton Corporation
EG&G Optoelectronics (Salem
facility)
City
Terre Haute
Kearney
Salem
Elf Atochem (Carrollton facility) Carrollton
Epson Portland Inc. (Hillsboro
facility)
First Environment, Inc.
Ford electronics and refrigeration
Ford electronics and refrigeration
Ford electronics and refrigeration
Ford electronics and refrigeration
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Hillsboro
riverdale
State
Indiana
Connecticut
Nevada
Massachusetts
Kentucky
Zip Code Telephone Contact Name TRI ID#
47804 812-462-8100 Gary Garrahan 47804DGTLD1800N
68848
41008
Oregon
New Jersey 7457
308 233-5470
502 732-4411 Elizabeth
Gillespie
201.616.9700 Reeva Schiffman
68847TNCRP4200E
01970GGNC35CON
41008MTCHM2316H
97124PSNPR395ON
19446FRDLC2750M
19446FRDLCCHURC
4733 1 FRDLCSTATE
47421FRDLC3120W
07601FRDFSI I OSN
07074FRDLB77MOO
46992THFRD775MA
48046FRDMT26090
30354FRDMT340HE
45103FRDMT1981F
14219FRDMT53663
60633FRDMT12600
60411FRDMT1000E
44142FRDMT5600H
44142FRDMT17601
44142FRDMT1760A
48121FRDM23001M
48121FRDM33001M
48121DRBRN3001M
48121FRDMT3001M
48121FRDMI3001M
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Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Facility name
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
City State Zip Code Telephone Contact Name TRI ID#
48121FRDM43001M
08818FRDMT939US
48121 FRDMTTHEAM
48146FRDMT25500
12183FRDMT75TIB
641 19FRDMTHWY69
40222FRDMT300 1 C
45801FRDMTI 155B
48150FRDMT36200
44053FRDMT5401B
40213FRDMTFERNV
48184FRDMT38303
48160MLNPL800CO
48161MNRST3200E
37209FRDMTCENTE
23523FRDMT2424S
44012FRDMT650MI
48101FRDMT17000
48121 FRDMT20000
48065FRDNW70 I E3
48176SLNNS7700M
44870FRDMT3020T
45241 FRDMT3000S
48170FRDMT14425
63042FRDMT6250N
48310FRDMT39000
74121 FRDMT5555S
55116FRDMT966SM
48087FRDMT50500
48078FRDMT41 111
48121FRDMT3900W
44146WLTNH7845N
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Company
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Formosa Plastics
Corp.
Formosa Plastics
Corp.
Formosa Plastics
Corp.
Foster Wheeler
Environmental
Corporation
Fuji Hunt
Hamilton Standard
Hamilton Standard
Facility name
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Ford Motor Co.
Formosa Plastics Corp.
Formosa Plastics Corp.
Formosa Plastics Corp.
Foster Wheeler Environmental
Corporation
Fuji Hunt Photographic Chemicals
Inc.
Hamilton Standard
Hamilton Standard
City
Indianapolis
Landsdale
Lima
Romeo
Van dyke
State
Indiana
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Michigan
Michigan
Zip Code
46219
48065
North Penn Pennsylvania
Delaware City Delaware
Baton Rouge Louisiana
Point Comfort Texas
Livingston New Jersey 7039
Telephone Contact Name TRI ID#
48184FRDMT37625
48184FRDMT37500
48183FRDMT20900
48183FRDMT24189
48197FRDMT128FA
17554FRDNWCOMME
48121FRDRG3001M
48096FRDMT50000
48198BCWLL2625T
08863HTCCRKINGG
48043MTCLM151LA
17557FRDNW300DI
48121 RGSTL3001M
46219FRDMT6900E
35125THFRD3929M
317-352-4301 Tom Kolbus ?46219FRDMT6900E
313.390.9646 John Phelps 19446FRDLCCHURC
4580lFRDMTI 155B
313.752.8087 Staci Swatzenbarg 48065FRDNW70 1 E3
48078FRDMT41 111
19706FRMSPSCHOO
70805FRMSPGULFS
77978FRMSPPOBOX
201-597-7000 Don Rogers, Vice President & CEO
Illinois
Farmington Connecticut
Windsor Locks Connecticut
60008LNHNT900CA
06032HMLTN I HAMI
06096HMLTNI HAMI
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Hitachi
Semiconductor
(America), Inc.
Honda
Transmission
Manufacturing of
America, Inc.
H-R Industries, Inc.
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
Hitachi Semiconductor (America),
Inc.
Honda Transmission
Manufacturing of America, Inc.
H-R Industries, Inc.
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
Irving Texas
Russells Point Ohio
Richardson Texas
75016-7928 972 756-3374 75016HTCHS 1505W
937-843-5555 Lee Sanders 43348BLLMR6964S
75081 214-301-6620
ESSEX
JUNCTION, VT 05452
BROOKLYN, NY 11205
KINGSTON, NY 12401
KINGSTON, NY 12401
HOPEWELL
JUNCTION, NY
HOPEWELL
JUNCTION, NY 125330999
POUGHKEEPSIE, NY 126015400
POUGHKEEPSIE, NY
126015400
ENDICOTT, NY 13760
ENDICOTT, NY 13760
BOCA
RATON, FL 33431
AUSTIN, TX 787583494
AUSTIN, TX 787583494
BOULDER, CO 80301
BOULDER, CO 80301
TUCSON, AZ 85744
SAN JOSE, CA 95193
SAN JOSE, CA 95193
Gary Roper 75081HRNDS1302E
05452BM 1000R
1 1205BM 585DE
12401 NTRNTNEIGH
12401 NTRNTNEIGH
12533BM EASTF
12533BM EASTF
1 2602BMCRPSOUTH
12602BMCRPSOUTH
13760BM 1701N
13760BM 1701N
33431NTRNTIOOON
78758BM 11400
78758BM 11400
80301 BM 6300D
8030 IBM 6300D
85744BM 9000S
95193BM 5600C
95193BM 5600C
Technology, Business and Environment, MIT140
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
IBM
Intalco Aluminum
Corporation
(Ferndale, WA)
International Paper
- Easter Region
Land & Timber
ITT McDonnell &
Miller (Chicago
facility)
Kerr-McGee
Chemical, LLC
Komatsu America
Kyocera, America
Kyocera, America
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
IBM
IBM San Jose
IBM Endicott
IBM Rochester
IBM Tucson
IBM Austin
IBM Somers
Intalco Aluminum Corporation Ferndale
(Ferndale, WA)
International Paper - Easter Region Georgetown
Land & Timber
ITT McDonnell & Miller (Chicago Chicago
facility)
Kerr-McGee Chemical, LLC Texarkana
Komatsu America International chattanooga
Company (Chattanooga
Manufacturing facility)
Kyocera, America
Kyocera, America Vancouver
Lockheed Martin Control Systems Johnson Cit
Lockheed Martin Control Systems Fort wayne
Lockheed Martin Electronics and
Missiles
TRIANGLE PARK, NC
NC 28262
SAN JOSE, CA 95112
180 KOST RD.
650 HARRY RD.
RESEARCH
CHARLOTTE,
ROCHESTER,
MN 55901
RTE. 134
LEXINGTON, KY 40511
California
New York
Minnesota
arizona
Texas
New York
Washington
95193
78757
10589
98248
South Carolina 29440
Illinois
Texas
60618
75501
Tennessee 37405
California
Washington
New York
Indiana
alabama
13790
408-256-8965 Ray Wynn
408-256-8965
512-823-7536
914-756-2725
360-384-7600
Ray Wynn
Pat Rurney
Patrick Aurrichio
Gary Duling
27709BM 3039C
28257BM 1001W
951 12BM 2020S
17055BM 180KO
95120BMRSR650HA
55901BM HWY52
10598NTLBSRTE 3
40511 NTRNT740NE
?95193BM5600C
13760BM1701N
55901BMHWY52
85744BM9000S
98248NTLCL4050M
843-546-2573 Donna Perison 29442NTRNTKAMIN
312-267-1600 Richard Falck 60618TTMCD350ON
903 794-5169 John Getz
(423) 757-0333
(607) 770-2696
219) 434-5398
75503KRRMCI55BU
Gerald Street ?44833DRSSR IMILE
Doug Garner
Rick Barry
92123KYCRM861 lB
98661KYCRN5701E
13790GNRLL600MA
?35802SCMNF4000S
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Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lockheed
Lucent
Lucent
Technologies
Lockheed Martin Electronics and
Missiles (Orlando site)
Lockheed Martin Electronics and
Missiles (Troy facility)
Lockheed Martin Federal Systems
Lockheed Martin Federal Systems
Lockheed Martin Government
Electronic Systems (Moorestown
facility)
Lockheed Martin Infared Imaging
Systems
Lockheed Martin Ocean, Radar
and Sensor Systems
Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense
Systems
Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense
Systems (Archbald facility)
Lockheed Martin Tactical Defense
Systems (Oldsmar facility)
Lockheed Martin Vought Systems
Lockheed Martin Vought Systems
( El Paso, Grand Prairie, and
Lufkin)
Lockheed Martin Vought Systems
( El Paso, Grand Prairie, and
Lufkin)
Lockheed Martin Vought Systems
( El Paso, Grand Prairie, and
Lufkin)
Sanders, (Lockheed Martin
Company)
Sanders, (Lockheed Martin
Company)
Sanders, (Lockheed Martin
Company)
Sanders, (Lockheed Martin
Company)
Sanders, (Lockheed Martin
Company)
Cirent Semiconductor (Joint
Venture of Lucent
Technologies/Cirrus Logic)
Lucent Technologies
Orlando
Troy
Owego
Moorestown
Lexington
Syracuse
Akron
Archbald
Oldsmar
camden
Grand Prairie
El Paso
Lufkin
Nashua
Hudson
Merrimack
Manchester
Chelmsford
Orlando
Texas
Texas
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Florida
79906
75904
32819
Breinigsville Pennsylvania 18031
32855MRTNM4600S
?85338LRLDF1300S
607-751-2285 hal ehrhardt 13827BMSYSROUTE
2211 ONTRNT9500G
08057GRSPCBORTO
Florida
arizona
New York
Virginia
New Jersey
Massachusetts 2421
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Florida 34677
arkansas
Texas
Rick Vincent
Brian Kent
Alan Shuluga
Jim Wildenstein
13221GNRLLELECT
44315LRLCR 121OM
18403DVFFRJFKEN
Art Kaikkonen 71701LTVRSPOBOX
Art Kaikkonen 7505 l LTVRS 170 1 W
Art Kaikkonen
(972) 603-1742 Art Kaikkonen
(603) 885-6678
(603) 885-6678
(603) 885-6678
(603) 885-6678
(603) 885-6678
407.645.6514
Margo Seddon
Margo Seddon
Margo Seddon
Margo Seddon
Margo Seddon
Doug Wagner
613.391.2167 David McCleary
?03061SNDRSDWHWY
03051CLCMP65RIV
03054SNDRSDWHIG
03108LCKHD5PERI
32819TTMCR9333S
18031 PTLCT9999H
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142
ISO 14000
Lucent Lucent Technologies
Technologies
Lucent Lucent Technologies (Allentown
Technologies facility)
Lucent Lucent Technologies (Berkeley
Technologies Heights facility)
Lucent Lucent Technologies (Berkeley
Technologies Heights facility)
Lucent Lucent Technologies (Reading
Technologies facility)
Lucent Lucent Technologies Inc
Technologies Microelectronics Group Power
Systems
March Coatings, March Coatings, Inc. (Brighton
Inc. (Brighton facility)
facility)
Mark IV Mark IV Automotive
Automotive
Mark IV Mark IV Automotive
Automotive
Mark IV Mark IV Automotive
Automotive
Matsushita Matsushita Compressor Corp. of
America (Mooresville facility)
Matsushita Matsushita Electronic Components
Corporation of America (Knoxville
facility)
Matsushita Matsushita Refrigeration Company
of America (Vonore facility)
Matsushita Matsushita Semiconductor
McDonald McDonald Technologies
Technologies International Inc.
International Inc.
Micro Industries Micro Industries (Westerville
(Westerville facility) facility)
Micron Micron Electronics, Inc. (Boise
facility)
Micron Micron Electronics, Inc. (Nampa
facility)
Micron Micron Technology Inc.
Minolta advance Minolta advance Technology
Technology
Mitsubishi Silicon Mitsubishi Silicon America (Salem
America (Salem facility)
Mt. Olive New Jersey
allentown Pennsylvania
Berkeley Heights New Jersey
Berkeley Heights Pennsylvania
Reading Pennsylvania
Mesquite Texas
Brighton
Easley
Big Rapids
Walterboro
Mooresville
Knoxville
Vonore
Puyallup
Bonham
westerville
Boise
Nampa
Boise
Goshen
Salem
7828
7922
19612
19612
973 426-1348
610.715.5659
908.508.8156
610.939.7857
610.939.7857
Peter Grant
Bill Knolle
Ted Polokowski
Andy Straka
Andy Straka
Michigan
South Carolina
Michigan
South Carolina
North Carolina
Tennessee
Tennessee
Washington
Texas
Ohio
Idaho
Idaho
Idaho
New York
Oregon
29641
49307
29488
28115
75418
43081
83687
10924
97303
864-855-2025
616-796-2691
843-538-5941x254
704-664-8140
(423) 673-0700
Steve Louthan
Joe Forrest
Russell Revell
stan faires
mark Holt
18103TTMCR555UN
19612TTMCR2525N
75149TTMCR3000S
481 16MRCHC160SU
29641NCHRSWY93
49307FTZSM600DE
28115MTSSHONEPA
37914MTSSH5105S
423-884-1379 Steve Alvanas 37885MTSSH56EXC
98373NTNLS1 1113
972-243-6767 Thomas Varchese
914-294-8400
503-371-0041
Terry Syrek
Mary Milbrath
83706MCRNT2805E
83704MCRNT8455W
FacID OR0001947217
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TI
facility)
Molycorp, Inc.
(Mountain Pass)
Montenay Energy
NCR Corporation
NEC
Nellcor Puritan
Bennett Inc.
New Breed Leasing
Company
Niagara Mohawk
Niagara Mohawk
Niagara Mohawk
Niagara Mohawk
Niagara Mohawk
Niagara Mohawk
Niagara Mohawk
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
Molycorp, Inc. (Mountain Pass) Mountain Pass
Montenay Energy Resources of conshohocken
Montgomery County, Inc.
(Conshohocken)
NCR Corporation (Peachtree City Peachtree City
facility)
NEC Technologies Inc. McDonough
(McDonough facility)
Nellcor Puritan Bennett carlsbad
Inc./Hospital Manufacturing
Division (Carlsbad facility)
New Breed Leasing Company
Niagara Mohawk Power Scriba
Corporation (Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Generating Station, Units
I & 2)
Niagara Mohawk Power Tonawanda
Corporation (Nine Mile Point
Nuclear Generating Station, Units
I & 2)
Niagara Mohawk Power Albany
Corporation Albany Steam Station
Niagara Mohawk Power Dunkirk
Corporation Dunkirk Steam
Station
Niagara Mohawk Power Tonawanda
Corporation Huntley Steam Station
Niagara Mohawk Power Oswego
Corporation Oswego Steam Station
Niagara Mohawk Power Scriba
Corporation Oswego Steam Station
NIPSCO Angola Local Operating Angola
Area
NIPSCO Central Stores/Service Valparaiso
Center
NIPSCO Crown Point Local Crown Point
Operating Area
NIPSCO Fort Wayne Local Fort wayne
Operating Area
NIPSCO Gary Local Operating Gary
Area
92366MLYCRI15AN I
30269
30253
92008
27410
610-940-6000 Jay Lehr
770-487-7043 Steve Barker
760-603-5976 kelly O'Brian
California
Pennsylvania
Georgia
Georgia
California
North Carolina
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
New York
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
315) 428-6962
(315) 428-6962
315 -428-6962
(315) 428-6962
(315) 428-6962
219-647-5247
219-647-5247
219-647-5247
219-647-5248
219-647-5249
Chris Kolarz
Chris Kolarz
Chris Kolarz
Chris Kolarz
Chris Kolarz
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
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315-428-6962 Chris Kolarz
(315) 428-6962 Chris Kolarz
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
NIPSCO
Northrup
Grumman
Northrup
Grumman
Novus International
Inc. (Alvin facility)
OKI Semiconductor
Manufacturing
Osram Sylvania
Osram Sylvania
P.H. Glatfelter
Comapny
Pacific Bell
Pacific Bell
PacifiCorp
NIPSCO Goshen Local Operating
Area
NIPSCO Hammond Local
Operating Area
NIPSCO La Porte Local Operating
Area
NIPSCO Michigan City
Generating Station
NIPSCO Monticello Local
Operating Area
NIPSCO Peru Local Operating
Area
NIPSCO Plymouth Local
Operating Area
NIPSCO South Bend Local
Operating Area
NIPSCO Valparaiso Local
Operating Area
NIPSCO Warsaw Local Operating
Area
NIPSCO-Bailly Generating Station
NIPSCO-Liquified Natural Gas
Operations
NIPSCO-R. M. Schahfer
Generating Station
NIPSCO-Royal Center
Underground Gas Storage
NORTHROP CORP B2 DIV
Northrop Grumman Corporation,
Saint Augustine Site
Novus International Inc. (Alvin
facility)
OKI Semiconductor
Manufacturing
Osram Sylvania Products Inc.
Osram Sylvania Products Inc.
(Wellsboro facility)
P.H. Glatfelter Comapny
Pacific Bell
Pacific Bell Corporate Realestate
(San Ramon)
PacifiCorp (Naughton Plant)
Goshen
Hammond
La Porte
Michigan City
Monticello
Peru
Plymouth
South Bend
Valparaiso
Warsaw
Chesterton
Rolling Prairie
Wheatfield
Royal Center
Saint Augustine
Alvin
Versailles
wellsboro
Spring Grove
San Ramon
San Ramon
Kemmerer
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Indiana
Florida
Texas
Oregon
Kentucky
Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania
California
California
Wyoming
219-647-5250
219-647-5251
219-647-5252
219-647-5253
219-647-5254
219-647-5255
219-647-5256
219-647-5257
219-647-5258
219-647-5259
219-647-5260
219-647-5261
219-647-5262
219-647-5263
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
Jack Watkins
(904) 825-3543 Roger Payne
40383
16901
17382
94583
94583
606-873-7351
717-724-8200
717-225-4711
415 331-0924
John Young
Tom Lang
Neal Carter
Nancy Clancy
90660NRTHR8900E
77511 NVSNTFM291
1690 GTPRDI JACK
40383GTPRD900TY
307/828-4211 Mark Mansfield
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(Naughton Plant)
Parke-Davis Parke-Davis Research Ann Arbor
Research Ann facility
Arbor facility
Performance Performance Solutions
Solutions International Ltd.
International Ltd.
Philips Philips Consumer Electronics
Company (Greeneville facility)
Philips Philips Semiconductors
(Albuquerque facility)
Philips Philips Semiconductors
(Sunnyvale Facility)
Plasticolors, Inc. Plasticolors, Inc. (Ashtabula
(Ashtabula facility) facility)
QualComm QualComm Personal Electronics
Personal (San Diego facility)
Electronics (San
Diego facility)
Quality Chemicals, Quality Chemicals, Inc.
Inc.
Quality Chemicals, Quality Chemicals, Inc.
Inc.
Raychem Raychem Corporation, Polyswitch
Corporation, (Menlo Park)
Polyswitch (Menlo
Park)
Reichhold Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.
Chemicals, Inc.
Republic Metals Republic Metals Corporation
Corporation (Opa- (Opa-Locka facility)
Locka facility)
Ricoh Ricoh Electronics (Tustin)
Ricoh Ricoh Electronics Inc. (Fountain
Valley facility)
Ricoh Ricoh Electronics Inc. (Irvine
facility)
Rockwell Rockwell Automation
Automation
Rockwell Rockwell Automation
Automation
Rockwell Rockwell Automation
Automation
Rockwell Rockwell Automation
Ann Arbor Michigan
west Bloomfield Michigan
Greeneville
Albuquerque
Sunnyvale
Ashtabula
San diego
Tyrone
Schaumburg
Menlo Park
Bridgeville
Opa-Locka
Tustin
Fountain Valley
Irvine
Duluth
Milwaukee
Dublin
Highland
Tennessee
New Mexico
California
Ohio
California
Pennsylvania
Illinois
California
Pennsylvania
Florida
California
California
California
Georgia
Wisconsin
Georgia
Indiana
48105PRKDV2800P
48322
92121
16686
94025
810-661-4520
(505) 822-7678
(408) 991-4129
216-997-5137
619-657-2527
James Cochran
Glen Tsukamoto
814-684-4310 Diane Gormelly
415-361-4046 Chuck Culley
412-257-5700
305-685-8505
30095
53204
51021
46322
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
37744PHLPSSNAPA
87113SGNTC9201P
94086SGNTC81 lEA
44004PLSTC2600M
16686QLTYCINDUS
94025RYCHM980HA
15217KPPRSMILLE
Richard rubin 33054RPBLC12900
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
92705RCHLC23002
92714RCHLC17482
30136RCKWLI 800S
53204LLNBR 1201S
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Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Rockwell
Automation
Sanyo
Sanyo
Sanyo
Schneider
Schneider
SERMAcoat, L.L.C.
(Brighton facility)
SGS-Thomson
SGS-Thomson
SGS-Thomson
Sharp
Sharp
Sharp
Sharp
Sharp
Rockwell Automation Sumner
Rockwell Automation Mayfield
Heights
Rockwell Automation Mayfield
Rockwell Automation Twinsburl
Rockwell Automation Eau Clair
Rockwell Automation Mequon
Rockwell Automation Allen Dublin
Bradley Co. Inc.
Rockwell Automation Allen Eau Clair
Bradley Company Inc. (Eau Claire
facility)
Rockwell Automation, Allen- Highland
Bradley Company, Inc. Heights
Sanyo E&E Corp. (San Diego San Diego
facility)
Sanyo Energy Corp. (San Diego San diego
facility)
Sanyo Manufacturing Corporation Forrest cit
(Forrest City facility)
Square D Company (Oxford Oxford
facility)
Square D Pacifico San Lean
SERMAcoat, L.L.C. (Brighton Brighton
facility)
SGS - Thomson Microelectronics San Diego
SGS-Thomson MicroElectronics Phoenix
(Phoenix)
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, Carrolton
Inc. (Carrollton facility)
Sharp Electronics Corporation Camas
Sharp Laboratories of America Inc.
Sharp Manufacturing Company of
America
Sharp Manufacturing Company of Memphis
America (Memphis facility)
Sharp Microelectronics
Village
y
dro
Iowa
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Wisconsin
Wisconsin
Georgia
Wisconsin
Ohio
California
California
arkansas
Ohio
California
Michigan
California
arizona
Texas
Washington
Washington
Texas
Tennessee
Washington
44124
44124
44087
54703
53092
31021
54703
44087
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
414 382-3640
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
Majo Thurman
92173SNYCR2001S
72335
48116
92127
85022
75006
98055
870.633.5030 Stephen Sestina
619-592-8939
602-485-6328
972-466-6023
Pat Hoy
Peg Goodrich
Rick Coleman
45056SQRDC5735C
94577SQRD1998R
92127NRTHR 16350
85022SGSTH1000E
75006SGSTH 131 0E
38115
98607
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Solutia, Inc.
Sony
Sony
Sony
Sony
Sony
Sony
Sony
Sony
Sony
Sony
SouthTech
Synair Corporation
(Chattanooga
facility)
Synthetic Industries
(Chickamauga
facility)
Tivoly Inc. (Derby
Line facility)
Toshiba
Toshiba Display
Devices Inc.
Toyota
Toyota
Toyota
Toyota
Tytex Inc
Ultra Additives Inc.
Technology Inc.
Solutia, Inc. Alvin
Sony De Mexicali (Calexico Calexico
facility)
Sony Disc Manufacturing Springfield
(Springfield facility)
Sony Magnetic Products of Dothan
America (Dothan facility)
Sony Music (Pittman facility) Pittman
Sony Music Entertainment Inc. Carrollton
(Carrollton facility)
Sony Professional Products Boca Raton
Company (Boca Raton facility)
Sony Semiconductor Company of San Antonio
America (San Antonio facility)
Sony Technology Center (San San diego
Diego facility)
Sony Trans Com, Inc. (Irvine Irvine
facility)
Sony Video Corporation (Baja Baja
facility)
SouthTech Inc. (Tappahannock Tappahannock
facility)
Synair Corporation (Chattanooga chattanooga
facility)
Synthetic Industries (Chickamauga Chickamauga
facility)
Tivoly Inc. (Derby Line facility) Derby Line
Toshiba America Sunnyvale
Toshiba Display Devices Inc. Horseheads
TABC INC.
TOYOTA INDL. EQUIPMENT
MFG. INC.
TOYOTA MOTOR MFG.
KENTUCKY INC.
Toyota -- TABC, Incorporated Long Beach
Tytex Inc Woonsocket
Ultra Additives Inc. (Paterson Paterson
Texas
California
Oregon
alabama
New Jersey
Georgia
Florida
Texas
California
California
California
Virginia
Tennessee
Georgia
Vermont
California
New York
77512-9888 281 228-4000
36305
33487
78245
(561) 998-6810
210-647-6918
714-252-6762
Phil Winget 77511 HNTSMFM291
Shelly Greenstein
Ron Beauvais
36301 SNYMGHWY84
08071 SNYMS400NW
30117CBSRC5152C
78245DVNCD861 IM
92127SNYMN16450
92718SNYTR40PAR
22560STHTCAIRPO
(423) 697-0419 Jeff Gomberg 37406SYNRC2003A
30707
5830
14845
BEACH, CA 90805
COLUMBUS, IN 47201
GEORGETOWN, KY 40324
California 90805
Rhode Island 2895
New Jersey
802-873-3106 Michael Gaudreau 0583ONNBTTBAXTE
607 796-3500
LONG
Steve Castellana
562 984-3319 Dan Monette
401-762-4100 Richard Lutman
14845TSHBWWESTI
90805TBCNC6375P
47202TYTND55551
40324TYTMTlOOC
90805TBCN6375P
07543LTRDD460ST
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(Paterson facility)
United Paradyne
Corporation
(Vandenberg Air
Force Base)
United Waste Water
Services, Inc.
(Cincinnati)
US Steel
Vectron
International
Viking Pump Inc.
(Cedar Falls
facility)
Warner-Lambert
Co.
Westinghouse
Westinghouse
World Resources
Company (Pottsville
facility)
Xerox
Xerox
Xerox
Xerox
facility)
United Paradyne Corporation
(Vandenberg Air Force Base)
United Waste Water Services, Inc.
(Cincinnati)
US Steel
Vectron International
Viking Pump Inc. (Cedar Falls
facility)
Warner-Lambert Co.
Westinghouse Savannah River
Company (DOE site)
Westinghouse Waste Isolation
Division (DoE)
World Resources Company
(Pottsville facility)
Xerox Corporation (El Segundo
facility)
Xerox Webster Manufacturing
Operations (Webster facility)
Xerox X-link (Cincinnati facility)
Xerox X-link (Pittsburgh facility)
Vandenberg Air California
force Base
Cincinnati
Clairton
Hudson
Cedar Falls
Lititz
Aiken
Carlsbad
Pottsville
El Segundo
Webster
Cincinnati
Pittsburgh
Ohio
Pennsylvania
New Hampshire
Iowa
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
New Mexico
Pennsylvania
California
New York
Ohio
Pennsylvania
93437
45241
15025
3051
50613
17543
88220
805.734.2750 John Sipos
513-733-4666 David Weber
412-233-1015 Coleen Davis
603-577-6724 Joe Dufresne
717.627.9539 Charles Souders
(505) 234-8332 Steven C. Kouba
717-622-4747
15025SSCLR400ST
50613VKNGL7THBL
17543WRNRL400WL
29802SVNNH5CHIG
88220GRGRY1502G
17901WRLDRWALNU
90245XRXCR701 SO
14580XRXCR800PH
45242
15220
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Appendix 2: Company Interview Protocol
Good
My name is Jason Switzer. My research group at MIT, the Technology Business and Environment group, is
performing a study of ISO 14001 and its implementation in the US. We would very much like your
participation.
I have a few questions I would like to ask you. It will take about 30 minutes, perhaps less. Is this a good
time to talk, or should I call you at another time. When would you prefer, morning or afternoon ?
1. Who is your registrar, and when were you first registered ? How frequent is recertification ?
2. Why did you choose to adopt ISO 14001 ? Why undertake the additional effort of obtaining certification
? Supplier requirement ?
Foreign owner ? Customer Requirement ? ISO 9000 ? Leader Recognition ?
Laggard Reqt? Intl market access ? Other ? Improve EP ?
3. What process did you undertake to determine what aspects of your operations are 'significant' ?
4. Do you make any of your goals public ? What goals have you set for your management system ?
a. Transparency: How are you publicising your goals/use of standard ? How are they communicated to your
employees ? Were any outside stakeholders involved in goal-setting ?
b. Comprehensiveness and Stringency: How are they differenct to what you had in place prior to
certification ? Are you setting goals for regulated and unregulated aspects ? Do you think these goals will be
difficult to achieve ?
c. Sustainable: To what extent are you focusing on prevention of pollution/pollution prevention ? Are you
rethinking manufacturing processes, changing products, etc. as a result ?
d. Measurable: How specific are your goals in terms of timetables and performance metrics ?
5. What other tools from the ISO 14000 series are you employing or plan to employ? (EPE, LCA...)
6. What is CI ? What metrics do you use to demonstrate continual improvement ? (Is CI equivalent to
making progress towards your goals, or is it something different )?
7. What happens if you fail to show Continual Improvement ?
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Appendix 3: Registrar Interview Protocol
Good .
My name is Jason Switzer, from MIT. The Technology, Business and Environment group is beginning a
project to understand the impact of ISO 14000 on firms' environmental efforts. We would like your
participation.
Is this a good time to talk ? This will not take more than 20 minutes. Would you prefer that I call you
tomorrow morning or afternoon ?
Question:
1. Who have you registered and when ?
2. *How do you get accreditation ?
3. Why are firms adopting ISO 14001 ? Are customers requiring it ?
4. How frequently must firms be recertified ?
5. *Explain the certification process ? Who is involved ? Who signs the form at the end ?
6. What does it mean 'to demonstrate continual improvement'? Does that mean 'improvement of the
management system (i.e. more training, better data collection, more thorough analysis of aspects) or
progress towards goals established by the firm ?
7. What happens if a firm fails to show 'continual improvement' ? Can a firm be suspended ? Would you
suspend a client for non-conformances?
8. What kind of goals are being established ? Performance ? Management ? who is involved in process ?
*9. Some state regulators are considering offering regulatory flexibility to certified firms. What do you
think of the idea ? How would that change your role ?
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